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Abstract
Although Argentina does not rank badly in democratic indexes1, actual levels of institu-
tional quality in subnational units do not always scale down evenly. Some Argentinian
provinces and municipalities are truly obscure places in terms of law enforcement, bu-
reaucratic effectiveness, and state accountability. This thesis explores channels leading
to these pervasive institutional characteristics. I argue that some of these particulari-
ties can be rooted in subnational socio-economic and fiscal conditions. In the first two
chapters I broadly analyse unintended consequences from the Federal Tax-sharing Agree-
ment (FTSA) in Argentina. The FTSA, or “Coparticipation”, is the building block of
subnational finances, both for provinces and for municipalities. I posit that the current
system generates a number of effects, ranging from allowing mayors to rely on opaque tax
structures, to facilitating constitutional reforms to relax term limits in some provinces. In
the last chapter, this appetite for constitutional tailoring is further explored for Munici-
pal Charters (MC), connecting it to local levels of socio-economic segregation and spatial
inequality.
In the first chapter, the link between fiscal resource abundance and constitutional
reforms in Argentinian provinces is studied. I assert that fiscal (dis)organisation, in the
form of a careless FTSA, can have long-lasting repercussions. One particular feature of
provincial constitutions is closely traced: term limits. Using a formal theoretical model, a
political agency set-up is considered where term limits are endogenous to federal transfers.
Argentina provides us with a natural experiment to assess this. In 1983, after more than 50
years of institutional instability, provincial constitutions limited governors from running
for re-election. These exogenous term limits were inconvenient for many of these newly
appointed governors. Exploiting the timing of reforms, I suggest that those jurisdictions
with higher shares of FTSA per capita were among the first to reform constitutions to
relax term limits.
The second chapter explores yet another channel by which unearned revenues can
affect institutional settings. In this case, I examine the impact of windfall-like federal
transfers received from the Federal Solidarity Fund on the tax structure of municipalities
in Argentina after 2009. To better internalise the idea of revenue substitution, I use
a career concern model where the mayor, running for re-election, can mask her ability
relying on non-transparent tax bases. The emerging theoretical propositions are then
tested. By collecting a panel of 428 local governments over 2006-2017, I employ the design
of FFS distribution, based on fixed two-decades-old coefficients set in the FTSA, to apply
event case difference-in-differences. The main findings indicate that local mayors who
disproportionally benefited from FFS funds reacted by reducing and substituting direct
visible taxes.
Finally, the third chapter assesses the effect of local socio-economic segregation on
the probability of sanctioning Municipal Charters (MC) in Argentinian municipalities.
To identify the effect, I rely on the differential time gaps (in years) between the plausibly
19 out of 10 (for full democracy) in the Political Regime Score by Roser (2019).
iv
exogenous recognition of municipal autonomy, granted by provincial constitutional reform,
and the year when the municipality sanctioned its Municipal Charter. For that purpose, I
calculate the Gini Segregation Index (G) and Information Theory Index (H) using Census
2001 and 2010 data. Duration analysis is then applied to the 178 municipalities that have
adopted an MC out of more than 400 eligible. This allows us to explore the relationship
between local spatial inequality and the likelihood of having an MC. The findings seem to
support that economic segregation in education levels, poverty and unsatisfied basic needs
is correlated to adopting an MC in municipalities in Argentina.
v
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Introduction
In November 2001, while Argentina was plunging deep into one of its most notorious
recessions, in the province of San Luis a brand-new football stadium was being built. In a
province not particularly strong in football, with no team placed in the first, second or third
tier in national leagues, this project seemed grandiloquent. Surely, with poverty levels
reaching 61% in the region, there must had been better places to allocate the provincial
budget. To the casual observer, it must have been odd to see that while the country
was undergoing political and economic turmoil, in this province everything seemed to be
under control. Without knowing, this onlooker was witnessing the workings of an illiberal
democratic regime; latent corruption, co-partisanship subdued, manipulated judiciary, and
non-existent term limits.
Subnational authoritarian enclaves blended in democratic countries have been carefully
studied in the literature (O’Donnell (1993), Giraudy (2010), Gibson (2005), Gervasoni
(2010, 2018), Behrend (2011), Behrend and Bianchi (2017)). However, the causes of
continuity or reproduction of such “hybrid regimes” are less well understood. For instance,
Behrend (2011) studies “closed games” in Argentinian provinces, defined as cases where a
family (or group) controls key provincial democratic institutions (local legislature, media,
etc). These games follow a very distinct logic, and its reproduction cannot be easily halted,
neither by alternation in power (where new incumbents adopt not-so-different behaviour)
or by federal intervention. Alternatively, Giraudy (2010) argues that these subnational
undemocratic regimes survive because they serve national incumbents’ strategic political
interests. From a more financial perspective, Gervasoni (2010, 2018) links their survival
to the disproportional fiscal rents easily available to some governors (mainly in the form of
federal transfers). Either political connections or economic advantages allow these regimes
to have mechanisms that sustain their power. These ideas embody the main drivers of
this thesis. The fiscal channel is explored in the first two chapters; in the first one,
we note that such reproduction was institutionally blocked in provinces after 1983, as
governors were term-limited and re-election banned. Similarly, in the second chapter, we
show how municipal budgets rely heavily on supra-municipal transfers and how that tilts
municipal finances towards opaque tax instruments. In the third paper, we observe how
socio-economic factors are capable of explaining constitutional change. In a nutshell, in
this work I try to bridge institutional qualities of subnational units with aspects of fiscal
federalism, socio-economic structure, and tax effectiveness.
When trying to explain the secular decline in Argentinian economic wealth through-
out a century, Vito Tanzi argued that its problems were “mostly fiscal” (Tanzi, 2007).
Argentinian fiscal structure concentrates expenditures at the provincial level, while a bad
mixture of provincial taxes and centralised revenues at the federal level lead to a high
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI). These features have attracted scholars, and their
research has motivated this thesis2. On the one hand, the very existence of VFI implies
that subnational governments finance a big portion of their budgets with federal transfers.
2Institutional implications of fiscal arrangements for Argentina are better summarised by Ardanaz
et al. (2014).
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The literature on unearned revenues and the accountability effects is vast (for two com-
prehensive surveys see Ploeg (2011); Ross (2015)). Embedded in this scholarship is the
concept of “Rentier State” where ”...an abundant flow of oil revenues enables incumbents
to both reduce taxes and increase patronage and public goods, making it possible for them
to buy off a larger set of potential challengers and reduce dissent”(Mahdavy, 1970; Ross,
2001, 2015). The failures of subnational units to build cohesive institutions can be rooted
in such effects. Drawing on these concepts, Gervasoni (2010), one of the earliest influences
on this work, adapts this definition to “Rentier Provinces”: subnational units in command
of fiscal rents. These provinces, the author argues, have seen a detrimental reduction in
provincial democratic levels. The particularities of Argentinian fiscal system, on the other
hand, can be connected to the literature that explores the effects of decentralisation. The
positive effects of decentralisation (as in Oates (2008)) can be seriously undermined by
pervasive characteristics at the subnational level. Particularly relevant is the likelihood
of elite capture, the idea that certain vested interest-groups can redirect and appropri-
ate local institutions to benefit them in corrupt manners (for comprehensive surveys on
the effects of decentralisation see Mookherjee (2015); Mansuri and Rao (2012)). These
enormous strands of literature touch diverse aspects of the three chapters in this thesis.
The three papers in this thesis follow a similar methodology. They are primarily
empirical studies but coupled with theoretical models that guide the intuition and con-
nect empirical elements. In terms of the theory, in the first two chapters I use widely
popular political economy models. These models are motivated in the books by Persson
and Tabellini (2000, 2005); Besley (2005); Besley and Persson (2011b). In the first one,
in a political agency theoretical setting, the incumbent can actively pursue affecting the
probability of re-election by diverting funds from the provincial budget. A game where
incumbents can buy political support by investing in legislators is considered. This deci-
sion depends on a number of institutional features, but higher rents from office alter the
advantages of this “Political Confrontation”. In the second paper, a career concern type
of model is adapted to exploit the possibility of tax instruments with different levels of
visibility. The local mayor in this setting has three sources of revenues with different level
of visibility, two taxes and federal transfers. The non-salient part of the municipal budget
creates an underestimation of the true local revenues, which makes voters overestimate the
mayor’s ability. An exogenous increase in federal transfers not only accentuates this, but
also relaxes budget pressures, permitting some tax substitution. We show that the fully
observable tax is the most likely tax base to be replaced in such a scenario. Lastly, without
a model but guided by a theoretical framework, in the third paper, municipal charters are
thought to be the outcome of a number of socio-economic characteristics, in particular
local segregation. In this chapter, endogenous institutional change literature, the role of
elite capture in decentralised countries, the “Constitutional Contract Theory” (charters
seen as aggregations of citizen preferences), and a number of other possible explanations
are discussed.
In terms of the empirical strategy, the first two chapters use quasi-experimental designs
from natural experiments. In the first chapter, I combine the exogenous term limit faced
by incumbents after 1983, with a proposed instrument for federal transfers that exploits
2
military alterations. Following a similar structure to Galiani et al. (2016), the instrument is
obtained from aggravations, by military decree3, of an already non-proportional provincial
distribution of seats in Congress (our variable “Aggravated Malapportionment”). In the
second one, I use event case difference-in-differences generated by the combination of both,
the creation of a Federal Solidarity Fund in 2009 (FFS by its Spanish acronym) and the
form it was distributed to provinces using arbitrary coefficients from the FTSA of 1988.
This generated a differential influx of funds in municipalities only because of the different
provincial location. In the third chapter, I rely on the plausibly exogenous decision from
provinces to permit municipalities to dictate Municipal Charters, and the population
thresholds institutionally set, to analyse the time to reform as survival analysis.
One important contribution of this work has been the compilation of three brand
new datasets. For the first chapter, a provincial dataset was assembled containing fiscal,
economic and political variables over the period 1983-2014. This database builds on
the work by several authors which have gone remarkable distances to amass provincial
information4. For the second chapter, a newly data panel of 428 local governments in
Argentina was collected over 2006-2017. The key contribution of this dataset was the
disaggregation of subcomponents of municipal revenues. Multiple sources of municipal
data were scrutinised, mostly from municipal authorities5, but secondary sources, such as
provincial organisms, were also crucial6. A thorough search was performed for the entire
set of municipalities bigger than 10.000 habitants, in some crucial cases, emails, phone
calls and even letters by post were used. Finally, in the third chapter we compiled a panel
dataset for municipal segregation indexes and other socio-economic characteristics. These
local measures were obtained from census tracts in Census 2001 and 20107.
As previously mentioned, the first two chapters deal with unintended consequences
of federal transfers. In the first paper, titled “Rentier Governors: A Fiscal Theory of
Constitutional Reforms”, I argue that those jurisdictions with higher shares of FTSA per
capita were among the first to reform constitutions to relax term limits. Using a formal
model and the natural experiment for term limited governors, I suggest term limits may
be endogenous to federal transfers. The second chapter, “Resource Windfalls and Tax
Instruments. Evidence from Local Governments in Argentina”, examines the effect of the
exogenous implementation of the Federal Solidarity Fund in 2009 on the tax structure of
municipalities in Argentina. Using a formal model, we exploit the design of FFS distribu-
3In 1983, before calling elections, the minimum number of Deputies per province was increased to five.
4Just to mention a few, Russo (1997), Porto (2004), Calvo and Escolar (2005) and Tow (2016), and
the work by the School of Economics - Buenos Aires University (FCE-UBA) - Public Administration
Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones en Administracio´n Pu´blica (CIAP)). Constitutional reforms
and provincial laws information was more disperse. This portion of the data draws mainly on Almaraz
(2010), Lucardi and Almaraz (2017), Calvo and Escolar (2005), Altavilla (2017), and Liendo (2014)
5Official web pages either from municipalities, from local legislative councils, or from the municipal
audit office (if there was any). “The Wayback Machine”(http://http://web.archive.org/.), a digital
library with billions of stored web pages, allowed us to recover data from deleted or unused old websites.
6Provincial audit offices (Tribunal de Cuentas Provincial) that collect municipal budget information
in the provinces of Entre Rios, or Mendoza, or Provincial Statistics Directions such as in Neuquen. Or the
Provincial Council for Fiscal Responsibility in Chubut.
7These three dataset are available upon request.
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tion to apply event case difference-in-differences. We build a case showing that those local
mayors who received a disproportional influx of FFS funds reduced direct visible prop-
erty taxes, with no effect on total municipal revenues. Lastly, departing from the topic
of federal transfers, the third chapter -“Spatial Inequalities Shaping Institutional Design.
Municipal Charters in Argentina”- explores constitutional change at the local level, and
the findings seem to point that the probability of sanctioning Municipal Charters (MC)
is linked to local socio-economic segregation levels.
Finally, the workings of ineffective states are a flourishing area for research. Al-
though focused only Argentina, I acknowledge that the topics presented in this thesis
are widespread, especially in Latin America. Every so often, incumbents try to exploit
unaccounted funds, resource windfalls, or commodities booms to further their political
careers. Some of them build stadiums, others just buy-off opposition and write tailored
constitutions. The consequences are usually grim.
4
Chapter 1
Rentier Governors: A Fiscal
Theory of Constitutional Reforms
Abstract
Can disproportional fiscal rents perpetuate local politicians? In this paper, I
explore a subtle channel by which arbitrary fiscal arrangements can facilitate con-
stitutional reforms in term-limited Argentinian provinces. I use a political agency
model to analyse the decision of an incumbent to buy off legislators and to engage in
“political confrontation” with the purpose of affecting the probability of re-election.
Institutional features shape governor’s incentives, but higher exogenous rents alter
the advantages to political gambling. To put this theory to test, I compile a new
dataset on economic and institutional variables over 1984-2014. In the fragile return
of Argentina to democracy in 1983, all elected governors faced term-limited offices. I
combine this generalised re-election ban with a proposed instrument for federal trans-
fers that exploits aggravations of an already malapportioned Federal Congress made
by the departing military government. The empirical evidence indicates that higher
levels of federal transfers per capita increase the probability of relaxing term limits.
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1.1 Introduction
Careless design of fiscal federal arrangements can have far-reaching institutional reper-
cussions. This paper studies the effect of fiscal resource abundance, generated by dis-
proportionate federal transfers, on the likelihood of relaxing term limits in Argentinian
provinces. During the convulsed early 1980’s, the idea of constitutional reform as a process
for legitimisation of young democracies was widespread across Latin America (Nino, 1993;
Stotzky, 1989). In Argentina, after more than 50 years of democratic and political turmoil,
elected incumbents in 1983 saw themselves with a particular impediment: re-election was
banned. If they were to “survive” in power, they needed to amend provincial constitu-
tions. Did federal transfers affect the probability of constitutional reforms in term-limited
Argentinian provinces?
A large body of literature focuses on the intricacies of the so-called resource curse. This
research discusses the effects of “unearned” or “free resources” on institutional features (for
two comprehensive surveys see Ploeg (2011); Ross (2015)). One strand of this scholarship
explores the concept of “Rentier State”. First postulated by Mahdavy (1970), and further
developed by Ross (2001), it describes cases where ”...an abundant flow of oil revenues
enables incumbents to both reduce taxes and increase patronage and public goods, making it
possible for them to buy off a larger set of potential challengers and reduce dissent”(Ross,
2015). From a subnational perspective, for an incumbent who receives fiscal grants from
a tax-sharing agreement, the internalisation of that revenue resembles foreign aid; an
uncollected resource for which is not necessarily accountable. Behind this well documented
phenomenon lies the possibility of shifting fiscal responsibilities.
This paper argues that constitutional features can be rooted in the fiscal federal (dis)
organisation of a country. Argentina presents us with an opportunity to study this for term
limits. For institutional reasons, in 1983, Argentinian governors were banned from running
for re-election. This exogenous term limit faced by the ruling elite and the combined effect
of military alterations, to both the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement (FTSA) and to the
power in Federal Congress, offered a suitable empirical ground for work. By exploiting
these particularities, I assess the impact of automatic transfers from the federal government
on one crucial institutional pillar; provincial constitutions. I proceed in two steps. First,
I build a theoretical model that helps us better understand the effects of exogenous rents
on the probability of re-election. Second, in the empirical section, I study term limits
in Argentinian provinces, and I provide some evidence linking FTSA per capita with
the likelihood of relaxation of term limits. Lastly, to further explore causal mechanisms,
in the last section of the paper, I instrument federal transfers using the aggravation of
malapportionment in the National Congress after 1983 military modifications.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, based on Besley and Persson (2011a,b),
a political agency model is developed to make the turnover probability endogenous. This
is characterised by the decision of an incumbent to buy off legislators with the purpose
of affecting the likelihood of re-election. The incumbent can actively pursue this by di-
verting funds from the provincial budget. I add to this model in two ways. On the one
hand, I depart from the idea that turnover is related to political violence or armed con-
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flict. The concept of “political confrontation” is proposed, where the incumbent can alter
institutional settings by diverting funds and by exploiting legal channels. On the other
hand, in order to parallel the situation in Argentina in 1983, I modify the model so that
the incumbent in the first period cannot run for re-election unless she invests in political
confrontation. By doing this, I obtain clear-cut theoretical propositions to test with the
data.
The second contribution is empirical. An original panel dataset is built on fiscal,
political and economic variables over 1983-2014. In that period, 28 episodes of term-
limit modifications were identified, involving 20 out of the 24 provinces. I begin the
analysis by showing suggestive findings using survival analysis tools. In this framework,
relaxing term limits is seen as “failure” event, and provinces (or governors) start failing at
different points in time after 1983. While duration analysis uses a combination of cross-
sectional variation with the specific timing of reforms, I also take advantage of the panel
structure of the data. Thus, the Linear Probability Model (LPM) allows us to account for
provincial heterogeneity and time-invariant institutional factors. What stands out from
these specifications is the systematic and significant correlation between FTSA per capita
and the probability of reforming provincial Constitutions. I conclude this empirical section
by proposing an instrument for federal transfers; “Aggravated Malapportionment” inspired
by Galiani et al. (2016). This instrument helps us to build the case for causal effects
running from fiscally “Rentier Provinces” (Gervasoni, 2010, 2018) to local constitutional
modifications.
This paper relates to a strand of literature that links windfall-like fiscal transfers to
diverse outcomes, such as public spending, living standards, corruption and incumbency
advantage (Brollo et al., 2013; Litschig and Morrison, 2013; Ferraz and Monteiro, 2014;
Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Gadenne, 2017). Empirically, most of these studies use regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD) to tackle potential endogeneity of transfers. The design
of Brazil’s fiscal system seems to be particularly well suited for this: tax-revenue is mainly
redistributed to subnational governments on the basis of population, and the formula in-
cludes specific cut-offs. I extend this body of research to the Argentinian setting. I deal
with endogenous federal transfers by using an exogenous instrument generated by mili-
tary alterations to the number of legislators in the Federal Congress. By over representing
less populous provinces, the military government exacerbated an already malapportioned
Congress before calling elections in 1983.
Argentinian fiscal federalism has been carefully scrutinised in the literature, in particu-
lar for its high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (Porto and Sanguinetti (2001), Moskovits
and Cao (2012), Artana et al. (2012), Tommasi et al. (2001)). Previous studies show the
implications of fiscal arrangements in the institutional setting (for a survey see Ardanaz
et al. (2014)). These effects include, among others, malapportionment (Galiani et al.,
2008), incumbency advantage or power concentration (Calvo and Escolar, 2005), and re-
duction of accountability (Gervasoni, 2010). The contribution of this paper is proposing
an alternative consequence of inadequate fiscal arrangements, the facilitation of constitu-
tional reforms.
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Several studies use term limits or the number of re-elections as determinants of the
democratic structures (for applications in Argentina see Gervasoni (2009) and Ardanaz
et al. (2014)). The logic behind this research is sound; longer time-spans in power may
help the incumbent to increase her grip on institutions. However, given that in Argentina
in 1983 no province allowed for re-elections, term limits may be endogenous. Indeed, I
provide evidence that federal transfers affected the likelihood of reform. According to
the evidence presented, it is not possible to understand the perpetuation in power of
certain governors, or the characteristic strong executive branch, without connecting this
to the fiscal imbalance politically exploited by those incumbents. The same resources that
facilitated term limits reforms (in some cases permitting indefinite re-elections) may have
been used in subtle ways to undermine democratic institutions in the most vulnerable
jurisdictions.
Two works are closely related to the questions posed in this paper; Lucardi and Al-
maraz (2017) and Gervasoni (2010, 2018). Lucardi and Almaraz (2017) explain term limit
relaxation in Argentinian provinces by focusing on political control of the jurisdiction, and
the degree of opposition dispersion. The argument is compelling, but the mechanism at
work in this paper is different for three reasons. First, our period of analysis focuses only
on initial reforms that affected term limits. While some jurisdictions reformed more than
once, initial reforms are seen as game changers that altered the local constitutional land-
scape. Secondly, although it is acknowledged the political local game and its importance in
facilitating (or blocking) reforms, there is a case for a different channel allowing term limit
relaxation, the office-value originated from fiscal advantages. Third, and last, I contribute
to the empirical approach by using an instrument to better explore causal mechanisms
behind relaxing term limits. The research in Gervasoni (2010, 2018) provides empirical
support to the claim that provinces in command of fiscal rents (mainly in the form of fed-
eral transfers) have seen a reduction in democratic levels of accountability in Argentina.
According to the author, these rentier provinces are characterised by restrained political
competition (executive and legislative contestation) and high-power concentration on the
incumbent, in the form of multiple re-elections and provincial legislature control. Term
limits are used as determinants of levels of democracy, but in this paper it is argued that
term limits are endogenously determined by federal transfers.
Finally, as previously discussed, I exploit some characteristics of the democratic tran-
sition of the country in 1983. There is some research that closely looks at these democratic
alternations, or junctures, to explore the behaviour of elite groups. Examples of this line
of research are, among others, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Martinez-Bravo et al.
(2017). This literature highlights the different mechanisms and effects caused by the distri-
bution of political power when facing institutional change. While I do not look at specific
behaviour of vested-interest groups or political dynasties, the behaviour of term-limited
governors (provinces) and the appetite for constitutional tailoring is analysed.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides a theoretical
model to shed light on the relationship of “unearned” revenues and term limits. Section
1.3 studies at length the empirical approach. This long part of the paper is subdivided
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in several subsections that explore the institutional background (1.3.1), the reforms of
provincial constitutions (1.3.2), the initial empirical findings using Cox model and LPM
(1.3.3), and the proposed instrument for federal transfers (1.3.4). Finally, I conclude by
connecting the theoretical propositions to the empirical evidence.
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1.2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we proceed to model the behaviour of an incumbent on the decision to
use political influence to relax term limits. Drawing from Besley and Persson (2011b,a),
I begin by adapting the model to depart from turnover being determined by political
violence. A different channel is proposed, best described as “Political Confrontation”. In
this scenario, the incumbent manipulates institutional settings by spending on legislators.
The second modification involves the fact that the incumbent necessarily has the initiative,
otherwise she is banned from running as candidate. This pretends to simulate conditions
in Argentina in 1983, where re-election was not allowed. In this two-time period model,
it implies starting with a probability of turnover of one. The theoretical framework also
involves two groups (incumbent I and opposition O). The group in power in the first
period faces the decision to spend in public goods, in transfers to both groups, or in
buying off support in the Legislature (LI) with the aim of affecting the likelihood of
turnover. The interplay between the advantages of remaining in power and the costs of
political conflict will trigger confrontation. Crucially, how cohesive institutions are will
set a limit to intra-group transfers, and hence determine the office premium of being (and
remaining) incumbent.
Two equilibrium spaces are identified. First, in what we call “Restrained Incumbent”,
institutional constraints are tight, and public goods are highly valued. Most spending goes
to public goods and therefore there is no real motivation to keep office. There is rotation
in power. Second, we can potentially end up in the “Political Confrontation” scenario,
where some spending goes to transfers, and there are advantages on holding office. Given
these conditions, it is reasonable for the governor to spend on legislators trying to affect
the probability of turnover. However, the office premium will be compared to the cost of
confrontation. There will not be term limit relaxation if the advantages of remaining are
small relative to the costs of political confrontation. Term limit relaxation equilibrium will
occur just in the opposite scenario; high office premium. If that is the case, the incumbent
in period 1 will divert part of the budget to buy off Legislators and affect term limits. In
the following pages, we discuss this model in detail and derive our formal propositions.
1.2.1 A Reformer Model
There are two time periods s = 1, 2 with two identical groups (J = A,B) of individuals
which comprises half of the population each, and total population size is normalised to
1. At the beginning of period s = 1 one group holds power I1 ∈ A,B, which we call
the incumbent, and the other group is the opposition O1 ∈ A,B. Since there are only




s + α V (gs) (1.1)
Where xJs represents private consumption, and V (.) is the utility deriving from public
good consumption. It satisfies Inada-type conditions: increasing, concave, continuously
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differentiable, Vg(0) → ∞ as gs → 0, and Vg(∞) → 0 as gs → ∞1. The parameter α is a
shifter of the value of public goods, a constant parameter with 2 > α > 1. Importantly
for our results, this ensures clear ordering for preferences in corner solutions. For each
member of the group J = I,O, private consumption is given by net of taxes income y and
transfers rJs ,
xJs = (1− τ)y + rJs , J ∈ I,O (1.2)
Political institutions are modelled by adding a constraint to the incumbent. If rIs is
the transfer to the incumbent group, σrIs should be given to the other group.
rOs ≥ σrIs (1.3)
We assume that this fixed share σ ∈ [0, 1] is exogenously given. We think of it as Exec-
utive Constraints faced by the incumbent, when σ = 1, transfers between groups are the
same. The Government has a budget constraint from where there is spending in public
good, in transfers to groups, or in political influence in the (single chamber) Legislature
(gs; {xJs };ms). ms represents the extra cost of legislators, at salary w, in period one.
ms =
{
ωLI , if s = 1
0, if s = 2
Therefore, the budget constraint of the government is as follows:




Public revenues come from two sources: non-tax revenues R and taxes τ . R is an exoge-
nous source of income, for instance, windfall-like federal transfers. τ captures provincial
taxes on income y. We can express (1.4) in terms of the transfers:
rJ = βJ [R+ τy − gs −ms] (1.5)
If we define the parameter θ = σ1+σ ∈ [0, 12 ]2, we can obtain βI = 2(1−θ) and βO = 2θ.
As we can see, if θ = 12 , β
I = βO. On the other hand, if θ = 0 the incumbent can transfer
all to his own group. In other words, θ represents the restrictions on institutions in the
model, or the Executive Constraints.
Turnover Probability: The probability of turnover, γ is affected by spending in “po-
litical control”, understood as the number of legislators needed to surpass a majority
institutional threshold for constitutional reforms in the Legislature house (LI). Rather
than distinguishing between opposition and incumbent legislators, by generally specifying
(LI) we assume no party loyalty, a realistic assumption for divided and atomized op-
position in provincial parliaments in Argentina (see Lucardi and Almaraz (2017)). The
1We are using the notation setting the first derivative as ∂V
∂g
= Vg(.)
2From the equation R + τy = gs + ms +
rI+rO
2
, we replace rO = σrI , we solve for rJ using that
(1− θ) = 1
1+σ
and we get (1.5).
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incumbent can spend from the public purse in paying salary w to the extra legislators
(wLI). The probability of turnover is:
γ(LI) (1.6)
We make the following assumption on the gamma function:
Assumption 1: For all LI ∈ [0, Lˆ], we assume, γ ∈ [0, 1] and γL < 0, γLL > 0,
This assumption reflects the power of the incumbent to affect γ albeit at a decreasing
rate. Lˆ is an institutional minimum from which there is no point in exceeding that number
of legislators. For instance, the qualified majority voting thresholds for constitutional
reforms3. There exist LI ∈ [0, Lˆ] such that:
γ(LI) =
{
1 if LI = 0
0 ≤ γ(LI) < 1, if LI ∈ (0, Lˆ] (1.7)
We start off with γ(0) = 1, which can be interpreted as re-election banned on the first
period.
Timing The timing of the model is as follows:
• Incumbent (I1) is in power and nature determines parameters {θ, α, y,R, τ},
• I1 chooses a set of first-period polices {g1, rJ1 , LI},
• (1− γ(LI)) is determined,
• The new incumbent I2 chooses new policies {g2, rJ2 }.
We have to solve for a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. The quasi-linearity of the utility
function allows us to recursively solve the problem. At each time, the group in power
decides spending among public good, transfers and political conflict {gs, rIs , LI}. Thus,
we start by looking at the decisions of the group in power in period two, and then go back
to period one.
Substituting the above-mentioned constraints into the utility function (1.1), we get
period two maximization problem. Since there is no spending on LI , the incumbent
chooses the set of policies {g2, rI2} such that:
max
g2,rI2
αV (g2(α, θ)) + (1− τ)y + 2(1− θ)[R+ τy − g2(α, θ)] (1.8)
3Mathematically, we are thinking in terms of a function along the lines of γ(LI) = 2e−L
I − 1, for
Lˆ = ln 2.
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Period 2 - Public Good and Transfers Spending: From the FOC for g2 we get the
following solution:
αVg(g2) ≥ 2(1− θ) (1.9)
This reveals the trade-off for the incumbent between public good consumption, valued at




R+ τy, if αVg(R+ τy) > 2(1− θ)
0, if αVg(0) < 2(1− θ)
gˆ(α, θ) otherwise
(1.10)
By the property that Vg(0) → ∞ as gs → 0, there is always some level of public good
spending. Consequently, transfers in period two will be given by
rJ2 = β
J [R+ τy − gˆ(α, θ)] (1.11)
When the budget is entirely spent on public goods, rJ2 = 0, there is no advantage in
holding office. Both groups get the same utility from public good consumption. We will
use this for Proposition 1.
Period 1 - Political Conflict Decisions: In period 1, the incumbent additionally
faces the decision on LI spending. This will in turn increase the probability of being an





αV (g1(α, θ)) + (1− τ)y + βJ [R+ τy − g1(α, θ)− wLI ]
+ (1− γ(LI)) uI2(α, θ) + γ(LI) uO2 (α, θ)
(1.12)
As we can see, (1.12) involves two periods, with the subsequent probability of being
incumbent or opposition in the second period. Depending on institutional factors (α, θ),
these two future states will bring different utility to the current incumbent, factorised by
the probability of each state. From the FOC for (1.12) for the selection of LI we get:
− γI(L1) [uI2(α, θ)− uO2 (α, θ)]− λ1w ≤ 0 (1.13)
The opportunity cost of foregone spending λ1 is related to the incumbent’s decision
to spend on transfers and public good provision. With an interior solution, the marginal
cost of public funds will be the same. More generally:
λ1 = max{αVg(gs); 2(1− θ)} (1.14)
It is insightful to compare the indirect utilities for the two limit realisations of θ ∈ [0, 12 ].
If θ = 0, there are no restrictions in place for transfers. Therefore, the expected utility
difference will be (uI2(α, 0)−uO2 (α, 0) = 2[R+ τy− gˆ])4. On the other hand, if θ = 12 there
4
uI2(α, 0) = αV (gˆ) + 2[R+ τy − gˆ] + y(1− τ) and uO2 (0) = αV (gˆ) + y(1− τ)
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is no difference between expected utilities, i.e., (uI2(α,
1
2)− uO2 (α, 12) = 0)5. In general, we
have:
[uI2(α, θ)− uO2 (α, θ)] = ω2(1− 2θ)Z (1.15)
Where
Z =
[R+ τy − gˆ(α, θ)]
ω
(1.16)
Plugging (1.15) into (1.13), we can get the following expression:
− γL(LI) ω2(1− 2θ) ZI − λ1ω = 0 (1.17)
Where we can see that the decision to invest in political influence in period 1 is related
to the expected value of the wage-adjusted redistributive funds (Z) compared to the cost
of LI , adjusted for the opportunity cost of funds (−λ1w). However, from (1.17), spending




Considering that the decision to invest in LI is related to the size of the redistributive
“pie” in the next period (Z), we can get the following propositions:
Proposition 1: When public goods are highly valued, αVg(R + τy) > 2(1 − θ), the
incumbent makes no transfers. There is no advantage in holding office and there is no
investment in political conflict LI → 0.
Proof Proposition 1: When αVg(R+ τy) > 2(1− θ), we have a corner solution and
the budget is entirely spent on public good provision. Assume otherwise, and some level of
transfers are paid. The utility derived from these transfers will be given by 2(1− θ). But,
given condition (1.9), the incumbent will redirect spending from public good to transfers
if and only if αVg(R + τy) ≤ 2(1 − θ), which is a contradiction. Furthermore, given
the assumptions imposed on V (gs), transfers are only provided when there is an interior
solution.
Since we have gˆ(α, θ) = R + τy, by equation (1.16) and (1.15), we get Z = 0 and
uI2(α, θ) − uO2 (α, θ) = 0. In other words, there is no advantage in holding office. The
current costs of spending on Legislators is never covered by future benefits from transfer
differential in second period. Formally, since Z = 0 equation
−γL(LI) w2(1− 2θ) Z − λ1w = 0
is not affected by spending in LI . Therefore LI = 0 and γ remains 1; γ(0) = 1.
Proposition 2: For an interior solution, with θ < 12 , and given some level of spending





) = αV (gˆ) + [R+ τy − gˆ] + y(1− τ) and uO2 (1
2
) = αV (gˆ) + [R+ τy − gˆ] + y(1− τ)
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1. If Z ≤ Z¯, there is no investment in LI (LI = 0), and γ = 1,
2. If Z > Z¯, the incumbent invests in LI (LI > 0), and 0 ≤ γ(LI) < 1.
Proof Proposition 2: The proof of proposition 2 can be divided in two. First of all,










> 0 if Z > 0 (1.20)
This is the result of our Assumption 1. The expenditure on legislators is increasing on the
wage-adjusted funds being transferred Z. Subsequently, we have to prove existence of a




0, if − γI(0) 2(1− 2θ) Z − λ1 ≤ 0
LˆI(Z), if − γI(LˆI(Z)) 2(1− 2θ) Z − λ1 > 0
(1.21)
Therefore, the triggering point is:
Z(α, θ) =
−λ1
γL(0)2(1− 2θ) > 0 (1.22)
Since γL(0) < 0, it concludes the proof of the proposition.
In a scenario where the model leads to transfers, two different results can be observed.
On the one hand, it can be the case that buying off legislators is so expensive (high
w) compared to the future proceedings from office (Z), that there is no conflict. γ(0)
remains 1, and there is alternation in power. Alternatively, when returns of holding
office are sufficient, they can cover the present cost of Legislators in period one. In these
circumstances, the incumbent invests in LI to set 0 ≤ γ(LI) < 1 and relax term limits. In
Table 1.1 we can observe this more clearly, and gˆ represents an interior solution:
(A) Restrained incumbent (αVg(R+ τy) ≥ 2(1− θ)). Since everything is spent on public
goods, gˆ(α, θ) = R + τy, Z = 0 and there is no difference in future utilities for both
groups. As there is no spending on transfers, there is rotation in power and γ(0) = 1.
As we can see, this scenario is more likely to happen as θ → 12 .
(B) Political confrontation (gˆ(α, θ)): The model leads to transfers and there are advan-
tages in staying in power; i.e., [uI2(α, θ) − uO2 (α, θ)] = w2(1 − 2θ)Z. The final result
depends on how large Z is. We have two possible outcomes.
[a] No term limit relaxation (Z ≤ Z¯): The advantages of remaining in office are
small relative to the costs of political confrontation. In other words, they do not
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Table 1.1: Political Investments
Key Parameters Z ≤ Z¯ Z > Z¯
θ < 12 γ(0) = 1 0 ≤ γ(LI) < 1
compensate the cost of buying off legislators in the first period. Therefore, there is
no expenditure in LI , and γ(0) = 1,
[b] Term limit relaxation (Z > Z¯): The incumbent in period 1 decides to divert
part of the budget to buy off Legislators, in this scenario, 0 ≤ γ(LI) < 1.
Corollary 1: Given some levels of transfers, higher wages ω decrease the likelihood of
a constitutional reform affecting term limits.
When there are transfers in the model, the group in power compare the cost of buying
off extra legislators with the future benefits of holding office. w constitutes a direct
measure of the marginal cost the incumbent faces. The higher is the cost, measured in w,
the smaller will be this “pie” in the second period.
Corollary 2: With positive transfers, higher values for R increase the likelihood of an
incumbent pushing for a constitutional reform affecting γ, the probability of turnover.
The main effect of R runs through the increase of the ”redistributive pie” from which
the incumbent will make transfers.
For the proofs of Corollaries, we work with (1.16):
Z =
[R+ τy − gˆ(α, θ)]
w
Proof of Corollary 1: We need to prove that Z is decreasing in w:
dZ
dw
= − [R+ τy − gˆ(α, θ)]
w2
< 0 (1.23)








In the following sections we are going to contrast theoretical results with modifications
of term limits in Argentinian provinces after 1983.
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1.3 Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Reforms
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the study of the impact of automatic transfers
from the Federal Government on the probability of reforming constitutions with re-election
aims. The theoretical propositions in the previous section are put to the test through the
lens of fiscal and institutional data in Argentina. The analysis is divided into four. We
start with a short description of the Argentinian fiscal system; we show that transfers
from the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement (FTSA) are crucial for subnational provincial
budgets. Then we move on to study constitutional reforms. While in 1984 re-election was
banned in all provinces, slowly but surely most jurisdictions relaxed term limits in the last
30 years. We continue by showing some initial findings. We explore discrete-time survival
analysis using a combination of cross-sectional variation with timing of reforms, and then
exploiting the panel structure of the dataset. Lastly, we propose an instrument for federal
transfers, “Aggravated Malapportionment” inspired by Galiani et al. (2016), to argue for
causal effects.
1.3.1 Argentinian Fiscal System
This section presents a brief summary of Argentinian’ fiscal, economic, and political struc-
ture. The main purpose is to scratch the surface of a complex federal system and to set
the framework for the analysis of provincial reforms (for a detailed study see Porto and
Di Gresia (2012) or Porto (2009)). Argentina is a federal country formed by three dif-
ferent levels of government: Federal, Provincial and Municipal. Provinces pre-existed the
Nation6 and consequently enjoy ample constitutional power when it comes to spending
and tax collection.
The historical process of how fiscal responsibilities evolved in time is best summarised
by Porto (2009). The author distinguishes three periods of federalism in Argentina: “Com-
petitive Federalism”, “Cooperative Federalism” and “Coercive Federalism”. The “Coer-
cive Federalism” period started by early 1970’s, and it was (and still is) characterised by
strong intervention by the Federal Government in fiscal affairs, and a structure of trans-
fers with no parliamentary discussion and halfway corrections. The current picture is that
of a complex system with a pronounced vertical fiscal imbalance due to centralisation of
revenues and decentralisation of expenditures7. This clashing structure of revenues and
expenditures pushes provinces to a constant deficit (Porto and Di Gresia, 2012; Ardanaz
et al., 2014), which is partially covered by transfers from the tax-sharing regime (FTSA -
Coparticipation).
6At the moment of the first Constitution 1853, there were 14 provinces, which then evolved to 23 plus
the City of Buenos Aires (capital of the country). In this work they will be considered as 24 jurisdictions.
7The National Constitution regulates the distribution of taxing capabilities, where the Federal Gov-
ernment retains the power to levy imports and exports duties (trade taxes), and there is concurrent power
with the provinces when it comes to indirect taxation. In its Article Nro. 75, the Constitution establishes
that provinces can use direct taxation. In practice, provincial governments have delegated this responsibil-
ity in the Federal Government. Following an opposite path, provinces face a wide range of responsibilities;
they supply “visible” local public goods such as education, health, housing, and infrastructure, among
others.
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The backbone of Argentinian’ fiscal structure is the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement
(FTSA) system. The grant structure allocates funds from a pool of taxes to provinces8.
Provincial shares, participations, are far from objective: they are a mixture of a Law from
1988 and subsequent “Fiscal Pacts”. Modifications to the system are almost deadlocked;
they require not only the approval of the Congress (both Chambers), but also from the
President and from each Governor. This zero-benefit game has proved difficult to over-
come. By constitutional mandate in 1994, a new Law establishing the new structure of
provincial shares should have been passed before 1996. Nowadays, more than 20 years
after that deadline, this Law has not been sanctioned.
It has not always been like this. One of the milestones of the Federal Tax Share Agree-
ment in Argentina was the sanction of Law 20,221 in 1973 (Saiegh and Tommasi, 1998;
Porto, 2004). For the first time in the fiscal history of the country, the allocation criteria
for the common pool of taxes, the so-called secondary distribution9, was determined by
objective indicators. Each province would receive a share of total funds determined by a
combination three factors: development gap10 (25%), demographic dispersion (10%), and
population (65%). Even though sanctioned by a military government, the “Law-Accord
for the Coparticipation of Federal Taxes” was ratified and prolonged until 1983 by the Na-
tional Congress, democratic at that moment. This reflects the fact that negotiations with
provincial leaders were in operation before its sanction (Porto, 2004). By construction,
this reform favoured both underdeveloped and unpopulated provinces, at the expense of
advanced ones. This Law would last for 10 years, and even though it was modified in
1980, this redistributive principle remained until 1984. The period that goes from 1985
and 1987 was plagued by negotiations and short-term agreements between governors and
the Federal Government. It led to a vulnerable grant system. In January 1988 a new
Law was passed and it is still the main body of norms that regulates the system. These
three years of negotiations are key for our identification strategy, therefore a more detailed
analysis of this period is in Section 1.3.3.1.
From a political perspective, the country experienced more than 50 years of political
turmoil. From 1930 to 1983, democratic governments where more or less frequently re-
placed by military counterparts. Thus, most of the fiscal arrangements that Porto (2009)
mentions in many cases were not democratically supported. The period of democratic
stability came only after 1983. One peculiar consequence of this instability is that at the
end of 1983 re-election was banned at provincial and federal levels. In the next subsection,
we will explore provincial constitutional reform and the pursuit of abolishing term limits.
1.3.2 Reforms to Term-limited Provincial Constitutions
In the period that goes from 1984 to 2014 (31 years), a total of 28 episodes affecting term
limits have been identified. They involve 20 out of the 24 jurisdictions in the country.
8Primarily income tax and VAT, but the confluence of several taxes to the pool constitutes a
“Labyrinth” (Tommasi et al., 2001)
9Primary Distribution is between the Federal Government and Provinces.
10Defined as the difference in wealth with the most developed jurisdiction in the country, interpreted by
an index closely related to Development Human Index (see Porto (2004) for further details on calculations.)
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Notes: This Figure portraits the probability of “surviving” past time t, starting from 1984 (Time 0).
Tierra del Fuego and the City of Buenos Aires do permit one re-election, but they are not
considered reformers as both jurisdictions were “born” with constitutions with re-election
clauses. Previous to the year when their jurisdictional status changed (1991 for Tierra
del Fuego and 1996 for City of Buenos Aires)), governors were appointed by the Federal
Government. Using that sub-sample of 22 provinces, only Mendoza and Santa Fe currently
ban re-election11.
We can distinguish two waves of reforms: the early-reformers that started as soon
as 1986, just three years after the return to democracy, and the wave in 1994, where 5
provinces passed constitutional reforms. In Figure 1.1 we show the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor, a non-parametric estimate of the probability of survival past time t. In 1984, time 0
in Figure 1.1, 22 provinces were at “risk” of reforming their constitutions. While in 1993,
the probability of survival was 0.5455, by 1994 that probability had dropped to 0.3182.
As we will see later, the Federal Constitution was reformed that year, and it formally
demanded provinces to reform their constitutions to permit municipal autonomy.
11This dataset draws mainly on Almaraz (2010), Lucardi and Almaraz (2017), Altavilla (2017), and
Liendo (2014). A number of discrepancies were found and cleaned. For instance, in the work of Ardanaz
et al. (2014), Formosa is considered as having term limits where own investigations have found that the
reform in 2003 included indefinite re-elections in its Article 132. Similarly, the authors consider that Salta
allows one re-election, when it allows for 3 terms in office. We also find some differences with Liendo
(2014)’s study of reforms to provincial constitutions. We have that Salta reformed the constitution in
1986, but it did not affect term limits; re-election was included in the reform of 1998 by Juan Carlos
Romero. Similarly, when comparing figures with the work of Almaraz (2010), by 2007 the author affirms
there were only two no-term-limited provinces, while there were three (Catamarca, Formosa and Santa
Cruz).
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1983 Initial change Second change
Notes: This Figure shows the maximum number of potential years in office, subject to winning a re-election
bid. 20 years is used for no term limits. * La Rioja and San Luis reduced from no term limits to one re-election.
** In Cordoba, La Pampa and Tucuman, Eduardo Angeloz, Ruben Marin and Jose Jorge Alperovich ruled for
three consecutive periods, even though the constitution only permits one re-election.
When faced with term limits, governors can skilfully conjure up constitutional devices
to circumvent bans. Out of the 28 partial or complete reforms, four cases involved am-
biguous (but lawful) interpretations of the fundamental Law; Cordoba in 1991, La Pampa
in 1998, Santa Cruz in 1998, and Tucuman in 2006. In Cordoba, provincial judges inter-
preted that the new constitutional term limit only applied to the period under the rule of
the new constitution (dated 1987); Angeloz’s re-election as governor of Cordoba in 1987
was considered as if it were the first term. He was permitted to run and he effectively
won in 1991. Ruben Marin in La Pampa used a similar approach, but he went through
the provincial legislature. He pursued a partial modification on “re-election of governor
and vice-governor” clause, and while total term limits were unaffected, the Law Nr. 1812
established period 1995-1999 as first term under the new constitution. He was authorised
to run for re-election and he won. In Santa Cruz, unlimited re-election in 1998 was in-
troduced by mechanisms not stipulated in the constitution (via referendum). Lastly, in
Tucuman, the reform in 2006 included an Article (Nr. 159) that clarified that what fol-
lowed was the first term. Thus, Jose Alperovich could run for three consecutive periods.
Figure 1.2 depicts the current situation in terms of the potential mandate for governors
across provinces.
The requirements for constitutional reforms are fairly similar across provinces (Al-
maraz, 2010; Lucardi and Almaraz, 2017). They can be grouped in two stages. The first
step involves a provincial Law calling for constitutional reform. It normally includes spe-
cific details, such as the scope of reform (partial or complete), articles affected, and the
request for Constitutional Assembly. This type of modifications normally demand “qual-
ified majority” or 2/3 of the legislature votes (by both chambers in case it is a bicameral
20
system), but some provinces even demand 3/4 for complete reforms (i.e., Santiago del
Estero). In the second step, the Constitutional Assembly is elected, the new constitution
(or article) drafted, and the reform voted.
In Table 1.2, we detail modifications to provincial constitutions that affected term
limits. We use the year the constitution was effectively sanctioned, although the time
between the provincial Laws mandating reform and the constitution being sanctioned can
substantially differ. We prefer this identification of the event for two main reasons. First
of all, it is not guaranteed that when a reform has been called (by the legislature), it
will effectively involve relaxing term limits. Corrientes (1993), Salta (1986), Santiago del
Estero (1986), and Tucuman (1991) are examples of new constitutions with no alteration
on term limits. Second, even if it does explicitly include relaxation of term limits, it is
not certain that this reform will be sanctioned. Misiones in 2006 is an example of this,
not only a Law calling for amendment passed, but also the Constitutional Assembly was
formed. The reformers decided that there was no need for constitutional reform and
ratified Article 110 of previous constitution (one re-election limit). In addition, in Table
1.2 we also include two cases that went in the “wrong” direction, reducing term limits
from unlimited re-elections clauses (San Luis and La Rioja), and four cases where the
initial reform did not relax term limits. Four provinces relaxed term limits more than
once (Formosa, Salta, San Juan and Santa Cruz).
One crucial concern arises when comparing more than one reform per jurisdiction.
After initial reforms, semi-flexibility was incorporated to some constitutions (for instance,
La Rioja, Rio Negro, San Juan and San Luis (Corbacho, 1998)). In San Juan, the new
article 277 of the 1986 reform introduced the figure of one-article amendment, and 2011
term-limit extension made use of it12. By comparing successive reforms, we will in part
be capturing the effect of newly relaxed constitutional requirements. From a different per-
spective but with similar effects, Calvo and Micozzi (2005) find evidence that incumbency
bias was introduced by constitutional and electoral reforms in Argentina provinces. In a
scenario of increasing power concentration on the executive branch, subsequent reforms
for the same jurisdiction are not necessarily comparable as the political game has been
inclined in favour of the incumbent. In order to effectively assess the political impact on
the likelihood of reforms, we restrict the analysis to 20 episodes of first modifications.
12One-article amendment adds flexibility to constitutions facilitating partial reforms. In this case,
it incorporates the possibility of reforming one single article of the constitution. In addition to 2/3 of
Legislators, the article 277 also demands popular vote in the “first subsequent election”. It is relevant to
notice that the 2011 modification of term limits was entirely based on this flexibility; only article 175 of
1986 Constitution was modified.
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1 Buenos Aires 1994 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1993 11488 Provincial web page
2 Catamarca 1988 Unlimited Constitutional Reform 1988 4522 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
3 Chaco 1994 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1993 3952 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
4 Chubut 1994 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1993 3924 Lucardi and Almaraz (2017)
5 Co´rdoba 1987 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1986 7420 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
6 Co´rdoba 1991 Clause interpretation
7 Corrientes 1993 Unaffected Constitutional Reform 1992 4593 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
8 Corrientes 2007 Re-election Constitutional Reform 2006 5692 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
9 Entre R´ıos 2008 Re-election Constitutional Reform 2007 9768 Provincial web page
10 Formosa 1991 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1988 783 Provincial web page
11 Formosa 2003 Unlimited Constitutional Reform 2002 1406 Provincial web page
12 Jujuy 1986 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1985 4158 Lucardi and Almaraz (2017); Carrera (2001)
13 La Pampa 1994 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1993 1523 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
14 La Pampa 1998 Clause interpretation
15 La Rioja 1986 Unlimited Constitutional Reform 1984 4469 Lucardi and Almaraz (2017)
16 La Rioja 2008 Re-election Ammendment 2007 8135 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
17 Misiones 1989 Re-election Ammendment 1988 2604 Provincial web page
18 Neuque´n 1993 Re-election Ammendment 1993 2039 Provincial web page
19 R´ıo Negro 1988 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1986 2087 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
20 Salta 1986 Unaffected Constitutional Reform 1984 6269 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
21 Salta 1998 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1997 6955 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
22 Salta 2003 Two re-elections Constitutional Reform 2003 7232 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
23 San Juan 1986 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1985 5419 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
24 San Juan 2011 Two re-elections Ammendment 2011 8199 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
25 San Luis 1987 Unlimited Constitutional Reform 1986 4702 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
26 San Luis 2007 Re-election Ammendment 2006 XII-0545-2006 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
27 Santa Cruz 1994 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1994 1887 Lucardi and Almaraz (2017)
28 Santa Cruz 1998 Unlimited Ammendment 1998 2481 Lucardi and Almaraz (2017)
29 Santiago del Estero 1986 Unaffected Constitutional Reform 1985 5500 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
30 Santiago del Estero 1997 Re-election Constitutional Reform 1997 6377 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
31 Tucuma´n 1991 Unaffected Constitutional Reform 1988 5903 Provincial web page
32 Tucuma´n 2006 Re-election Constitutional Reform 2004 7469 Sistema Argentino de Infomacio´n Jur´ıdica (SAIJ)
Notes: This table includes constitutional reforms considered in this paper. It is not a comprehensive account of all constitutional reforms or amendment attempts, but only of those reforms that affected term
limits. I also include 4 constitutional reforms that did not relax term limits but they were sanctioned before term limit relaxation in that jurisdiction (in bold letters). In italics, I include (lawful) interpretations
of the first period affected by the reformed constitution where both incumbents managed to be re-elected for second time, even though they were term limited. Constitutional Reform Year is the official year the
constitution was sanctioned. Term Limit Clause indicates the type of term limit relaxation. Strategy Adopted shows whether the reform took place via a constitutional reform (total or partial) or via amendment.
Law Mandating Constitutional Reform Year is the year that the provincial law requiring the reform was passed. Provincial Law number is Law Number.
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1.3.3 Initial Findings. Discrete-time Survival Analysis for Provinces
and Governors
The following section examines the relationship between FTSA per capita and the proba-
bility of relaxing term limits using discrete-time survival analysis. We model the relaxation
of term limits as “failure” events, and units, either provinces or governors, start failing
at different points in time. Survival analysis seems appropriate in this case as there is
very little cross-sectional variation at the level of provinces; 20 out of 22 jurisdictions have
relaxed term limits. Timing of these reforms can reveal some information. First, in order
to correctly identify the effect, in subsection 1.3.3.1 we discuss at length the particular
characteristics of Argentina in 1984 that allow us to connect federal transfers and the
likelihood of reform. We next introduce and explain our main variables of interest, which
breathe life into the theoretical model in Section 1.2. After that, we use discrete-time
survival analysis to explore correlations. We employ two different approaches. In the first
one, we use the widely popular Cox model to incorporate the effect of time in the sur-
vival of term-limited provinces. We include a number of alternative model specifications,
such as different definitions of the event or shorter periods. In the second one, we con-
sider provincial heterogeneity across provinces by exploring the Linear Probability Model
(LPM)13. Across all specifications, we present two alternative “subjects” of failure or units
of analysis; governors and provinces. While the number of failures is 20 in both cases, this
convenient modification allows us to move from 22 jurisdictions in “risk” of reform, to 113
term-limited governors.
As a preview of the following analysis, in Figure 1.3 we disaggregate the Kaplan-Meier
survival estimates using different percentiles of the distribution of FTSA per capita. Panel
(a) shows the probability of surviving for the top 25% provinces that received higher
FTSA per capita in 1984, compared to the survival estimate for the remaining provinces
(75th percentile). Likewise, in panel (b) we grouped provinces in two: the dashed line
corresponds to the survival estimate for the top 50% of provinces who benefited the most
from automatic transfers from the Federal Government in 1984, and the solid line contains
the other half of jurisdictions. As we can observe, the divergent rates in the survival
functions are shorter for higher level of transfers.
1.3.3.1 Identification strategy
Two particular institutional features of Argentina after 1983 set the ground for our empir-
ical strategy. First and foremost, we exploit the exogenous term limit faced by the ruling
elite that took office, combined with the effect of a perceived more stable democracy.
Secondly, we utilise two modifications made by the military government before calling
elections in October 1983: the aggravation of malapportionment and the changes to the
Federal Tax-sharing Agreement of 1973. This indeed implied a serious modification on
the main structure by which the Federal Government transferred funds to provinces. In
1984, the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement had mutated to a fragile system, uncorrelated
13In Appendix A.4 we discuss methods to study time-series cross-section data with binary dependent
variables (BTSCS). We particularly look at the fixed effect logit, also known as a conditional logit.
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Notes: This Figure highlights the different survival probabilities for percentiles of the distribution of FTSA
per capita. The dashed line is used to show top percentiles.
to objective indicators.
Enduring Democracy: After more than 50 years of institutional instability, the general
elections in 1983 marked the return of the country to the democratic path. This time
democracy would last. According to Gerchunoff and Llach (2010), the country had finally
reached institutional consent on democratic rules. This was a result of a combination of
factors. First of all, after six years of civil repression and economic collapse, the military
government lacked substance or justification to remain in power, worsened by the defeat
with Great Britain in the Malvinas/Falkland war in 1982 (Garro, 1993). Secondly, the
triumph of Unio´n Cı´vica Radical (UCR) over the Partido Justicialista (PJ) signalled the
return to the centre of the political spectrum14. Thirdly, and most importantly, President
Raul Alfonsin’s figure and his compromise with building democratic institutions were
clear from the beginning (Nino, 1993; Garro, 1993; Stotzky, 1989; Gerchunoff and Llach,
2010). His initial agenda followed two substantial points: the decision to carry forward a
thorough investigation on past human right abuses, in the so called “dirty war”(including
an exemplary trial in 1985), and the creation of the Council for the Consolidation of
Democracy (Garro, 1993).
The idea of constitutional reforms as a process for the legitimization of young democ-
racies was part of a general wave across the continent in the early 1980’s (Nino, 1993;
Stotzky, 1989). In this fragile bloom, the elected incumbents in 1983 in Argentina, both
at the national and at the provincial level, saw themselves with a particular institutional
limit; re-election was banned. Provincial governors were practical enough to take advan-
14The UCR and the PJ are the two largest national parties in the country. Although both forces are
best understood as catch-all and policy-shifting parties with federal scope, the UCR can be identified as a
middle-centre party, while the PJ is more a working-class party (Jones et al., 2000)
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tage of this institutional transition; if they were to “survive” in power, they needed to
reform provincial constitutions.
Military Government Alterations: Unlike previous military governments, the 1976-
1983 dictatorship made two important changes to the balance of political power and to
the distribution of federal funds to provinces. On the one hand, before calling general
elections in 1983, by Decree 22,84715, the minimum number of Deputies per jurisdiction
was increased from 4 to 5 in an attempt to reduce political power to the Justicialist
Party (PJ by its Spanish acronym)(Galiani et al., 2016). The new National Congress
exacerbated malapportionment as small provinces increased their representation. On the
other hand, by a combination of factors, ranging from outdated coefficients (established
in 1973), the implementation of pre-coparticipations (specific detractions from the general
pool of taxes), and careless design of certain Laws16, the system in place for federal
transfers since 1973 had changed to something new in 1984. The range of modifications
not only involved the primary distribution but also the coefficients that corresponded to
each province (secondary distribution) (Porto, 2004).
By reducing the total amount of funds received by provinces, the military government
effectively hollowed out the 1973 Coparticipation Law. Combined with the new redis-
tribution of seats at the National Congress, this made negotiations substantially more
difficult. After 1984 provinces and the Federal Government could not reach a new accord
and the Law effectively expired17. The inherited structure resulted in a period of fiscal
disorganisation with extended use of discretionary national treasury contributions (ATN
- Aportes del Tesoro Nacional). In practice, the system entered into chaos in 1985. This
period finished in January 1988 with the sanction of the new tax-sharing agreement, Law
23,548 “Federal Coparticipation Law”. Based on Porto (2004), in Figure 1.4 we can get an
idea of the stark contrast between Law 20,221 coefficient distribution (normalized to 100)
and what provinces obtained from the Federal Government in 1984. As we can observe,
ATNs would become an important part of federal transfers to provinces in 1984-87 period.
If Law 20,221 coefficients were based on an objective distribution criterion, 1984 transfer
allocation had significantly departed from that purpose.
15July 1983.
16Especially Law 22,293 in 1980. This Military Law reduced the share of funds received by provinces
vis-a-vis the Federal Government (primary distribution). According to (Porto, 2004), this Law implied
a transference of 4.5% of total federal pool of taxes in the first year, and an additional 11.4% in 1981.
Always in favour of the Federal Government.
17On December 1983, Law 20,221 was unilaterally prorogued for an extra year.
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Law 20,221 (1973) ATN* plus coefficient distribution in 1984
Notes: In this Figure we contrast two distributions of Federal Funds, following Law 20,221 and using 1984
criteria. Law 20,221 (1973) coefficients are normalised to 100. Based on coefficients in Porto (2004). *Aportes
del Tesoro Nacional (ATN) are national treasury contributions.
Reformers vs Negotiators in 1985-1987: federal transfers can be endogenous to
economic and political factors. Difficult to measure, political ability of some governors
can explain both a higher coefficient of per capita transfers from the Federal Government
and a provincial constitutional reform. If so, timing is of concern. Detecting a governor
that first negotiated fiscal transfers, and once those funds were captured proceeded to relax
term limits, would weaken the argument for the direction of the effect. We would argue
that stability in the grant system would only be gained after 1988. We see discretionary
funds in the absence of legal regime (in the form of ATN or any other arrangement) as
unstable in nature, negotiable, temporal, and subject to conditions.
In order to tackle these concerns, we can split the sample in two, before and after
the sanction of Coparticipation Law 23.548 (see the historic timeline in Table 1.3). After
1988, along the lines of Besfamille et al. (2017), we can rule out governors endogenously
determining FTSA per capita. The reason is simple: coefficients have remained relatively
unaltered and constant for the entire period after the 7th January 1988. Even more, given
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Table 1.3: In Between Two Coparticipation Laws
1973 • Sanction of Coparticipation Law 20,211.
•
1976 • Military Coup.
•
1980 • Coparticipation Law alteration: Law 22,293.
•
1983 • Coparticipation Law 20,211 prorogued one year.
• Military Decree 22,847. 5 minimum number of seats per province in Congress.
• Democratic Elections in October.
1984 •
1985 • Collapse of FTSA system. Absence of a legal regime for federal transfers.
• Discretionary use of National Treasury Contributions (ATN).
1986 • Term limit relaxation in Jujuy, La Rioja and San Juan.
• Temporary Financial Agreement.
1987 • Term limit relaxation in Cordoba and San Luis.
• Provincial elections.
1988 • New Coparticipation Law 23,548.
•
2014 • Coparticipation Law 23,548 still in place.
Notes: This Table displays a timeline for the convulsed transition from the 1973 FTSA (Law 20,221) to the 1988
FTSA (Law 23,548). From 1976 to 1983 the country was ruled by military government. Term limits were relaxed in
five provinces occurred before 1988.
that these coefficients are independent from any economic or political determinant, we can
reject the possibility of incumbents affecting institutional or economic variables with the
aim of increasing their share in the secondary distribution.
A period of intense bilateral negotiations between provinces and Federal Government
occurred before 1988 (Saiegh and Tommasi, 1998). As we can observe in Table 1.3,
provinces entered 1985 with no legal system regulating the distribution of the centrally
collected pool of taxes. With no institutional or legal support, the Federal Government
continued transferring funds on a daily basis until the sanction on 1985 Federal Budget
(Porto, 2004). After a chaotic 1985, a Temporary Financial Agreement was reached in
March 1986. Undoubtedly, it was an improvement from the previous year, but it never
reached institutional consistency to a level comparable to Coparticipation Laws (20,221
and 23,548)18. The potential problem of finding an able governor manipulating federal
grants and then reforming provincial constitution is particularly acute in this period.
Therefore, we will attempt to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns by using a combi-
nation of features:
• Firstly, we actually attempt to measure political ability of governors. This is indi-
18The Financial Agreement was only meant to last for 1986 fiscal period, and although it was extendible
for one year, it was subject to further revision of coefficients. Most importantly, the agreement in its Article
8 opened the door for a new round of negotiations that would end up with the sanction of the new Law in
1988.
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rectly done by building a number of variables reflecting political and institutional dif-
ferences across jurisdictions. They include Adjusted Malapportionment in National
Congress, Party Coincidence with President, and provincial Executive Constraints
(see below for more details).
• Secondly, as we can observe from Table 1.3, the grant system during this period
was inherently unstable19. This is particularly relevant for term limit relaxation
processes, as they normally involve more than one round of voting in provincial
Legislature, and more than one fiscal year. Medium or long term compromises with
legislators would require some constant influx of funds. Variability in grants only
reveals that powerful governors never managed to secure higher level of transfers for
more than one fiscal year. Furthermore, the five modifications of term limits that
occurred in this time frame involved at least two fiscal years.
• Thirdly, between 1986 and 1987, a case-by-case analysis reveals that reform processes
were independent of negotiations for funding. Out of the five reformers before 1988,
Jujuy, La Rioja, and San Juan relaxed term limits in 1986, with provincial laws
mandating constitutional reforms being passed by the end of 1985 (see Table (1.2)).
Thus, we can eliminate the impact of the Temporary Financial Agreement on these
jurisdictions. The remaining two provinces, San Luis and Cordoba, started reforms
after the agreement. However, in both jurisdictions, the term limit relaxation process
started in 1986 and finished in 1987. Again, the intrinsic instability of the settlement
played a role. Funding for 1987 was not necessarily determined by what had been
obtained in 1986.
• Fourthly, by using Linear Probability Model with fixed effects (see subsection 1.3.3.4),
we attempt to control for time-invariant unobservable provincial characteristics.
In a nutshell, by the instability of the grant system in this period, the group of first re-
formers never reached an acceptable level of institutional consistency over future grants.
Starting in 1984, the leaving dictatorship offered an exogenous change in the Copartic-
ipation system, characterized by difficult negotiations and a shift in power in favour of
relegated provinces. In the next subsection, we explain variables and model specification
in more detail.
1.3.3.2 Variables Description
Our theoretical model depicts clear-cut effects from an increase in unearned revenue on
the probability of turnover. Empirically, we materialize these results in the effect of the
funds in the Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement (FTSAit) on the probability of reforming the
constitution to relax term limits. As mentioned before, the Autonomous City of Buenos
Aires and Tierra del Fuego have been excluded from the analysis (see section 1.3.2) leaving
in 22 the number of jurisdictions over 31 years (1984-2014).
19Porto (2004) elaborates this point further. From a comprehensive review on the history federal tax-
sharing agreements in Argentina, the period that starts in 1973 tops the ranking in terms of instability
and uncertainty.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Reformed Term Limits 269 0.074 0.262 0 1
FTSA per capita (Logs) 269 6.804 0.461 5.383 7.879
GGP per capita (Logs) 269 9.438 0.451 8.556 10.727
Executive Constraints 259 0.590 0.060 0.388 0.731
Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs) 268 4.593 1.242 0.544 7.736
Total revenues per capita (Logs) 269 7.739 0.455 6.724 9.296
Adjusted Malapportionment 269 0.670 0.458 0 2.763
Party coincidence with President 269 0.442 0.497 0 1
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 269 13.174 6.385 2 24
Notes: This Table provides summary statistics for the main variables of interests used in the paper.
The dependent binary variable, Reformed Term Limits, takes 1 if province i modified
the constitution at time t (year) affecting term limits. We only consider first constitutional
reforms that included some sort of re-election clause. Consequently, 20 episodes have been
identified (269 observations are left in the data set; after the year of reform, the value for
this variable goes to missing). In Table 1.4 we can observe descriptive statistics for the
covariates used in the panel data set.
In an attempt to capture different political conditions in each province by year, Execu-
tive Constraints and Adjusted Malapportionment variables were created. Lucardi and Al-
maraz (2017) find evidence that powerful incumbents and divided opposition have opened
the gate for constitutional reforms that pursued alterations of term limits in Argentinian
provinces. Executive Constraints (θit) is a measure of local political power. It consists of
a simple average of the votes obtained by the governor (% votesit), the difference in votes
with second candidates in the closest election (% differenceit), and the number of seats
in the provincial legislature -there can be up to two chambers per province- (% seatsit).
Once averaged, we subtract it from 1, i.e., the closest is θi to one, the harder the executive
constraints faced by the incumbent. The following expression is calculated;











Where i stands for provinces and t for years. Provincial elections for Governor normally
take place every four years, unless there is some unexpected event that forces otherwise.
Nonetheless, for legislature, mid-term elections every two years are common across ju-
risdictions. With no re-election permitted, one incumbent can face up to two different
Executive Constraints, depending whether or not there were mid-term elections20. Elec-
tions are normally held in October, and the seats in the Legislature are taken in December,
therefore we lag Executive Constraints variable in order to effectively measure the political
landscape faced by the incumbent in power21.
20In comparison with other observations, there are 10 missing values in this variable as there is no
information on the distribution of seats in the provincial legislature for Salta in 1991, 1993, and 1995 (6
missing values), and for Tucuman in 1987 election (4 missing values)
21The only exception is Santiago del Estero in 1997. constitutional reform was officially dated the 29th
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The second variable is Adjusted Malapportionment, a measure of national political
influence. Each jurisdiction has a non-proportionally distributed number of seats in Na-
tional Congress (see Galiani et al. (2016) or Ardanaz et al. (2014)). Even though there
is also malapportionment in the Senate, we only focus on the Chamber of Deputies22. If
we divide the proportion of total seats each province has in Congress by its fraction of
the total population of the country, we will get a measure of malapportionment (one if
representation is proportional)23. The distribution of seats has remained fixed since 1983,
except for an increase in 3 in 1991 as a consequence of the creation of a new jurisdiction
Tierra del Fuego, which moved the total to 257. We circumvent this relatively time-
invariability by adjusting malapportionment by the percentage of those seats that belong
to the same party as the governor in Federal Congress. We use the following formula;
Adjusted Malapportionmentit = (% Seats Congressit) ∗Malapportionmentit
Governors exert a powerful grip on national legislators (Galiani et al., 2016; Jones
et al., 2002; Jones and Hwang, 2005). The time variation in the data (t) is given by the
fact that 1/2 of the chamber is renewed every two years. However, the minimum of zero
for Adjusted Malapportionment in Table 1.4 points out that it is not odd to see cases
where the party of the incumbent did not win any seat at the Federal Congress. For the
same reasons as for the Executive Constraints I lag this variable.
This variable, “Adjusted Malapportionment”, allows us to control for a number of
aspects. First, negotiations for the share in the FTSA (predominately in 1985-87) can be
influenced by the power the jurisdiction has in National Congress. If we do not account
for this, the error term will be affected, making it harder to sustain certain assumptions
(see below for more details on this). Secondly, a politically powerful province but with a
low FTSA per capita can obtain extra revenues by triggering discretionary funding from
the central government. If that is the case, the effect on the probability of reform from
FTSA will be diminished. For that reason, we also control for Discretionary Transfers.
Thirdly, the Federal Government can intervene in provinces under different clauses (to
guarantee the republican form of government for instance)24. Since the power to intervene
in provinces belongs to the Congress, the more powerful is the province, the less likely
will be an intervention in the event of a provincial constitutional reform. All other things
constant, a province with low FTSA per capita but powerful in the Congress can try to
block any intervention in the face of an institutional reform not supported by the Federal
December 1997, and the closest previous elections was held in October 1997.
22The main reason is that Senators were not directly elected before the National Constitutional Reform
in 1994.
23For instance, Buenos Aires makes up the 38% of population of the country, but the total proportion
of seats in National Congress is 27% (70 out of 257). On the other extreme, Santa Cruz have a population
equivalent to 0.05% of that of the country and enjoys a representation in Congress of 1.9% of seats.
24Since 1983, there have been six federal interventions in four provinces. According to Gervasoni (2010),
in at least four of them the incumbent in the province showed authoritarian behaviour. As an special case,
in 2004 Santiago del Estero was intervened and the provisional government called for a partial reform of the
provincial constitution (Provincial Law Nr. 6,667). Even though the Supreme Court of Justice considered
this unlawful a month later (Zaval´ıa, Jose´ Luis c/ Provincia de Santiago del Estero y Estado Nacional s/
Amparo.), a constitutional reform would pass a year later when the province was no longer intervened.
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Government (for instance one that includes indefinite re-elections). On similar grounds, we
include Party coincidence with a President dummy, which takes 1 if there is coincidence.
On average, provincial governors shared the same party affiliation as the President 44.2%
of the time, but with an enormous variation in the data.
Finally, we use Gross Geographic Product (GGP) per capita (see Appendix A.2.1
for a detail on sources used for calculation), and Ranking of Human Development Index
(HDI) to approximate human capital in each jurisdiction. The HDI variable is composed
by measures of poverty, education and income25. In Table 1.4 we can observe that the
highest value for HDI ranking is 226.
1.3.3.3 Cox Model - Provinces and Governors
At the expense of assuming a proportional hazard, the Cox model is a straightforward
way of using the powerful tools of survival analysis. The Cox specification presents certain
advantages over other alternatives. In particular, it allows for a natural way of dealing
with censoring and with tied events. In our case, the existence of tied events can be
potentially troublesome: three provinces reformed the constitution in 1986 and five did
it in 1994 (see Figure 1.1). The Cox proportional hazards regression model presents the
following structure:
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(β
′x) (1.25)
The covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function. There is no specific
assumption about the shape of the hazard, except for being the same for everyone27. The
theoretical model guides our empirical modelling. We depart from a general specification
that only includes controls strictly defined by theory, that is, FTSA per capita, GGP per
capita and Executive constraints (for R, w and θ respectively, see Section 1.2), and end
up in a full model with a number of variables and interactions. In Appendix A.3, there is
a detailed discussion on goodness of fit and preferred baseline model.
Table 1.5 is divided in two panels depending on whether we use provinces (Panel A) or
governors (Panel B) as units of analysis. Specifications gradually increase the number of
controls, including, in model 3 for instance, growth of fiscal and economic variables. Mod-
els 4(10) to 6(12) replicate the previous three estimations, but with interactions among
FTSA per capita, Executive Constraints and GGP per capita. Apart from the unambigu-
ous effect of FTSA per capita (we can observe that FTSA per capita remains statistically
significant across specifications), it is not easy to generalise conclusions for other variables.
Executive Constraints shows the expected coefficient sign, that is, the higher the political
25United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) calculates the HDI for years 1996, 2001, 2006 and
2011. For the previous 13 years, we use the Composite Index developed by Russo (1997) for 1980 and
1991. Since both methodologies differ substantially, we only use the ranking ordering of the different
indexes which goes from 1, for the most developed jurisdiction, to 24.
26The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is the most developed jurisdiction of the country, but we are
not including this jurisdiction in the analysis. The minimum of 24 in this ranking can also be interpreted
by noticing that we are not including Tierra del Fuego either.
27The Cox model can be approached to a BTSCS using a Complementary log-log (Cloglog) link (Beck
et al., 1998).
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Table 1.5: Survival Time Analysis Applied to Provinces and Governors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Unit of Analysis: Provinces
FTSA per capita (Logs) 1.173+ 2.898++ 3.050+ 1.670+++ 2.983++ 2.862
(0.610) (1.406) (1.649) (0.588) (1.398) (1.811)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.150 3.280+ 3.561++ 0.191 3.115++ 3.061+
(0.428) (1.705) (1.623) (0.525) (1.363) (1.687)
Executive Constraints -5.267 -9.739++ -11.12+++ -5.472 -9.677++ -10.14++
(3.203) (3.967) (4.304) (4.823) (4.916) (4.805)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) -2.513 -1.676 -1.949
(1.682) (2.051) (2.016)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) -0.0326 2.265 -0.0574
(8.261) (10.59) (9.832)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 5.584 8.214 7.325
(7.691) (9.454) (8.737)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Growth Covariates Yes Yes
Estimation Method Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M.
Nr. of Subjects 22 22 22 22 22 22
Nr. of Failures 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 237 236 235 237 236 235
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel B: Unit of Analysis: Governors
FTSA per capita (Logs) 0.487 2.639+ 2.970+ 0.358 2.358+ 2.667+
(0.458) (1.434) (1.615) (0.508) (1.344) (1.583)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.00761 1.889++ 1.919++ 0.0378 1.934++ 1.989++
(0.370) (0.870) (0.930) (0.459) (0.870) (0.971)
Executive Constraints -0.412 -0.432 -0.597 -2.299 -2.462 -2.300
(1.650) (1.891) (1.844) (2.343) (2.711) (2.379)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) 0.0322 0.0584 -0.170
(0.916) (1.021) (1.062)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 5.530 5.608 5.349
(4.543) (4.371) (4.180)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 1.729 2.110 2.079
(4.625) (5.031) (5.524)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Growth Covariates Yes Yes
Estimation Method Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M. Cox M.
Nr. of Subjects 113 113 113 113 113 113
Nr. of Failures 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 545 544 543 545 544 543
(*) Mean centred variables.
Standard errors clustered by provinces in Panel A, by governors in Panel B. + p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the first set of initial findings. Using the Cox model we estimate the effect FTSA per capita (in logs) on the
likelihood of relaxing term limits. In Panel A, we use as subject of failure the 22 provinces. In Panel B, we change the subject to 113 term-
limited governors. We gradually include Control Covariates (Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs), Total revenues per capita (Logs), Adjusted
Malapportionment, Party coincidence with President, Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking), and Growth Covariates (Growth FTSA pc
(t− 1), Growth difference GGP vs GDP (t− 1), Growth GGP pc (t− 1), Growth discretionary transfers pc (t− 1), Growth total revenues pc
(t− 1).). Across all specifications a significant and positive effect of FTSA per capita is observed.
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constraints, the less likely the incumbent will push for a constitutional reform. However,
in some specifications this variable is not significant. Similar conclusions can be obtained
for GGP per capita.
A back of the envelope calculation gives that one standard deviation increase in the
log of FTSA per capita has a positive effect on the probability of reform between 72.9%
and 315%28. On the other hand, the point estimate for a one standard increment in
Executive Constraints reduces the hazard of term limit relaxation by between 27% and
49%. In Appendix A.3 I perform a wide range of tests on the assumptions on which the
Cox model is based. I find no evidence that specifications violate the proportional-hazard
assumption or that there is multicollinearity among variables (we were concerned on FTSA
per capita (Logs) with Total revenues per capita, or Executive Constraints with Adjusted
Malapportionment). Overall, Models 1 and 3 seem to show better fit.
Exploring alternatives: In Table 1.6 we perform a number of alterations to the Cox
specification to check consistency of results. These extensions can be grouped in three.
First, Royalties are included, a source of revenue that shares similar characteristics to
FTSA per capita. Secondly, the period under analysis is reduced to before 1994, the
year the National Constitution was reformed in the country. And third, we use two
different dependent variables capturing alternative expressions of event year; the first
constitutional reform (model 4), irrespective from whether or not it affected term limits,
and the provincial call for constitutional reform (model 5).
The first two models involve considering Royalties. This source of revenues deserves
particular attention as it is very similar to FTSA: local constituencies only perceive indi-
rect benefits as they do not bear the direct burden of the tax. Some authors emphasise the
combined effect of both FTSA and Royalties on subnational behaviour (Besfamille et al.,
2017). 18 out of 24 jurisdictions receive some type of royalties (17 out of 22 in our working
sample), and for some provinces, they represent a relevant proportion of revenue. Accord-
ing to the authors, Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego, collect more revenues from
royalties than from provincial taxes. Empirically working with royalties is not straight-
forward. Given that we are using per capita logarithms, for those jurisdictions that do
not collect this concept we face the difficulty of missing values for Log (0). We have dealt
with this by using a conservative approach creating a new variable that consist on logs of
FTSA plus Royalties per capita. Two alternatives are presented, one that separates both
variables (FTSA per capita and FTSA + Royalties per capita) in model 1(6), and one
that only uses the combined variable in model 2(7). We get mixed results depending on
whether we are observing as provincial (Panel A) or governors subjects of failure (Panel
B). These results seem to point out that incumbents perceive these two sources of revenues
in a different way. Nonetheless, even in that scenario, FTSA per capita seems to have a
positive effect on the probability of reforming.






Table 1.6: Exploring Alternatives, Cox model
Including Royalties Before 1994 Different failure event
(1) (2) (3) (4(*)) (5(**))
Panel A: Unit of Analysis: Provinces
FTSA per capita (Logs) 3.603++ 3.763+++ 3.120++ 3.458+++
(1.416) (1.176) (1.398) (1.159)
FTSA + royalties per capita (Logs) -2.840 -0.805
(2.954) (2.672)
GGP per capita (Logs) 3.406++ 1.495 4.123+++ 2.492 3.046++
(1.618) (1.028) (1.468) (1.648) (1.357)
Executive Constraints -9.411++ -5.883 -6.607 -10.48++ -7.806++
(4.611) (4.772) (4.924) (4.887) (3.468)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of Subjects 22 22 22 22 22
Nr. of Failures 20 20 15 20 20
Observations 236 236 153 190 214
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.129 0.196 0.177 0.122
Including Royalties Before 1994 Different failure event
(6) (7) (8) (9(*)) (10(**))
Panel B: Unit of Analysis: Governors
FTSA per capita (Logs) 2.106 2.292+ 2.314+ 1.565
(1.281) (1.317) (1.371) (1.118)
FTSA + royalties per capita (Logs) 1.324 2.227+
(1.399) (1.351)
GGP per capita (Logs) 1.907++ 0.916 2.823++ 1.577+ 1.248
(0.892) (0.716) (1.165) (0.816) (0.859)
Executive Constraints -0.783 -1.056 -2.025 -0.301 -2.489
(1.953) (2.141) (3.743) (2.102) (1.954)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of Subjects 113 113 113 113 113
Nr. of Failures 20 20 15 20 20
Observations 566 566 201 581 559
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.036 0.070 0.056 0.043
Standard errors clustered by provinces in Panel A, by governors in Panel B.
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table extends previous initial findings by exploring new alternatives. These extensions include
accounting for Royalties, reducing the period of study before 1994, and using two competing events; (*)only
constitutional reforms and (**) only provincial call for reform. We continue using the Cox model to estimate the
effect FTSA per capita (in logs) on the likelihood of relaxing term limits. In Panel A, we use as subject of failure
the 22 provinces. In Panel B, we change the subject to 113 term-limited governors. We gradually include Control
Covariates (Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs), Total revenues per capita (Logs), Adjusted Malapportionment,
Party coincidence with President, Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking), and Growth Covariates (Growth
FTSA pc (t−1), Growth difference GGP vs GDP (t−1), Growth GGP pc (t−1), Growth discretionary transfers
pc (t− 1), Growth total revenues pc (t− 1).). Across all specifications a significant and positive effect of FTSA
per capita is observed.
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In model number 3(8), the reform of the National Constitution in 1994 is considered.
According to its new Article 123, ”...each province enacts its own constitution as stated
in Section 5, ensuring municipal autonomy and ruling its scope and content regarding the
institutional, political, administrative, economic and financial aspects” (National Consti-
tution, Article 123). This particular mandate pressed provinces into reforming their own
provincial constitutions to safeguard municipal autonomy. In order to avoid confounding
external political and institutional factors that may influence the incumbent, we restrict
the analysis to 1984-1994 period. Even though less efficient as we drop a number of
observations, FTSA per capita remains significant.
Lastly, reforming a provincial constitution demands political leverage. Presumably,
including an article to relax term limits even more so. In models 4(9) and 5(10), we
use different dependent variables accounting for such demonstrations of power. What
differs in these two specifications is the notion of a failure event. In model 4, we use first
constitutional reforms even if they did not effectively include re-election clauses. Most of
them affected term limits, but provinces as Corrientes, Salta, Santiago del Estero, and
Tucuman passed innocuous reforms in terms of periods in office. Again, even though we
lose some observations, the results are quite similar to that of previous models: FTSA
per capita keeps explanatory power. Based on Table 1.2, we consider model 5. In this
specification, the dependent variable (event) is the year the provincial legislature passed
a law mandating a constitutional reform. Although these events show political power, it
is important to notice that for some reforms there was a considerable gap between the
Law and the reform. Formosa, for instance, passed the Law mandating a constitutional
reform the 8th of September 1988, and the constitution was sanctioned the 3rd of April
1991. In other cases, the reform did not materialise at all (Misiones 2006). As observed,
the significance of FTSA per capita remain just as significant29.
1.3.3.4 Considering Heterogeneity - Linear Probability Model
A general critique to the Cox model is that we are making strong assumptions with respect
to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity (see Section A.4 for a more detailed
discussion on this). In order to address this, we will exploit the panel structure of the data.
Although this section is centred on the Linear Probability Model (LPM) with provincial
and governor fixed effects, the analysis is extended to the conditional logit in Appendix
A.5. Given that there is no time variation in the dependent variable, we lose data on two
provinces that did not reform the constitution. However, the main advantage lies on not
having to make specific assumptions on the correlation between individual heterogeneity
and predictors. Equally important is the fact that it allows us to control for provincial-
specific time-invariant variables, predominately among those, institutional factors. As can
be seen from Table 1.7 (below) FTSA per capita continues to be relevant and significant
in explaining term-limit variable. This Table displays the LPM with fixed effects. While
models 1 to 6 only include provincial effects, from 7 to 12 we also add governor dummies.
It is worth mentioning that in these specifications, the interpretation of coefficients is
29It is worth mentioning that we have also analysed the inclusion of inflation, as a control for macroe-
conomic instability, but results were not altered (not shown).
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different; an increase in 1% of FTSA funding per capita would increases the probability
of reforming the constitution in a range that goes from 1.24% to 3.22%.
Thus far, it has been argued that there is a significant correlation between FTSA per
capita and the probability of pursuing modifications of term limits. This section began
by describing the identification assumptions that helped us build a case for one particular
direction of effect. It went on to describe two econometric methods, the Cox model and
the Linear Probability Model, using either provinces or governors as unit of analysis.
What follows is a discussion on causal effects of FTSA per capita. federal transfers are
instrumented by constructing a new variable, “Aggravated Malapportionment”.
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Table 1.7: Linear Probability Model with Provincial and Governor Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Unit of Analysis: Provincial Fixed Effects
FTSA per capita (Logs) 0.124+++ 0.181+++ 0.249+++ 0.213+++ 0.272+++ 0.322+++
(0.0316) (0.0473) (0.0856) (0.0513) (0.0588) (0.0937)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.0282 0.0853 0.0797 -0.0449 0.0555 0.0356
(0.124) (0.192) (0.200) (0.171) (0.218) (0.230)
Executive Constraints -0.704 -0.615 -0.512 -1.008+ -0.919+ -0.811
(0.494) (0.506) (0.487) (0.489) (0.506) (0.500)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) 0.139 0.183 0.170
(0.150) (0.144) (0.132)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) -1.865+++ -1.843++ -1.838+++
(0.652) (0.669) (0.649)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 0.486 0.641 0.664
(1.101) (1.129) (1.039)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Growth Covariates Yes Yes
Governor Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259 258 254 259 258 254
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.022 0.060 0.048 0.047 0.083
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel B: Unit of Analysis: Provincial and Governor Fixed Effects
FTSA per capita (Logs) 0.0795 0.125+ 0.128 0.138++ 0.209++ 0.260+
(0.0478) (0.0719) (0.120) (0.0573) (0.0792) (0.135)
GGP per capita (Logs) 0.0301 -0.00165 -0.0632 -0.0696 -0.237 -0.360
(0.221) (0.310) (0.325) (0.164) (0.218) (0.339)
Executive Constraints -0.974 -0.451 -0.290 -0.654 0.565 0.910
(0.891) (0.898) (0.917) (1.090) (1.299) (1.303)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) 0.0401 0.102 0.122
(0.118) (0.137) (0.157)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) -1.154 -1.101 -1.276
(0.772) (0.821) (0.853)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 1.780 3.213 3.374
(1.950) (2.254) (1.993)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Growth Covariates Yes Yes
Governor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259 258 254 259 258 254
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.232 0.243 0.241 0.244 0.257
(*) Mean centred variables.
Standard errors adjusted for 22 clusters in provinces. + p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table displays the LPM estimations. In Panel A, we only account for provincial fixed effects. In Panel B, we combine both, provincial and
governor fixed effects. We gradually include Control Covariates (Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs), Total revenues per capita (Logs), Adjusted Malapportion-
ment, Party coincidence with President, Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking), and Growth Covariates (Growth FTSA pc (t − 1), Growth difference
GGP vs GDP (t − 1), Growth GGP pc (t − 1), Growth discretionary transfers pc (t − 1), Growth total revenues pc (t − 1).). Across all specifications the
probability of reforming the constitution to relax term limits is positively correlated to FTSA per capita.
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1.3.4 Instrumenting Federal Transfers
As discussed above, it has been argued that there is a close and significant relationship
between FTSA per capita and the likelihood of reform. However, the period that runs
from 1984 and 1988 involved intense negotiations between provinces and the Federal Gov-
ernment regarding the FTSA (see section 1.3.3.1). Some concerns arise on the potential
endogeneity of federal transfers over these years. After 1988, and following Besfamille
et al. (2017), we can safely assume funding from FTSA to be exogenous30. In January
1988 a new Federal Tax-sharing Agreement was reached and it would last more than 30
years.
In what follows, we draw from Galiani et al. (2016) in using malapportionment to
instrument “FTSA per capita”. Being a generalised phenomenon, malapportionment
originates in the political over-representation (under) of smaller (larger) jurisdictions in
Legislatures. In a slight modification, I use “Aggravated Malapportionment”, defined as
the number of seats won (or lost) by provinces after adjustments in Congress. Two exoge-
nous modifications are exploited, one in 1983 and the other in 1991. First, following our
discussion in section 1.3.3.1, as a consequence of Military Decree 22,847 in 1983, the total
number of seats in Congress was increased in eleven units before elections. Meant to be
proportional, in an already malapportioned Congress, the increase in total seats affected
all jurisdictions, not only those provinces that improved their representation. Second, in
1991 a new province was incorporated to the federal structure of the country, Tierra del
Fuego. Accordingly, three new seats were added and thus affecting overall distribution of
political power. Figure 1.5 exemplifies our instrument by using 1983 military alterations.
First, in sub-figures 1.5a and 1.5b, we contrast a proportional Congress with how it actu-
ally looked like in 1982. From sub-figure 1.5c we can appreciate how the increase in eleven
seats further affected the political representation and the balance in Congress.
Table 1.8 displays the actual calculations for “Aggravated Malapportionment”. As
previously mentioned, two effects stand out when the number of seats is modified. First,
there is a reduction in representation of provinces compared to those jurisdictions that
increased the number of seats. Second, the overall impact will depend on how malappor-
tioned each jurisdiction was before the modification. For instance, Buenos Aires, previous
to 1983, was under-represented by 26.3 seats, while in 1983, that number reached 28.6
seats, even though 2 seats were added in that year. Thus, the net effect for Buenos Aires
was a loss in representation of 2.3 seats. The last two columns of the Table 1.8 calculate
winners and losers resulting from the two modifications in 1983 and in 1991.
30As discussed in section 1.3.3.1, current FTSA is based on fixed and arbitrary coefficients, not by
formula.
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Figure 1.5: Aggravated Malapportionment in Congress 1983
243
(a) Proportional Distribution of Seats - 1982
243
(b) Actual Distribution of Seats in 1982
254
(c) Distribution of Seats in 1983
Notes: This Figure presents how our variable “Adjusted Malapportionment” operates. We identify the change
in representativeness in ten provinces that were apportioned eleven seats in 1983. Sub-figure 1.5a estimates
a proportional Congress in 1982; 243 seats distributed according to provincial population. In sub-figure 1.5b,
the actual distribution of seats is portrayed. Lastly, in sub-figure 1.5c we can observe the effect of increasing
eleven seats in 1983, and how it aggravates the already malapportioned congress.
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Table 1.8: Aggravated Malapportionment, 1983 and 1991
Allocated Seats Population Share Proportional Nr. Seats Malapportionment
Aggravated
Malapportionment
1973-1982 1983-1991 1991-2014 1983 1991 1982 1983-1991 1991-2014 1982 1983-1991 1991-2014 1983-1991 1991-present
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (G)=(a)-(d) (H)=(b)-(e) (I)=(c)-(f) (H)-(G) (I)-(H)
Buenos Aires 68 70 70 38.8% 38.6% 94.3 98.6 99.2 -26.3 -28.6 -29.2 -2.27 -0.62
Capital Federal 25 25 25 10.1% 9.1% 24.5 25.6 23.4 0.5 -0.6 1.6 -1.11 2.22
Catamarca 4 5 5 0.8% 0.8% 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 3.1 2.9 0.92 -0.15
Chaco 7 7 7 2.5% 2.6% 6.1 6.4 6.6 0.9 0.6 0.4 -0.28 -0.19
Chubut 4 5 5 1.0% 1.1% 2.4 2.5 2.8 1.6 2.5 2.2 0.89 -0.32
Cordoba 18 18 18 8.6% 8.5% 20.9 21.8 21.8 -2.9 -3.8 -3.8 -0.94 0.00
Corrientes 7 7 7 2.4% 2.4% 5.8 6.1 6.3 1.2 0.9 0.7 -0.26 -0.20
Entre Rios 9 9 9 3.2% 3.1% 7.8 8.2 8.0 1.2 0.8 1.0 -0.35 0.13
Formosa 5 5 5 1.1% 1.2% 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 -0.12 -0.34
Jujuy 5 6 6 1.5% 1.6% 3.6 3.8 4.0 1.4 2.2 2.0 0.84 -0.24
La Pampa 4 5 5 0.8% 0.8% 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 3.1 3.0 0.92 -0.12
La Rioja 4 5 5 0.6% 0.7% 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.5 3.4 3.3 0.93 -0.19
Mendoza 10 10 10 4.3% 4.3% 10.4 10.9 11.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -0.47 -0.22
Misiones 6 7 7 2.2% 2.4% 5.3 5.6 6.2 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.76 -0.66
Neuquen 4 5 5 1.0% 1.2% 2.3 2.4 3.1 1.7 2.6 1.9 0.90 -0.65
Rio Negro 5 5 5 1.4% 1.6% 3.5 3.6 4.0 1.5 1.4 1.0 -0.16 -0.39
Salta 7 7 7 2.4% 2.7% 5.9 6.2 6.8 1.1 0.8 0.2 -0.27 -0.61
San Juan 6 6 6 1.7% 1.6% 4.0 4.2 4.2 2.0 1.8 1.8 -0.18 0.04
San Luis 4 5 5 0.8% 0.9% 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.1 3.0 2.7 0.91 -0.23
Santa Cruz 4 5 5 0.4% 0.5% 1.0 1.1 1.3 3.0 3.9 3.7 0.95 -0.16
Santa Fe 19 19 19 8.8% 8.6% 21.3 22.3 22.1 -2.3 -3.3 -3.1 -0.96 0.20
Santiago del Estero 7 7 7 2.1% 2.1% 5.1 5.4 5.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 -0.23 0.07
Tierra del Fuego 2 2 5 0.1% 0.2% 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.7 1.7 4.5 -0.01 2.78
Tucuman 9 9 9 3.5% 3.5% 8.5 8.9 9.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.38 -0.14
243 254 257 243 254 257 0 0
Notes: This Table shows the steps taken to get “Aggravated Malapportionment”, the instrument for “FTSA per capita”. Allocated Seats is the official distribution of seats per province, considering
the addition of eleven seats in 1983, and then accounting for 1991 modifications (three more seats for Tierra del Fuego). For our Population Share columns, for 1983 we have used an estimation based
on the population growth between Census 1980 and 1991, and for 1991 simply the Census 1991 information. Proportional number of seats distributes according to population shares; 1983 share for
(d) and (e), and 1991 share for (f). The columns labelled as “Malapportionment” contrast the proportional distribution of seats with actual allocation. Finally, “Aggravated Malapportionment”
compares how this difference was altered both in 1983 and in 1991.
40
Table 1.9: Malapportionment and Federal Transfers, Reduced Form
Dep. Var.: FTSA per capita Entire Period: 1984-2014 Sub-period: 1984-1988
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggravated Malapportionment 0.368+++ 0.364+++ 0.147+++ 0.379+++ 0.404+++ 0.437+++
(0.0705) (0.0650) (0.0399) (0.0760) (0.0532) (0.0511)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.0156 0.208 -0.420++ -0.595+++
(0.182) (0.175) (0.199) (0.201)
Executive Constraints -0.732 -0.367 0.128 0.0974
(0.639) (0.516) (0.653) (0.506)
Party Coincidence with President -0.136++ -0.101+ -0.245+ -0.203++
(0.0568) (0.0545) (0.140) (0.0941)
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 0.0110 0.0102 -0.0126 -0.0220+
(0.0130) (0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0133)
Constant 6.792+++ 7.321+++ 5.038+++ 6.880+++ 11.04+++ 12.84+++
(0.0542) (1.851) (1.868) (0.0634) (1.919) (1.994)
Observations 291 259 259 102 101 101
R2 0.265 0.334 0.318 0.429
F (Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic) 27.28 31.37 24.90 57.64
FEff (Montiel Olea-Pflueger F-statistic) 27.28 31.37 24.90 57.64






Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes : This Table compares First Stage regressions using Aggravated Malapportionment to explain FTSA per capita.
The table is divided into two. The first 3 models use OLS and Random Effects in the entire period over 1984-2014. The
second column replicates these calculations for a sub-period between 1984 and 1988. Aggravated Malapportionment is
positively correlated to FTSA per capita.
A relevant discussion involves the exogeneity of our instruments. While malappor-
tionment is not necessarily exogenous, but the result of political forces at crucial historic
moments (Ardanaz and Scartascini, 2013), the circumstances under which the “aggrava-
tion” of malapportionment occurred in Argentina are. Both the military alterations in
1983 and the creation of a new province in 1991 are events orthogonal to our main variables
of interest. As discussed in Galiani et al. (2016), the 1983 changes were not related to fiscal
or economic variables, but to the fact that the military government considered that the
peronist’s votes were concentrated in large metropolitan areas. By over-representing small
provinces in Congress, the political power of this party would be diminished. Similarly,
the creation of a new province in 1990 responded to the institutional development of the
region. Even more, while the institutionalisation of Tierra del Fuego might result from a
number of factors, the resulting increase in representation in Congress was a consequence
of having low population which made 1983 military dispositions binding (a minimum of 5
seats per province).
Instrumenting endogenous variables with binary dependent outcomes demands certain
precautions. Building on the previous sections, we use the linear probability model and the
random effects estimator31. Unfortunately, we cannot any longer exploit fixed effect panel
31We also tried the non-linear probit. There are relatives advantages and disadvantages to each method
(see for instance Lewbel et al. (2012)), but for simplicity, we only show LPM results. It is important to
mention that findings are not affected if we use non-linear probit with instruments.
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Table 1.10: Malapportionment and Federal Transfers. Structural Equation
Dependent Variable: Reformed Term Limits
Entire Period: 1984-2014 Sub-period: 1984-1988
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTSA per capita (Logs) 0.0246 0.0183 0.0183 0.0809 0.113++ 0.113++
(0.0534) (0.0617) (0.0617) (0.0638) (0.0524) (0.0524)
GGP per capita (Logs) 0.0339 0.0339 0.00779 0.00779
(0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0790) (0.0790)
Executive Constraints -0.629+ -0.629++ -0.299 -0.299
(0.313) (0.313) (0.591) (0.591)
Party Coincidence with President 0.0235 0.0235 0.0611 0.0611
(0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0428) (0.0428)
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 0.00352 0.00352 -0.00203 -0.00203
(0.00263) (0.00263) (0.00600) (0.00600)
Constant -0.0977 -0.0524 -0.0524 -0.489 -0.599 -0.599
(0.363) (0.608) (0.608) (0.436) (0.973) (0.973)






Observations 291 259 259 102 101 101
R2 0.015 0.036 0.042 0.065
Instrumented = FTSA per capita (Logs)
Instrument = Aggravated Malapportionment
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes : This Table displays the Reduced From when instrumenting federal transfers using Aggravated Malap-
portionment. This Table is divided into two, one for entire period over 1984-2014, and the other for a sub-period
between 1984 and 1988. We use IV-2SLS and Panel Random Effects IV-2SLS with and without covariates.
The positive effect is observed across all specifications, although significance appears in the sub-period between
1984 and 1988.
structure of the data as a consequence of having a time-invariant instrument in the period
of interest (1984-1988). For that reason, we use either the LPM or the Random Effects
specifications in Table 1.9. Our First Stage regressions seem to show that there exists a
correlation between “Aggravated Malapportionment” and FTSA per capita32. Moreover,
the first-stage fit is strong: both the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic and the Montiel Olea-
Pflueger F-statistic are greater than critical values for respective tests. This result is robust
to a number of different specifications and data splits, mainly between the period that
concern us, 1984-1988, and over 1984-2014. (Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001) also discuss
this strong relationship between representation in Congress and level of federal transfers
in Argentina.
The most interesting finding in Table 1.10 is that when we restrict the analysis to the
period that concern us (1984-1988), the instrument does indeed do a good job. Especially
when covariates are considered. When instrumented, results point out to a positive cor-
relation between FTSA per capita and Reformed Term Limits. Over the entire period,
we would expect the instrument to be less relevant. As argued before, after 1988 federal
funds has been exogenously channelled to provinces.
32Due to multicollinearity we necessarily drop from our specifications our variable “Adjusted Malap-
portionment” used in previous sections.
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1.4 Conclusions
This study has argued that fiscal resource abundance can have unplanned consequences.
In particular, we linked Federal Tax-sharing Agreement (FTSA) imbalances to the prob-
ability of reforming Argentinian provincial constitutions. Using the institutional shock in
1983 and the particularity that re-elections were banned across jurisdictions, we provided
some evidence that the distribution of funds was consistently related to the probability of
reforming.
In the theoretical build up, we developed a model to make term limits endogenous.
This simple model captures the interactions between institutional factors and exogenous
sources of revenue. We described two possible equilibriums; the “Restrained Incumbent”
case where there is rotation in power, and the “Political Confrontation” equilibrium, where
the incumbent will try to affect turnover probability. This last scenario depends on the
value of retaining office, net from the cost of engaging in such confrontation. We therefore
identified a decreasing relationship with local levels of salaries, or economic development,
and an increasing pressure to relax term limits from higher levels of “unearned” revenues,
proxied by federal transfers. This simple model set out the groundwork for our empirical
work.
The evidence seems to be in concordance with the theoretical propositions. Guided by
the model, we first built a new dataset on economic, political and institutional variables for
22 provinces. We identified 28 episodes of constitutional reforms affecting term limits in 20
jurisdictions. Next, we laid some initial findings using survival analysis. This econometric
method allowed us to exploit variations both in FTSA and in the timing of reforms. We
then moved to a LPM model, which facilitated the control of institutional factors. Lastly,
we suggested causality between FTSA and term limits by instrumenting federal transfers.
For that purpose we used the aggravation of over representation of some provinces in
National Congress. While the evidence regarding economic development in the province
is mixed, our most interesting result points to a significant correlation between FTSA and
the likelihood of constitutional reforms.
The intricacies and repercussions of federal fiscal arrangements are necessarily subtle.
The “invisible” workings of fiscal federal structures remains a promising area for research,
especially if we are to comprehend the roots of political and institutional stagnation in
developing countries. For instance, by constitutional mandate in the national reform of
1994, Argentina should have passed a new law establishing new distribution of federal
transfers before 1996. Nowadays, more than 20 years past that deadline, the law has not
been sanctioned yet. Any serious discussion affecting the status-quo can be blocked by
winners of the 1988 FTSA. Taken together, this highlights some unexpected consequences;
sloppy designed tax-sharing agreements can be powerful enough to impose deadlocks even
to constitutional mandates.
This paper adds to the growing number of articles that deal with collateral conse-
quences of fiscal arrangements. In Argentina, the democratic transition in 1983 gave some
provinces (governors) a strong negotiating hand. While we have explored one of its conse-
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quences, the facilitation of politically demanding term limits reforms, a number of other
democratic institutions could have been affected. Argentinian provinces, as many other
institutions in developing countries, exhibit a very strong provincial executive branch.
These rentier governors would not have been there if term limits had not been relaxed.
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Chapter 2
Resource Windfalls and Tax
Salience. Evidence from Local
Governments in Argentina
Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of windfall-like federal funds in the tax structure
of municipalities in Argentina. I build a career concerns theoretical model with three
sources of revenue with different level of visibility. Local incumbents can exploit tax
opacity to disguise themselves as able administrators. In this scenario, an equilibrium
is discussed where local mayors reduce direct and accountable taxes after an un-
expected increase in funding. To give empirical support to this proposition, a newly
collected panel is used consisting of 428 local governments in Argentina (distributed in
23 provinces) over 2006-2017. To isolate exogenous variation in funding, I exploit the
creation by presidential decree of the Federal Solidarity Fund, Fondo Federal Solidario
(FFS), in March 2009, which was channelled to provinces using fixed two-decades-old
coefficients set in the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement (FTSA -Law 23,548 in 1988).
Using event case difference-in-differences, I compare winners and losers resulting from
its disproportional design. Some evidence is presented that the increase in funding
has permitted those municipalities in winner jurisdictions to alleviate revenue pres-
sures for their constituencies, and the preferred channel has been to reduce direct
taxation. Weak tax-benefit linkages can have pervasive effects on accountability that
local mayors can potentially exploit.
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2.1 Introduction
The “perils of unearned income” (Smith, 2008) have long since puzzled scholars and inter-
national donors alike. In the seventies, a nascent literature emerged on the consequences of
freely collected revenues, such as aid or natural resource rents, on growth, but it quickly
grew to more complex issues like democratic institutions and rule of law (for compre-
hensive reviews see Ploeg (2011); Ross (2015)). In this study, the effect of windfall-like
federal transfers on the tax structure of municipalities in Argentina is analysed. Sub-
national governments in developing countries normally face severe limits when trying to
collect revenues. In the aftermath of a resource bonanza, is a municipality’s ability to
collect revenues undermined? After receiving extra funding, do local mayors substitute
revenues by reducing direct taxes, thus exploiting an opaquer tax structure?
How federal transfers are spent by local governments has been widely scrutinised in
the literature. The immense research on the flypaper effect observes the differential im-
pact on public spending when it is financed by transfers (for a comprehensive survey see
Inman (2008)). One possible explanation of the flypaper effect resides in the interaction
between institutional constraints and incentives faced by incumbents. A related body of
research has argued that given a preferred allocation of public goods, the extra influx of
funds may be used to reduce local taxes and fees (Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2001). However,
these discussions have been centred around the allocation of extra-revenues between lo-
cal public goods and local taxes, or a combination of both. In this chapter we focus on
the simultaneous selection of tax instruments and public goods, after extra resources are
poured into local governments.
This paper makes two contributions. First, drawing on Bracco et al. (2018), we develop
a simple model to capture the interaction between resource revenues and tax instrument
selection. We account for the behaviour of an office-minded incumbent who collects three
sources of revenues; two taxes and federal transfers. These revenues differ in their visibility.
Regarding taxes, while one tax instrument is fully observed, the other is only partially
internalised by voters. We are thinking in terms of two widely used taxes or contributions
in local governments in Argentina, the property tax and the business tax. The latter is
plausibly less salient. In order to get re-elected, the local mayor in this framework can
disguise her ability by exploiting the lack of visibility of both federal transfers and the less-
salient tax. We develop two propositions. First, non-salient tax bases will be exploited
more intensively. This is a consequence of political advantages from using opaque tax
structures. Second, after an unexpected increase in federal transfers, the incumbent will
reduce both taxes, but the substitution will be more pronounced for the most visible tax.
Forces operating in this scenario are similar to the previous case, by switching from visible
sources, voters’ ignorance of the mayor’s ability can be exploited.
The theoretical model is inspired by the growing literature related to tax salience.
Given that governments have available a set of taxes with different levels of visibility, voters
would systematically underestimate government budgets. Previous studies have focused
on electoral competition gains resulting from exploiting different tax bases (Bracco et al.,
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2018; Bordignon et al., 2017). But local taxes are just one portion of municipal revenues.
Federal transfers are the building block of local budgets. In Argentinian municipalities,
federal and provincial grants represent nearly 48% of total revenues (Lopez Accotto et al.,
2016). In spite of their preponderant relevance, federal transfers have not been analysed
in their theoretical settings. We add to this literature by studying the interaction between
taxes and exogenous federal funding.
The second contribution is testing the main implications of this model in Argentinian
municipalities. We work with a newly collected panel of 428 local governments over 2006-
2017. One key addition is the disaggregation of subcomponents of own source municipal
revenues (OSRs). Crucial for our theory, Contributions on Property and Contribution on
Businesses are identified. To the best of our knowledge, there is no such comprehensive
compilation of data for municipal governments in Argentina. For instance, in the work by
Lopez Accotto et al. (2016), data is compiled for 277 local governments in 2013. In this
chapter we not only increase the number of units, but also build a panel structure.
Several studies illustrate the complexity of finding a good quasi-experimental design
with plausible exogenous variation in the influx of federal funds (for an insightful discus-
sion on endogeneity issues, see Dahlberg et al. (2008)). This paper exploits a naturally
conceived experiment in Argentina. In March 2009, the Federal Government created by
presidential decree the “Federal Solidarity Fund - FFS (by its Spanish acronym)”. Formed
by 30% of soy export tariffs, this funding was channelled to provinces, and then to mu-
nicipalities, using fixed two-decades-old arbitrary coefficients in the Federal Tax-sharing
Agreement (FTSA). Using difference-in-differences, we compare winners and losers result-
ing from its disproportional design. We provide some causal estimates of the impact of
the FFS on tax effort and tax selection. For those municipalities that received a dis-
proportional inflow of funds after 2009, results suggest there was a reduction between
3.38% and 5.01% percentage points in contributions that fall on property for a 10% devi-
ation in our measure of windfall intensity. Being partially compensated by an increase in
easy-to-collect indirect taxes, there was no significant effect on total own source revenues.
There is a recent strand of literature that explores misuses of federal transfers. Caselli
and Michaels (2013) argue that there was little improvement in public good quality spend-
ing, or in living standards, when Brazilian municipalities experienced exogenous increases
in revenues from higher oil prices. Rather than boosting spending on productivity-
enhancing public goods, “extra” funds were spent on embezzlement, self-enrichment and
vote buying. Similarly, for the municipal context in Brazil, Gadenne (2017) discusses the
differential impact of tax revenues and transfers. While the former improved quantity and
quality of municipal education infrastructure, the later had no impact on public good pro-
vision. In the same institutional setting but following a different empirical strategy, Brollo
et al. (2013) find evidence that a positive variation of 10 per cent in federal transfers raised
local corruption by 16 per cent and increased the probability of re-election by 7% in munic-
ipalities in Brazil. According to Ferraz and Monteiro (2014), municipal-level oil windfalls
in Brazil helped incumbents remain in power. Litschig and Morrison (2013) show that
re-election probability improved by about ten percentage points in 1988 elections for those
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local governments who received extra funds for being just over the population threshold.
We contribute to this literature by adding a more subtle and indirect channel by which
tax selection results biased towards opaque tax sources after the influx of funds.
This chapter relates to the literature on vertical fiscal imbalances in developing coun-
tries. There is some evidence that these imbalances are more pronounced in non-OECD
countries (Besfamille and Lockwood, 2007). This mismatch between expenditures and
revenues can be exploited by local authorities by exporting taxation (or receiving federal
transfers)(Inman, 2003). An interesting point is raised by Krane et al. (2004). If local
service demand increases subnational governments may attempt to “(a) transfer the costs
upward, (b) export the costs, (c) seek revenues from superior levels of government, or (d)
adopt (or seek permission to adopt) less visible sources”. Argentina shows a large provin-
cial vertical fiscal imbalance (Artana et al. (2012), Tommasi et al. (2001), Ardanaz et al.
(2014)), but due to empirical limitations, very little research has been done for the munic-
ipal level. In this chapter we acknowledge the relevance of this mismatch between taxes
and expenditures in local municipalities, but we explore the forces behind a relaxation of
certain tax pressures. Moreover, we closely look at the interaction between local taxes and
federal transfers. This behaviour can have pervasive repercussions on tax-benefit linkages
and accountability; fiscally independent governments can act as rentier states, taxing very
little to their constituencies and extracting the benefits of public spending.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, a principal-agent model with
career concerns is carefully studied. Next, in Section 2.3 the empirical strategy is set out;
this section includes a detailed explanation on the institutional setting, the identification
strategy and the baseline findings. Finally, Section 2.4 provides the conclusions.
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2.2 Theoretical Model
In this section we closely follow Bracco et al. (2018) in modelling tax salience. The
structure of the model is principal-agent with career concerns as studied by Persson and
Tabellini (2000). The main contribution is that an exogenous source of revenue is added
in the form of federal transfers. In the face of a newly greater budget, we explore the
consequences on a selected set of tax instruments. An office-minded incumbent will reduce
both types of taxes after the increase in transfers, but the most salient tax will experience
grater reductions.
An elected mayor rules in a representative municipality. There are two periods t = 1, 2,
and the incumbent allocates the local budget into public good provision Gt using the
following production function;
Gt = (τ1t + τ2t + Ft) exp(at) (2.1)
Municipal revenues depend on two tax instruments, tax on property and tax on busi-
ness (τ1t and τ2t), an exogenous source of revenue in the form of federal transfers Ft, and
the ability of the incumbent, at. We assume ability is a random but permanent feature
of the incumbent. At the end of the first period, voters can re-elect the incumbent with
an estimated known ability, ae1, or vote for an opposition’ candidate with unknown ability
but drawn from the same distribution, with mean zero..
We make two realistic assumptions regarding tax instruments. First, while property
tax (τ1) is completely observed, we assume that τ2, tax on business, is partially ratio-
nalised1. Voters are only aware of the salient part of the tax, a proportion s (0 ≤ s ≤ 1).
The second assumption is that voters only observe v (0 ≤ v ≤ 1) amount of exogenous
transfers (F ) received by the mayor. In the context of fiscal federalism, with multiple
layers of government, this is a plausible assumption for Argentinian municipalities. Fed-
eral governments can use a number of different instruments to make local citizens aware
of federal funded projects. These assumptions create a systematic error in forecasting
mayor’s ability that she will try to exploit.
During the first period, nature draws ability of the incumbent aM , and given the level
of transfers F1 and tax policy (τ11, τ21), G1 is determined by equation (2.1). Using the
level of public spending, voters try to calculate the mayor’s ability and they compare it
to the expected ability of a challenger. The incumbent is re-elected if her observed ability
is greater than that of the challenger. In the second period, the winner selects a new tax
policy (τ12, τ22), and G2 is provided.
The incumbent in office exploits this apparent contradiction in being fully aware of
public good consumption and rationally bounded in terms of tax policy. Bracco et al.
(2018) offer a possible explanation in terms of “cognitive bias”. The cost of calculating
the actual amount of the less-salient tax makes them unwilling to invest resources on it.
1This is simplification for algebraic purposes. It can easily be extended to both taxes being non-fully
observable. The only assumption needed is that tax on property would be more visible than business tax.
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This is particularly important for tax on business. While property tax is directly paid
by households on a monthly basis, in municipalities in Argentina, taxes on businesses are
mostly formed by a variation of turnover tax, or sales tax. This tax cascades and it is
rolled into the price of products (Section 2.3.1 provides a more detailed explanation of the
particularities of these two taxes in the context of Argentinian municipalities).
Voter’s Utility: There is a large number (a continuum of mass 1) of identical voters.
The representative voter maximises the following utility:
u(Gt, ct) = w(Gt) + c
i
t −Xi (2.2)
The utility from public good consumption w(Gt) is monotonically increasing and concave.
Ideological preferences captured by Xi are uniformly distributed over [η − 12ζ , η + 12ζ ]. ζ
is a measure of the dispersion of ideological preferences. η captures the possibility of a
popularity shock, for convenience uniformly distributed as well over the interval[− 12ξ , 12ξ ].
This popularity shock has a mean of 0, and a density of ξ.
Assuming exogenous income y, private consumption is given by,














2t, to model distortions associated with the administrative burden of tax
collection.
Quasi-benevolent Mayor: The incumbent is concerned with voter’s welfare, weighted
by λ (0 < λ ≤ 1), but also values office Vit.
max
τ1t,τ2t





τ22t) + γitVit (2.3)
Without loss of generality, we take Vit = 1 and we solve the problem backwards. γit
is the probability of re-election. The incumbent will try to exploit the visibility of tax
instrument to affect the likelihood of retaining office. For simplicity, we will use an explicit
utility from public good consumption in the form natural logs;
w(Gt) = ln(Gt) = ln(τ1t + τ2t + Ft) + at (2.4)
Second Period: In this period there is not re-election incentive, γit = 0. Therefore, the
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(τ12 + τ22 + F2)
− 1− τ22 = 0
(2.5)
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The tax strategy in period two does not depend on ability. However, mayor’s ability







= λ > 0 (2.6)
Given the structure of the model, the decision of voters is simple; They will always
re-elect above-average incumbents. During the first period, an estimation of mayor’s
ability will be obtained based on observed G1. Then, considering political preferences,
and full knowledge of the uniform distribution of abilities, the voters will select second
period incumbent. The mayor in office is fully aware of this voting decision and will try
to exploit the salience of different tax instruments to portrait herself as competent.
γ˜i =
{
1 if ae ≥ Xi
0, otherwise
Her probability of re-election then is given by Prob[γ˜i = 1] = Prob[a
e ≥ Xi]2. Given the





The estimated ability ae is inferred by voters in period one. For that purpose, they
use w(G1) which is affected by the biased estimate of the municipal budget. Considering
a log form, this estimation comes from the following expression;




1 ) + a
e (2.8)
The estimation error comes from the lack of salience of both the business tax (τ e21)
and federal transfers (F e1 ). This is a persistent error because voters consistently link
their imperfect estimations to what they can observe. Thus, for business tax voters only
incorporate the salient part (τ e21 = s τ21), and for transfers (F
e
1 = v F1). This causes that
some portion of the budget is incorrectly imputed to ae. The actual utility from public
good corresponds to;
w(G1) = ln(G1) = ln(τ11 + τ21 + F1) + a1 (2.9)
2A voter will compare ae − Xi ≥ 0, the estimated utility from the ability of current incumbent,
corrected by ideological preferences, with the expected utility of a challenger E(U2(a)) = 0. Using the
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The incumbent will need more than 1
2
of votes if he is to remain in office 1
2
+ ζ[ae − η] ≥ 1
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or ae ≥ η. By






Therefore, combining (2.9) and (2.8), the part attributed to the ability of the incum-
bent for public good consumption in first period is;
ae = ln(τ11 + τ21 + F1)− ln(τ11 + sτ21 + vF1) + a1 (2.10)
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(2.11)
While increases in τ11 reduce the mayor’s estimated ability, changes in both τ21 and
F1 have uncertain effects. This is due to the concavity of ln() and 0 < s, v < 1.
First Period: Given that we are in period 1, we drop the time subscripts. The Mayor
















s.t. w(G) = ln(G) = ln(τ1 + τ2 + F ) + a
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(τ1 + s τ2 + v F )
− λ− λτ1 = 0
(2.13)
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(τ1 + s τ2 + v F )
− λ− λτ2 = 0
(2.14)
These two FOC are different from those in second period (Equation (2.5)). The differ-
ence arises from the fact that setting τ1 and τ2 also involves the probability of winning the
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election. This probability is affected by voters incorrectly attributing some public good
consumption to mayor’s ability.
Setting (2.13) equal to (2.14), we obtain,
(τ∗2 − τ∗1 ) =
ξ(1− s)
λ(τ∗1 + sτ∗2 + vF )
(2.15)
From this expression we obtain the main propositions,
Proposition 1: When one tax instrument is not fully observed by voters, (s < 1), the
less-salient tax (τ∗2 ) will be set to a higher level than the fully observed tax τ∗1 .
Proof Proposition 1: This result derives directly from Equation (2.15). Given that
ξ, λ > 0 the RHS will be always positive for s < 1.
During the first period, the mayor in office will exploit voter’s incorrect estimation of
her ability, weighted against the marginal costs of raising both taxes. The key driver of
this result is (s < 1), as equal visibility of both taxes will equalise tax levels. The next
proposition explore further consequences of having less salient taxes.
Proposition 2: For tax salience s in the interval (s∗, 1], an increase in federal transfers
F , will widen the gap between both tax instruments (τ∗2 − τ∗1 ).
Proof Proposition 2: As a first step, assume that both tax instruments are fully
observable such as s = 1. In that case, we have by Equation (2.15) that τ∗1 = τ∗2 = τ .
Subsequently, for cases where s < 1, differentiating the tax gap Equation (2.15) with
respect to s, we obtain the inverse relationship (to facilitate notation we take τi = τ
∗
i for
i = 1, 2, the optimised taxes),
d(τ2 − τ1)
ds
= − ξ(τ1 + τ2 + vF )
λ(τ1 + sτ2 + vF )2
< 0 (2.16)
The gap between taxes increases as a consequence of reductions in tax salience. For
that to be possible, τ1 has to fall at a greater pace than τ2.
The next step is to totally differentiate (2.15) to get the partial effect of F on each tax
base,[














A = − v(τ2 − τ1)
(τ2 − τ1)− (τ1 + sτ2 + vF )
B = −s(τ2 − τ1) + (τ1 + sτ2 + vF )
(τ2 − τ1)− (τ1 + sτ2 + vF )
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A,B > 0 if (τ2 − τ1) < (τ1 + sτ2 + vF )
Undefined if (τ2 − τ1) = (τ1 + sτ2 + vF )
A,B < 0 otherwise
(2.18)
Therefore, in the vicinity of s = 1, by the continuity of the FOCs in s, there is an s∗
such as that (τ2 − τ1) < (τ1 + s∗τ2 + vF ) and A,B > 0. Furthermore, given that B > 1,
|dτ1dF | > |dτ2dF |.
The intuition of this result is as follows. An increase in F affects both the current
utility for public good consumption and the probability of re-election, through unobserved
imputed ability ( ∂a
e
∂F1
). Why would the incumbent reduce taxes? After all, by doing this
she would be counterbalancing both of these mentioned effects. The reduction in taxes is
due to the fact that for a given level of public goods G, the extra funding from F allows
the incumbent to alleviate deadweight losses from taxes.
The mayor faces an option between two tax bases to reduce. By Equation (2.15),
the level of tax salience s governs this decision. While one tax still generates a trade-
off in terms of re-election probabilities, the fully accounted tax does not. It necessarily
implies that the less salient tax will be used more intensively. This generates a tax gap.
However, deadweight losses impose a limit on this gap. Within the interval where these
administrative costs are not binding, more specifically, when both taxes are similarly used,
the incumbent will reduce both taxes but the reduction will be more pronounced for the
fully visible tax. This will be the case when s is close to one.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Institutional Framework. Municipal Revenues in Argentina
Argentina is a federal country with three overlapping tiers of government: Federal, Provin-
cial (24) and Municipal (2284). Provinces should guarantee local autonomy, but in some
jurisdictions, it has not been fully delegated yet3. When there is autonomy, local gov-
ernments are permitted to dictate their own constitution (Municipal Charters), otherwise
they are bound by Provincial Law (Ley Orga´nica).
There is wide heterogeneity in fiscal municipal structure. Table 2.1 shows the municipal
budget composition aggregated at the provincial level. Current revenues represent an
average on 89.3% of total revenues, almost entirely explained by the combined collection
of Own Source Revenues (OSRs) and Provincial/Federal Transfers (25.6% and 54.6%
respectively). When other current revenues are important, it is because municipalities
receive funding from royalties. On the other side of the balance sheet, municipalities
spend most of their budget in Current Expenditures, nearly 76.2% of Total Expenditures
where 47.8% is Personnel Expenses, that is salaries and public wages. Nonetheless, Capital
Expenditures are also an important destiny of municipal funds, reaching 23.8% of Total
Expenditures.
Own source municipal revenues (OSRs) derive from a constellation of contributions
and taxes. Two tax bases stand out and are broadly used; property and businesses. Both
tributes are collected in different ways, partially because they overlap with provincial and
even with federal tributes4. For those municipalities where property tax has not been fully
decentralised, “Contributions on Property” are formed by a charge for services related to
lighting, street cleaning, waste management, and other similar services; sometimes labelled
as a levy on real state (Tasa General de Inmuebles). Across municipalities, this tax receives
different names; such as General Services or Council Fees, Lighting and Cleaning Fees
(Alumbrado, Barrido y Limpieza). The tax base also varies across municipalities, but it is
ultimately always associated with the property value. According to (Lo´pez Accotto et al.,
2015), 77% of municipalities use either the “fiscal” value property, taken as a proportion
of market value, or area-based assessment in general expressed as lineal front meters of
the property, or a combination of both. Sometimes, the charge is related to the location
of the property within the city. Highest rates apply for properties near the city centre and
the rate decreases in relation to some sort of zonification (concentric rings in some cases).
3Municipalities should be autonomous jurisdictions, following the mandate in Art.123 of the reformed
constitution in 1994. Institutional, bureaucratic or administrative capabilities has not been decentralised
in municipalities in the provinces of Buenos Aires, City of Bs Aires, Mendoza, La Pampa and Santa Fe.
4Property is taxed by the three tiers of government; first as a variation of wealth tax (Bienes Per-
sonales) by the federal level, then as a property tax by provinces (sometimes urban areas are delegated
to local governments and rural areas remain provincial tax base), and finally by municipal governments
either as property tax or as a contribution. Similar considerations apply for contributions on business as
it closely shares the tax base with VAT (Federal) and with Turnover Tax (Provincial).
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Table 2.1: Aggregated Municipal Budget Composition at the Provincial Level
Province
Total Revenues Total Expenditures


































Buenos Aires 89.7% 10.3% 32.3% 49.0% 8.4% 7.3% 4.8% 20.2% 84.2% 15.8% 47.9% 36.3%
Catamarca 99.0% 1.0% 15.2% 74.8% 9.0% 2.6% 8.2% 4.5% 82.8% 17.2%
Chaco 92.2% 7.8% 27.8% 58.1% 6.4% 1.9% 3.2% 2.0% 20.6% 76.6% 23.4%
Chubut 75.2% 24.8% 20.1% 17.3% 37.7% 3.9% 6.2% 3.0% 4.7% 2.4% 65.7% 34.3%
Cordoba 85.5% 14.5% 47.2% 28.6% 9.6% 8.3% 13.5% 25.5% 75.9% 24.1% 34.9% 40.9%
Corrientes 86.1% 13.9% 23.3% 60.9% 1.9% 3.2% 0.7% 3.8% 15.5% 75.3% 24.7%
Entre Rios 93.8% 6.2% 25.4% 59.5% 8.9% 3.0% 20.0% 2.4% 80.4% 19.6% 44.8% 35.6%
Formosa 100.0% 0.0% 17.2% 82.5% 0.3% 71.4% 28.6%
Jujuy 81.9% 18.1% 13.0% 64.6% 4.3% 3.2% 1.2% 8.6% 80.3% 19.7% 55.7% 24.6%
La Pampa 83.3% 16.7% 34.4% 43.3% 5.7% 7.2% 0.5% 26.7% 95.2% 4.8% 54.7% 40.4%
La Rioja 96.5% 3.5% 20.1% 71.4% 5.0% 72.1% 27.9%
Mendoza 97.8% 2.2% 16.1% 68.0% 13.7% 5.6% 2.6% 7.8% 84.7% 15.3%
Misiones 99.1% 0.9% 49.9% 48.0% 1.3% 6.9% 29.3% 13.6% 76.1% 23.9%
Neuquen 66.8% 33.2% 13.0% 46.6% 7.2% 3.4% 4.1% 5.5% 81.6% 18.4% 54.2% 27.4%
Rio Negro 91.4% 8.6% 29.5% 51.7% 10.2% 8.0% 5.9% 15.6% 75.2% 24.8% 54.7% 20.6%
Salta 90.7% 9.3% 17.4% 53.9% 19.5% 4.1% 7.3% 2.1% 3.9% 74.4% 25.6% 43.4% 31.0%
San Juan 97.4% 2.6% 25.8% 57.9% 13.7% 9.1% 3.4% 13.4% 76.9% 23.1% 41.2% 35.8%
San Luis 83.3% 16.7% 25.7% 55.1% 2.5% 3.1% 3.2% 19.4% 56.6% 43.4% 30.9% 25.7%
Santa Cruz 67.0% 33.0% 16.4% 26.4% 24.1% 0.9% 1.5% 14.0% 65.9% 34.1% 57.6% 8.3%
Santa Fe 94.1% 5.9% 44.7% 43.5% 5.9% 10.7% 15.4% 18.6% 78.5% 21.5% 50.0% 28.5%
Santiago del Estero 97.8% 2.2% 10.5% 85.3% 2.0% 68.5% 31.5%
Tierra del Fuego 95.3% 4.7% 19.2% 71.0% 5.1% 2.2% 0.8% 3.0% 13.2% 82.0% 18.0% 52.7% 29.3%
Tucuman 90.7% 9.3% 44.2% 39.0% 7.4% 5.9% 28.6% 9.7% 72.5% 27.5% 45.9% 26.6%
Total 89.3% 10.7% 25.6% 54.6% 9.1% 76.2% 23.8% 47.8% 29.4%
Source: Collected Data Set.
Notes: This Table contains municipal fiscal data aggregated at the provincial level in percentage to total revenues and total expenditures. Current Revenues sums up receipts classified by the nature of fund
flows. Other Revenues are originated in capital sales (assets for instance) and other receipts. Own Source Revenues collects a number of different contributions, licences, permits, user fees, and taxes. Provincial
and Federal Transfers consolidate grants from the provincial and the federal government and Other Current Revenues includes funding from royalties among others. Contributions on Property comprehend
rates for public services for lighting and street cleaning, some municipalities charge it as one single concept (ABL (Alumbrado, Barrido y Limpieza)) and other governments differentiate it in different user fees.
Contributions on Business - Health and Safety Tax is a fee applied to business sales, it resembles a turnover tax. Property tax is applied by some jurisdictions. Municipalities in Chubut also apply Turnover
tax. Licences, permits and other user fees are included in Other Municipal Revenues. The last four columns are calculated as a proportion of total expenditures. Total Expenditures are divided into Current
Expenditures and when possible, I also include Personnel Expenditures.
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Table 2.2: Tax Base Comparisons
Tax Base





Fixed minimum based on property




Property front meters, type of
street and use (industry, business,
etc.).
Property value
Fixed minimum based on
building area (sq. metres)
and activity plus turnover
Turnover
Corrientes Corrientes




Property area (squared meters),
type, location and use (industry,
business, etc).
Property value
Salta Salta Property value Property value
Santa Cruz Caleta Olivia Property value Property value
Tierra del Fuego Ushuaia
Property front meters, location,
category and improvements.
Property value
Source: Selected Municipal Tax Codes.
Notes: This Table compares city tax codes of municipalities in provinces where tax collection has been decentralised. In
cases where municipalities can collect Property Tax, the tax base definition has been contrasted with that of Contributions on
Properties. Chubut has also decentralised Turnover Tax to municipalities. In this case, this tax is compared with Contributions
on Businesses.
Local governments also apply local business tax. In what we have labelled “Contribu-
tions on businesses”, we include the so-called Charge for Health and Safety Inspections.
This charge is generated by services related to security, health and safety in local industries
and businesses. Although the tax base varies across municipalities, it is typically applied
as a local tax on gross receipts. Less universally, some local governments also consider
the number of employees, squares metres, localization, some sort of fixed amount of sales,
or a combination of the previous. Following Lo´pez Accotto et al. (2015), 75% of local
governments use turnover as tax base.
The theoretical model distinguishes between direct and indirect taxation, and these
two taxes are used as proxies. In addition to the previous mentioned contributions, some
municipalities apply Property and Turnover Tax. For instance, in Table 2.2 we can observe
that Property tax has been decentralised in 7 provinces. A close examination to local tax
codes shows that both, Contributions and Property Tax use valuation of the property
as tax base. Ranging from the exact same tax base, such as in Salta (Salta) or Caleta
Olivia (Santa Cruz), to indirectly capturing the value by combining property location,
front metres, area, type and use. In the province of Chubut, turnover tax has also been
decentralised. In this case, there is also a clash of similar tax bases with Contributions on
Business. Both taxes are rooted in the turnover, with minor rates for contributions and a
fixed minimum based on building area.
2.3.2 Data
The database covers an unbalanced panel of 428 local governments in Argentina (dis-
tributed in 23 provinces) over 2006-2017. It contains information on 14 fiscal variables
covering municipal own source revenues (OSRs), federal and provincial transfers, and gov-
ernment expenditure. Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics. A detailed explanation
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Table 2.3: Municipal Fiscal Data, Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Own-source Municipal Revenues pc 3,179 321.5 237.9 5.4 2,501.2
Municipal Contributions on Property pc 2,286 60.5 87.9 0.0 1,316.1
Municipal Contributions on Business pc 1,547 52.5 70.3 0.0 622.9
Municipal Tax on Property pc 357 50.2 60.7 0.0 502.1
Municipal Turnover Tax pc 278 78.7 81.3 0.0 479.0
Automatic Transfers pc 3,703 726.3 536.6 0.0 3,721.2
FFS Transfers pc 2,669 50.7 43.7 0.8 432.9
Royalties pc 820 303.0 366.6 0.0 2,046.5
Discretionary Transfers pc 2,279 131.1 226.2 0.0 3,858.3
Personnel Expenses pc 2,413 706.2 627.5 76.5 6,270.4
Current Revenues pc 3,128 1,243.5 721.2 0.0 6,072.4
Current Expenditures pc 2,193 1,243.6 947.1 154.2 8,684.1
Total Revenues pc 3,251 1,686.4 2,922.6 208.7 106,862.2
Total Expenditure pc 3,576 1,651.4 2,790.7 192.9 106,862.2
Municipal Population 4,221 69,980.2 162,865.5 50 1,775,816
Note: This Table displays summary statistics for the main variables of interest. Constant values are
in Argentinian pesos in 2007 ($1 ARS peso=U$S 0.3203).
of data sources can be found on Appendix B.1.
As mentioned in the previous section, there is wide heterogeneity in municipal budgets.
The first clear pattern is that municipalities rely heavily on provincial and federal transfers
(Automatic Transfers pc). OSRs are second order when it comes to sources of revenues.
The second observation is that Contributions on Property and on Business are similar in
size to FFS transfers, so we can potentially observe substitution effect for these sources
of revenues. It is worth mentioning that the relatively small number of observations for
Tax on Property, Turnover Tax and Royalties are due to the fact that these taxes are
not widespread. Moreover, Turnover Tax is only collected at the municipal level in the
province of Chubut. Royalties are also limited to a small number of provinces. When
present in municipal budgets, they constitute a relevant source of revenue.
Table 2.4 provides an aggregated overview of the data set. According to the 2010
National Census of Population, Households, and Housing (INDEC), there were 2284 local
governments in the country distributed in 23 provinces, plus the Autonomous City of
Buenos Aires. In terms of coverage, the 428 units in the sample account for 77% of total
country population. The bulk of information is grouped around 2009, the year where the
Federal Solidarity Fund (FFS) was implemented. This is the result of having made every
effort to have pre and post FFS creation data, in order to have fiscal variation in the panel
structure. The sample continues up to 2017.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Buenos Aires 15,625,084 135 135 15,625,084 100% 134 134 134 134 134 135 135 135 40 54 59
Catamarca 367,828 36 1 159,703 43% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chaco 1,055,259 68 2 322,310 31% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Chubut 509,108 47* 27 496,389 98% 25 26 26 27 27 27 27 26 25 25 24 22
Cordoba 3,308,876 427* 19 2,030,851 61% 2 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 10 13 13 17
Corrientes 992,595 72* 3 479,993 48% 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
Entre Rios 1,235,994 274* 78 1,145,353 93% 76 76 77 77 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Formosa 530,162 55* 2 275,724 52% 1 1 2 1
Jujuy 673,307 60 3 368,199 55% 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
La Pampa 318,951 80 3 173,044 54% 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
La Rioja 333,642 18 1 180,995 54% 1 1 1 1
Mendoza 1,738,929 18 18 1,738,929 100% 9 9 11 16 16 16 15 12 13 13 13 13
Misiones 1,101,593 75 3 407,607 37% 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3
Neuquen 551,266 57* 37 532,220 97% 32 33 32 26 30 25 16 2 31 25 30 2
Rio Negro 638,645 76 5 372,095 58% 1 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4
Salta 1,214,441 60 15 828,120 68% 1 12 7 3 12 6 8 2 2 1 1 1
San Juan 681,055 19 3 276,653 41% 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1
San Luis 432,310 68* 49 305,849 71% 27 35 2 45 47 44 40 47 41 38 35
Santa Cruz 273,964 27* 3 168,418 61% 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
Santa Fe 3,194,537 363 16 1,929,259 60% 1 7 10 14 12 13 13 13 13 10 11 10 13
Santiago del Estero 874,006 117* 2 359,859 41% 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tierra del Fuego 127,205 5* 2 123,068 97% 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Tucuman 1,448,188 112* 1 548,866 38% 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-total 37,226,945 2,269 428 28,848,588 77% 1 83 349 368 331 392 380 368 339 374 265 283 259
City of Buenos Aires 2,890,151 15
Total 40,117,096 2,284
Source: + National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) 2016, National Census of Population, Households, and Housing 2010, and Collected Data Set. * Areas classified
as rural zones, disputed zones (in Corrientes), and Ranquel Country (in San Luis), are not included in the number of local governments, but their population is distributed in the corresponding province.
Rural zones are defined as areas of population less than 2,000 and on ”open country”, combined they sum up 470,909 habitants.
Notes: This Table shows a general overview of the collected dataset. In the first part of the Table, the number of municipalities in sample is contrasted to the total, including percentage of population
covered. In the second part, a distribution per province and year is detailed.
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In Appendix B.1, we use sample control to check how closely the dataset resembles
the population of local governments in the country. We contrast the distribution of three
groups of variables, potentially associated with municipal tax collection, between the sam-
ple and the entire set of municipalities. These variables contain information on human
capital, property and basic services at the municipal level. We find that discrepancies be-
tween both datasets are reduced when we consider local governments greater than 10,000
habitants.
Lastly, one of the key contributions of this newly collected database is that it covers
the principal subcomponents of own source municipal revenues (OSRs); Contributions on
Property and Contribution on Businesses. Collapsing this data also posed some challenges
mainly because of registration issues. What we call Contributions on Property receives a
number of different labels across municipalities, sometimes as one single concept or sepa-
rated into sub-concepts. As discussed earlier, to a certain extent, all these classifications
use some variation of the value of the property as a base for the tax. Similarly, Con-
tributions on Businesses is in effect a local tax on gross receipts. A local turnover tax,
with different tax rates per activity. In order to make these bases comparable, local legal
dispositions have been scrutinised to check for similarity across tax bases definitions.
2.3.3 Winners and Losers of FTSA 23,548
The empirical strategy exploits the particular way the Federal Solidarity Fund (FFS) was
distributed to provinces. According to the presidential decree, these funds were going to be
apportioned using coefficient-shares pre-established in the Federal Tax-sharing Agreement
(FTSA), Law 23,548. The system generates enormous asymmetries. For instance, in per
capita terms in 2009, Tierra del Fuego received 6.5 times more than Buenos Aires and
11.8 times compared to the City of Buenos Aires.
The root of these disparities lies in the fact that provincial shares are not defined
by formula in the FTSA. They are fixed and the result of political negotiations between
1985-1987 that ended up with the sanction of “transitory” Law 23,548 in 1988. Meant to
last for only one year, this not-so-transitory Law has survived for more than 30 years. An
effective deadlock was imposed5. This generates an FTSA system that is perceived as a
close-end, unconditional, lump-sum grant (Besfamille et al., 2017). There is no bargaining
in Congress for these resources and, given that it is not defined by objective indicators,
there is no incentive to affect institutional or economic variables to get more funding.
A number of political and incentive problems can be traced back to the disproportional
influx of FTSA funds some provinces receive (for instance, Gervasoni (2010)).
From the contrast between what constitutes an “optimal” distribution and actual
coefficients we can obtain winners and losers of the current regime. A number of studies
have attempted to establish what would be an appropriate distribution of federal funds
5The Reform requires the approval of both federal chambers and each provincial Legislature. The
deadlock has been so successful in preventing structural modifications to secondary distribution, that even
though by Constitutional mandate in 1994 a new regime should have been passed no later than 1996,
actual coefficients are still based on Law 23,548.
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in compliance with the Constitution6 (for a survey, see Piffano (2004)7). However, these
preferences are strongly influenced by institutional and political factors. To account for
this, we use the last legislation related to FTSA; the Law 20,221 in 19738. In this law, the
secondary distribution is based in three factors: 25% by development gap (using Human
Development Index -HDI), 10% by demographic dispersion, and 65% by population. A
very relevant point is that these coefficients were the starting point for the above-mentioned
negotiations between 1985-1987, hence they reflect direct winners and losers from the
current system.
By comparing these two laws we obtain our “Windfall Intensity”(Wk) variable, where
the sub-index k reflects provincial variation. In Table 2.5, we contrast coefficients in Law
20,221 with those used to distribute FFS funds in 2009. Thus, “Windfall Intensity” is
a correction factor, a ratio between both coefficients. Those provinces with a windfall
intensity less than one lost in negotiations, and otherwise. Wk takes the form;
Windfall Intensity = Wk =
Coefficients Law 20,221
Coefficients Law 23,548
for k = 1, ..., 24
Two points stand out from Table 2.5. The first one is that most provinces managed
to keep similar coefficients in 1988, as WI is compressed around one. The second issue is
that Buenos Aires is the greatest loser from the actual regime. Buenos Aires received 21%
less of what it would have obtained if Law 20,221 were still in use. At the expense of this
jurisdiction, smaller provinces ended up in a much better situation after 1988. The case
of Tierra del Fuego is exemplary. This province received 0.4% of federal funds in 1973,
and that proportion had escalated to 1.2% in 2009, a threefold increase9.
As a second stage, once provinces received the FFS funds, they were required to
redistribute “at least” 30% to municipalities. In the diagram in Figure 2.1, an overview
is displayed on the flow of funds reaching fictional Municipality “A”. As a first step,
30% of FFS were distributed to provinces using coefficients in Federal Law 23,548 (1988).
This is where the exogenous disproportional influx of funds is generated for the reasons
mentioned before. In the second step, at least 30% of funds received by the provinces
6In the Constitutional reform in 1994 it was established that federal transfers should be “equitable,
committed to solidarity and will prioritize the achievement of an equivalent degree of development, quality
of life and equal opportunities.” (Article 75, subsection 2).
7In general, most of these proposals put an important weight on Population, either directly or indirectly.
There is also agreement on the use of development indexes to address inequalities across jurisdictions, such
as Human Development Index (HDI) or the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (UBN). It is also acknowledged
the necessity of encouraging provincial fiscal effort and therefore the importance of including a measure
of own-source revenues or expenditure allocation (see Annex B.2 for a comparison for three selected
proposals).
8This Law was passed by the military government but ratified and extended for ten years by democratic
Congress (Porto, 2004).
9Both Laws, 20,221 and 23,548, are redacted in somewhat an intricate way when it comes to the
distribution of funds to the City of Buenos Aires (municipality at that moment), and Tierra del Fuego. In
Law 20,221 it is established that the City of Buenos Aires and Tierra del Fuego would get 1.8% and 0.2%
of the portion accrued to the Federal Government. On the contrary, in Law 23,548, 0.7% of total collected
funds would go to Tierra del Fuego and 1.4% to the City of Buenos Aires. For the sake of comparison,
coefficients have been normalised to 1 in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Deviations from the Optimal
Coefficients Deviations
Province Distribution FFS Law 20,221 Law 20,221 Windfall Intensity
(A) (B) =(A)/(B)
Buenos Aires 0.212 0.269 -21.08% 0.789
Catamarca 0.027 0.019 43.74% 1.437
Chaco 0.048 0.040 21.58% 1.216
Chubut 0.015 0.018 -14.93% 0.851
Cordoba 0.086 0.085 0.38% 1.004
Corrientes 0.036 0.036 -1.22% 0.988
Entre Rios 0.047 0.044 7.60% 1.076
Formosa 0.035 0.022 59.97% 1.600
Jujuy 0.027 0.021 29.44% 1.294
La Pampa 0.018 0.017 4.91% 1.049
La Rioja 0.020 0.017 20.87% 1.209
Mendoza 0.040 0.045 -11.27% 0.887
Misiones 0.032 0.028 12.21% 1.122
Neuquen 0.017 0.016 1.61% 1.016
Rio Negro 0.024 0.022 10.36% 1.104
Salta 0.037 0.036 2.87% 1.029
San Juan 0.033 0.025 33.13% 1.331
San Luis 0.022 0.017 30.89% 1.309
Santa Cruz 0.015 0.014 10.60% 1.106
Santa Fe 0.086 0.087 -0.76% 0.992
Santiago del Estero 0.040 0.039 3.56% 1.036
Tierra del Fuego 0.012 0.004 200.79% 3.008
Tucuman 0.046 0.044 5.12% 1.051
City of Buenos Aires (CABA) 0.024 0.036 -33.34% 0.667
Total Provinces + CABA 1 1
Note: Two distributions of federal funds are displayed in this Table, FFS apportionment based on FTSA Law
23,548, and Law 20,221. The coefficients in Law 20,221 from 1973 were formed in 25% by development gap
(Development Human Index), 10% by demographic dispersion, and 65% by population. In the last column,
Windfall Intensity variable is calculated
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of FFS Scheme Presidential Decree 206/2009
Federal Solidarity Fund (FFS) – 30% Soy Exports (£1 B.)
Secondary Distribution- Coefficients in 
Federal Law 23,548 (1988)











“At least” 30% redistributed 
to Municipalities -
Provincial Law
Eg.: “Municipality A” flow of Federal Funds: 
(FFS*X%)*0.30*A%
Note: This Figure shows the two stages that take the FFS to reach Municipality “A”. The differential impact
is created in the first stage, where funds are apportioned to provinces using the coefficients in FTSA 23,548.
Then, provinces redistribute “at least” 30% to municipalities. In this second stage, provincial laws were
normally used.
was redistributed to municipalities using local Laws. A relevant point here is to prove
that there were no negotiations between provinces and municipalities for these funds, as
it would weaken the point of exogeneity being originated in the initial redistribution. In
the next subsection, provincial handling of these funds is closely analysed.
2.3.3.1 Description of FFS Distribution per Province
The empirical strategy relies on the disproportional influx of funds resulting from using
FTSA to apportion funds to provinces. Given that provinces further decentralised FFS to
municipalities, it is important to rule out any involvement of municipalities in this decision.
Table 2.6 shows a detailed account of the legal instrument used by provinces to adhere
(and to receive) FFS transfers and the form of distribution to municipalities. Nearly 80%
of provinces used a provincial Decree. This portrays a picture of an agile and expedite legal
process only involving the executive branch. Laws, on the other hand, require negotiation
in the legislature where municipalities might have some influence. Nonetheless, when Laws
were used, they were dictated before the end of March, also in super-fast negotiations.
As a result, apportionment to municipalities rarely differs from already cemented Laws
of provincial distribution of funds or “Coparticipations”. Two types of deviations are
found. First, local governments in some jurisdictions received more than 30% of FFS
(Chubut 32.8%, Neuquen 30.8% and Salta 50%). Second, some provinces established new
coefficients of distribution of funds. In Neuquen, 29.199% of funds were distributed using
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Date Apportionment to Municipalities* Distribution %
Buenos Aires Decree 440 01/04/2009 Law 10559 (1988) - Coparticipation 30%
Catamarca Decree 280 27/03/2009 Law 5174 (2005) - Coparticipation 30%
Chaco Decree 535 20/03/2009 Law 3188 (1986) - Coparticipation 30%
Chubut Law II 109 31/03/2009 Law II 6 (1974) - Coparticipation 32.80%
Cordoba Decree 369 01/04/2009 Law 8663 (1998) - Coparticipation 30%
Corrientes Decree 399 19/03/2009 Law 5152 (1996) - Coparticipation 30%
Entre Rios Decree 758 26/03/2009 Law 8492 (1991) - Coparticipation 30%
Formosa Law 1532 26/03/2009 Law 766 (1998) - Coparticipation 30%
Jujuy Decree 2861 27/03/2009
Proportion ”similar” to Provincial
Coparticipation - Law 5329 (2002)
30%
La Pampa Law 2477 26/03/2009
Law 1065 (1988) and Law 2460 (2008) -
Coparticipation
30%
La Rioja Decree 357 25/03/2009
Established new coefficients in the Law, but
they resemble those in Decree 757 (1982) -
Coparticipation
30%
Mendoza Law 8028 26/03/2009 Law 6396 (1996) - Coparticipation 30%
Misiones Decree 292 26/03/2009 Law 2535 (1988) - Coparticipation 30%
Neuquen Decree 739 31/03/2009
29,199% according to Provincial Law 2148
(1993) - Coparticipation; 1,602% following new
coefficients established in the Decree
30.80%
Rio Negro Decree 82 24/03/2009 Law 1946 (1985) - Coparticipation 30%
Salta Decree 1368 25/03/2009
30% according to Decree 798 (1978) -
Coparticipation; 20% according to new
coefficients established in the present Decree
50%
San Juan Law 7972 23/03/2009 Law 7947 (2008) ”Provincial Budget” 30%
San Luis Decree 418 01/04/2009 Law 5537 (2004) - Coparticipation 30%
Santa Cruz Decree 517 01/04/2009 Law 1494 (1982) - Coparticipation 30%
Santa Fe Decree 486 31/03/2009 Law 7457 (1975) - Coparticipation 30%
Santiago del Estero Decree 198 26/03/2009 Law 6426 (1998) - Coparticipation 30%
Tierra del Fuego Decree 636 27/03/2009 Law 191 (1983) - Coparticipation 30%
Tucuman Decree 14/3 23/03/2009 Law 6316 (1991) - Coparticipation 30%
Notes: This Table details the legal instrument, the date, and the percentage used by provinces to redistribute
FFS to municipalities. Most provinces followed previous laws, but some cases sanctioned new legal instruments.
Law 2,148 (1993), and an additional 1.602% was used to create a “Compensatory Fund”
to be distributed among 8 municipalities (out of 57). Similarly, Salta distributed 30%
using pre-dated Coparticipation Law, and the additional 20% following new coefficients10.
This would pose a particular challenge to the empirical strategy. Either by receiving a
bigger share of FFS funds or by getting extra funding caused by coefficient modification,
some municipalities are directly receiving more transfers as a result of the provincial
decree, not only as a consequence of the application of Federal Tax Share Agreement. It
is possible that these negotiations might confound the channel of FFS effect. The most
straightforward way of dealing with this is by excluding these municipalities from our
working sample. As it will be shown in the following sections, this improves results but
10Although La Rioja and San Juan set new coefficients, these procedures were standard. In La Rioja,
there is no Law regulating distribution of provincial funds. The criteria followed for FFS resembled that
of Decree 757, dated 1982. In a similar case, in the absence of a provincial Law, San Juan distributed
FFS funds according to 2009 Budget, sanctioned in 2008. (for a detailed explanation of provincial laws for
transfer of funds to municipalities see Dı´az Frers (2013)
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does not affect main conclusions.
2.3.4 Main Findings
In this section, the differential impact of federal transfers on municipal revenues is exam-
ined. The identification strategy relies on the exogenous effect of FFS generated by appor-
tioning funds using the FTSA agreements. We apply event case difference-in-differences
analysis for winners and losers of the current FTSA scheme, the source of exogenous
treatment. Following Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), we estimate the following model:
Tikt = α0 + α1(Wk ∗ POSTt) + αZit + µi + vt + εikt (2.19)
Where i stands for municipality, located in province k at year t. Tikt = (
T
P )ikt is the
dependent variable in per capita logs, and involves different sources of municipal revenues.
Wk “Windfall Intensity” in logs, combines exogenous deviations in FTSA coefficients as
in Table 2.5 at the provincial level, it is our continuous policy variable11 POSTt is the
“treatment” variable, the application of the FFS fund, which takes one for all jurisdictions
after 2009 and zero otherwise. Zit is a vector of covariates such as log of GGP per capita
and Automatic Transfers per capita (in logs), one of the main sources or revenues for
Municipalities. Jurisdiction (µi) and time fixed effects (vt) are included. The years under
analysis cover 2006-2015 period. In December 2015, the Federal Government started a
process of shrinking FFS resources, triggered by a gradual reduction in the export duty
rate, followed by an altogether elimination in 2018. All standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
As explained before, we are interested in the effect FFS had on municipalities that
disproportionally benefited from its creation. The term Wk ∗ POSTt captures that inter-
action. Two important aspects are worth mentioning for our baseline results. First, for
the sake of getting an intuitive insight regarding substitution or complementarity of tax
bases, I use municipalities with complete revenue data. Given that there were different
degrees of accessibility of data, the database contains more observations for Total Rev-
enues, than for OSRs or for Contributions on Property. In order to account for that, I use
municipalities with complete data on composition of revenues. In the robustness section
I drop this restriction and show that the main results are unaffected by this. Secondly,
in the baseline regressions we omit small towns of less than 10,000 habitants. There are
both theoretical and empirical grounds to do so. Theoretically, the framework portraits a
model where the incumbent “hides” behind less visible tax sources. For small municipali-
ties this no longer holds, as the local mayor is presumably well known for all. Additionally,
transparency for small municipalities is very weak. By including them I would possibly
be uncovering some other effects related to different institutional designs. On empirical
grounds, during the data collection stage, I only intensively searched for municipalities
greater than 10,000. This does not mean that there are no small towns in the sample
though. The minimum town size with available fiscal data is 50 people (see Table 2.3). In
11We express Wk in logs to facilitate interpretation of coefficients.
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the robustness section B.4, we relax these two restrictions by using the entire unbalanced
dataset and by including 5,000 and 0 population thresholds. Main results are unaffected.
The baseline set of results are displayed in Table 2.7. Equation (2.19) is estimated for
four different sources of municipal revenues. While Panel A is run without covariates, in
Panel B the same regression includes Log of Automatic Transfers per capita and Provin-
cial Gross Geographic Product per capita. The first row of the table recovers αˆ1, the
behaviour after 2009 product of differential windfall intensity. The coefficients -0.338 and
-0.501 for the column of Log Contributions on Property per capita indicate that after re-
moving mean municipal and common year effects, there is a fall between 3.38% and 5.01%
percentage points in this revenue source for a 10% increase in windfall intensity after 2009.
In the same direction, Total Revenues experienced a reduction of 1.37%, but this effect
vanishes when covariates are included. These finding suggest that there actually was a
substitution of revenues after 2009, where the extra FFS funding was used to alleviate
Property contributions, and with no effect on Own-source municipal collections.
Table 2.7: Impact of 2009 Windfall on Municipal Revenues, 2006 - 2015
Panel A: No Control Covariates











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0947 -0.338+++ -0.144 -0.137++
(0.0852) (0.126) (0.241) (0.0600)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1516 1500 1314 1394
Number of municipal clusters 209 212 194 208
Panel B: Control Covariates











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.135 -0.501++ -0.137 -0.0603
(0.106) (0.237) (0.255) (0.0598)
Log Provincial GGP pc -0.203 0.772 0.150 -0.350+
(0.237) (0.771) (0.592) (0.181)
Log Automatic Transfers pc 0.0427 -0.0340 0.140 0.516+++
(0.0900) (0.210) (0.307) (0.0809)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1447 1432 1265 1339
Number of municipal clusters 207 209 191 206
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents our baseline calculations of Model (2.19) for different municipal revenues, without
covariates in Panel A, and including provincial GGP and automatics transfers in Panel B. Municipal and year
fixed effects are included.
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In terms of the behaviour of municipal revenues, it is interesting to analyse the initial
impact and subsequent adaptation to the windfall. For that purpose, in Figure 2.2 we re-
estimate Equation 2.19 with covariates, and sequentially expand the period of study. In
Plot 2.2a the interaction term (Wk ∗ POSTt) on Contributions on Property for year 2009
(α1) only includes observations over the period 2006-2009. For 2010, I run Equation 2.19
adding one extra year of observations (that is 2006-2010)12. For a more visual perspective,
I also include 95% confidence intervals. While Contributions on Property seem to have
shifted to a new permanent path of smaller revenues, Total Incomes show a sharp decline in
2009, followed by a three year recovery. As a consequence, over the period 2006-2015 there
is no significant change. Both Contributions on Business and OSRs reveal a somewhat
erratic pre-2009 behaviour, and no conclusive effect afterwards.
Recovering post intervention causal effects requires parallel trends and no anticipatory
behaviour assumptions to be satisfied. Given the unexpected nature of the creation of FFS,
the simultaneity and the form it was distributed, we can rule out any sort of anticipatory
reaction. For the parallel trends’ requirement, in the Appendix B.3, a combination of
visual tools with the more rigorous lead and lags method are used. From this analysis
it emerges that these assumptions hold. Lastly, in Appendix B.4 we try several different
specifications to see how robust are these findings13. In these checks we do not observe
any important alteration of results, thus evidence seems to corroborate the reduction of
Contributions on Property after 2009.
Taken together, findings from this Section suggest that there was a significant change
on municipal revenues after the influx of FFS funds, driven by the reduction of Con-
tributions on Property. We connect this result to the theoretical model by noting that
disproportional winners of current system reduced some visible and accountable tax bases,
because they can rely on more obscure and less transparent fiscal revenues. Given that
Contributions on Property tax collection demands stronger investments in fiscal capacity
building, there can be long term effects from this substitution.
12For the period that goes from 2006 to 2008, the point estimate is given by simulating 2007 or 2008
as the first year under of the application of FFS. A similar analysis will be performed in the placebo test
section.
13These alternatives include extending the data set to account for incompleteness by using an unbal-
anced panel, running placebo falsification test for years 2007 and 2008, expanding the sample to smaller
municipalities (less than 10,000), controlling for provinces where the FFS was distributed following new
patterns, including provincial fixed effects, restricting the sample to using only executed budget data,
exploring the similarity of tax bases when municipalities could also apply Property Tax and Turnover Tax,
changing our Windfall Intensity measure to per-capita influx of funds, and comparing those municipalities
at the tails of the distribution (top 25% and bottom 25% in Windfall Intensity).
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Note: These Figures portrait post-FFS adaptation for the four municipal revenues studied in this section. Each
point estimate (and the 95% confidence intervals) uses Model (2.19) but sequentially expanding the period
including that specified year.
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2.4 Conclusions
The application of the FFS fund in 2009 seems to have permitted some municipalities in
Argentina to exploit the benefits of unearned income. In this chapter we have argued that
local governments that received disproportional inflow of funds have reduced municipal
direct taxation. This can be potentially damaging for accountability at the subnational
level as weak tax-benefit linkages can have pervasive effects and they can be difficult to
revert.
Local mayors can exploit opaque tax structures in different ways. We have explored
these options in the theoretical model. By building a career concerns model, where the
local mayor can run for re-election, having three sources of revenues can give an edge in
the electoral contest. The incumbent in our model exploits the lack of visibility in some
tax instruments, in federal transfers, and in her unknown ability. One possibility is to base
their local budget on less visible tax sources in such a way that some portion of public
good consumption is confounded by voters and assigned to mayor’s ability. The other
possibility is to use extra budget due to transfers to relax taxing pressures. By doing this,
the incumbent would be seen as an efficient administrator and capable politician, which
increases the chances of re-election.
The empirical findings seem to support this behaviour in those municipalities located
in provinces winners from the Federal Share Tax Agreement. By using a newly collected
dataset of 428 local governments over 2006-2017, we explored the unexpected creation of
Federal Solidarity Fund in 2009. The influx of funds to local governments was immense.
In some cases, it matched the amount collected by principal components of own-source
municipal revenues. The most important finding was that while total budget did not
increase after FFS, these extra sources were used to reduce the visible Contributions on
Property. These results were consistent and robust to a number of checks.
While Argentinian fiscal structure is special in many ways, the results of this chapter
can be linked to the flourishing literature on effects of federal transfers in Brazil and
other subnational governments. This literature points out to interesting directions for
future research. It is natural to think about the political benefits of resource windfalls
(re-election probabilities, candidate selection, and corruption).
The importance of strengthening local budget constraints has been highlighted in the
literature (for instance in Bird (2011)). The increase in funding for local governments can
wipe out some benefits of decentralisation if some perverse institutional features are caused
by loose budgets and unaccountable politicians. It is the reinforcement of the pervasive
effects that we have explored in this chapter by observing the tax structure change due
to extra funds. The decrease in direct taxation that we observe for local governments in





Design. Municipal Charters in
Argentina
Abstract
This chapter explores the effect of socio-economic segregation on the probability of
sanctioning Municipal Charters (MC) for municipalities in Argentina. Using Census
data for years 2001 and 2010, we first develop municipal segregation measures for three
variables; education levels, unsatisfied basic needs, and overcrowded households. We
obtain the Gini Segregation Index (G) and the Information Theory Index (H) taking
advantage of the disaggregation of municipalities in census tracts units. Subsequently,
exploiting the timing of plausibly exogenous provincial constitutional reforms granting
municipalities the right to adopt MC, we analyse the time to reform and the main
factors driving this decision. The findings indicate a positive and consistent association
between segregation indexes and the likelihood of adopting a charter; the more unequal




This chapter is concerned with the effect of local segregation on the likelihood of adopting
Municipal Charters (MC) in Argentinian municipalities. Local Constitutions, or Municipal
Charters, constitute one the most important pillars under which some democratic countries
are organised. They define political institutions and reflect local preferences. Being an
agreement on political choices, certain frictions on conflicting interests arise. Is segregation
a driving force in shaping municipal charters? Do unequal cities prefer a more developed
institutional landscape by having its own “Carta Orga´nica”?
Previous studies have looked at factors explaining the sanction of municipal charters
in the US (Maser, 1985, 1998; McDonald and Gabrini, 2014). Maser (1985, 1998) develops
a theoretical model of “Constitutional Contracts” where alternative forms of governments
are seen as competing investments. Given that these “relational contracts” create a system
of rewards and penalties, each citizen will have a defined preference over these outcomes;
Municipal charters will be an aggregation of individual preferences into social choices.
Theoretically, local heterogeneity, or city income inequality, will be a factor influencing the
adoption of specific constitutional rules; such as safeguards (for instance, recall provisions).
Contributing to this literature, and using a similar method to our paper, McDonald and
Gabrini (2014) estimate the probability of adopting a charter in 67 counties in the State of
Florida. Their findings highlight the importance of economic factors, but inequality is not
modelled. To date, the existing account of empirical evidence has been mixed regarding
the impact of socio-economic characteristics, especially inequality, on this constitutional
event. Furthermore, the literature on this topic has been disperse and centred in the US.
In this paper, we provide an assessment on whether segregation in education levels,
poverty and unsatisfied basic needs is correlated to having MC in Argentina. Citizen’s
preferences over institutions translate into constitutional settings in intricate ways. Given
the likely endogeneity of Constitutions to economic fundamentals, it is challenging to
empirically answer such questions. In order to address that, I exploit differential time gaps
(in years) between the plausibly exogenous recognition of municipal autonomy, granted
by provincial constitutional reform, and the year when the municipality sanctioned its
Municipal Charter. I proceed in three steps. First, I obtain measures of segregation at the
subnational level using Census 2001 and Census 2010 data. Second, I study the process
of sanctioning municipal charters across provinces. Nineteen out of twenty-four provinces
allow their municipalities to sanction their MC, but nearly half of the eligible municipalities
have adopted one (178 out of 409). It stands out that there are important provincial factors
that drive municipal reforms, as 132 non-reformers (32%) are concentrated in provinces
with 0 MC events1. Lastly, Cox proportional hazards model is used to analyse the effect
of both the time to reform and the segregation levels in Argentinian municipalities.
The contributions of this study are twofold. First, this chapter adds to the new and
growing literature that attempts to measure segregation in Argentina using Census data.
A number of papers measure local socio-economic characteristics, but they are generally
1In Entre Rios, Formosa, La Rioja, Santa Cruz, and Tucuman.
71
case studies based in one city. In this chapter, segregation indexes are generated for more
than 400 localities. Rodr´ıguez (2019) is closely related to our work in developing measures
of income aﬄuence to a large number of municipalities, 789 cities, but his work is centred
around correcting flaws of segregation measures for places with small number of census
tracts. While his point is taken in our study, the institutional limits imposed by provinces
to dictate MC, usually more than 10,000 habitants, leave us with medium to large cities.
This means that we work with municipalities with large number of census tracts, averag-
ing out, or at least alleviating, any bias in our measures. Moreover, a conformed panel
structure naturally emerges from using Census tracts from 2001 and 2010 rounds. These
segregation measures derive from three variables that capture socio-economic conditions;
household head’s education levels, unsatisfied basic needs, and overcrowded households.
The second contribution is to empirically analyse the connection between segregation
and institutional change. To the best of my knowledge, for the very same empirical hurdles
mentioned above, the correlations between MC sanctioning and economic segregation have
not been explored for municipalities in Argentina. The timing of reform is a crucial
element in our analysis. Resembling a survival framework, where a clock starts counting
when provinces grant MC for the first time and stops at the time of reform, duration
analysis and its rich empirical apparatus seem appropriate to explore these correlations.
For the two calculated indexes, Gini Segregation Index (G) and Information Theory Index
(H), I estimate the Cox proportional hazards model. The baseline results point out to an
increase in the likelihood of sanctioning MC between 4.9% and 6.6% for a unit change in
the Gini Segregation Index.
Municipal autonomy is for some subnational entities the culmination of hard-fought
institutional decentralisation. There is an extensive body of research that deals with the
pervasive effects of decentralisation on local accountability, corruption, clientelism and
elite capture (for a survey see Mookherjee (2015); Mansuri and Rao (2012)). This lit-
erature is far from conclusive. An interesting point raised by Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000) highlights that elite capture at the local level seems difficult to predict vis a vis the
centralised alternative. The authors build a model that considers electoral competition
and local elites exercising lobby. It is the multiplicity of factors that affect the likelihood of
capture (interest-group cohesiveness, voters’ awareness, electoral competition and hetero-
geneity), that makes the final equilibrium hard to pin down. However, we are interested in
the reverse channel; the connection that runs from socio-economic residential segregation,
spatial and income inequalities, to institutional change.
This paper also relates to the research that explores the economic fundamentals behind
democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. This literature is vast and varied,
but the closest to our framework are the studies of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001,
2008), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Lagunoff (2009), and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010). This set
of papers, both empirical and theoretical, give a preponderant role to economic conditions
that facilitate endogenous institutional change. The conflicting role of polarisation, in-
equality and elite capture is particularly relevant. We add to this literature by exploiting
the exogenous exposition of some municipalities to self-selection of a major constitutional
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event, the sanctioning of MC, and the forces that play a role in this.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I start by reviewing the
extensive scholarship on how inequality (and segregation) influences institutions. Second,
using Census data for 2001 and 2010, I present newly developed measures of income
segregation for municipalities in Argentina. Third, I use the Cox semi-parametric Survival
Model to estimate the relationship between inequality and the probability of sanctioning
municipal charters. Finally, I conclude.
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3.2 Conceptual Framework
There are many reasons why municipal charters may be related to socio-economic seg-
regation at the local level. In this section we explore four strands of literature. First,
we present research related to the consequences of local segregation. Even though a di-
verse number of effects have been analysed, we find that institutional consequences have
been overlooked. Second, we connect the endogenous institutional change literature and
its main drivers. The body of research linking economic fundamentals with democratic
processes is vast and robust, but its application to different menus of institutional re-
forms (subnational constitutions) is less spread. Third, this diverse scale of organisation
in some countries is connected to the decentralisation literature. In this strand of research,
the role of vested-interest groups and the likelihood of elite capture has been extensively
analysed. Nonetheless, rather than exploring the effects of programs or countries when
decentralising, we argued in favour of the other direction, going from local socio-economic
characteristics to institutional settings. Finally, we explore the “Constitutional Contract
Theory” that sees municipal charters as aggregation of local preferences. Not only this
work is concentrated in one country, the US, but also we observe that empirical results
are far from conclusive.
3.2.1 Local Segregation and Diverse Outcomes
Although a large body of literature focuses on outcomes related to residential segregation,
very little research has been done on institutional consequences. A great deal of previous
research is focused in the US, but has connected segregation with different outcomes such
as racial sorting (Massey and Denton, 1988; Reardon and Bischoff, 2011; Reardon et al.,
2008, 2015), social upward mobility (Chetty et al., 2018; Bergman et al., 2019) and even
voting patterns (Williamson, 2008; Hersh and Nall, 2016). Reardon et al. (2015) finds
that households with similar income but racial/ethnic differences are located in different
neighbourhoods. For instance, middle class black households are generally located in poor
areas. The political connection is relevant to our work on institutional change. Williamson
(2008) explores the connection of local uses and characteristics, such as housing stock and
car-oriented suburbs, and their association with conservative political outlooks in counties
in the US. Similarly based in the US, Hersh and Nall (2016) connects partisanship in the
local area with racial composition, rather than with the economic context.
This literature normally makes use of data aggregated at census tracts level. A re-
cent application to mapping social mobility in the Unites States has been developed by
Chetty et al. (2018). The “Opportunity Atlas”, available for public use, estimates chil-
dren’s economic outcomes using Census data2. The authors find that children’s success
in adulthood is substantially affected by neighbourhood conditions. Moreover, by study-
ing families who moved with young dependants, the authors are able to provide a causal
link between relocation and upward mobility for children. Local conditions seem to mat-
ter. Studying the very same “Opportunity Atlas”, Bergman et al. (2019) analyse why
2See https://www.opportunityatlas.org/
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low-income families stay in low-opportunity areas. The researchers offer a natural ex-
planation; high-income areas impose barriers to moving, such as discriminatory housing
practices. Simply overcoming these frictions can be welfare enhancing in terms of upward
social mobility. Therefore, the residential mix is an important feature of some places,
and it is only natural to wonder about its institutional consequences. Nonetheless, little
research has connected these two areas.
3.2.2 Inequality and Institutional Change
Endogenous institutional change has also been analysed in the literature. There is a large
body of research dealing with elite capture and the selection of forms of government (Li-
jphart, 1992; Easter, 1997; Nakaguma, 2015; Robinson and Torvik, 2016). The majority
of previous studies focuses in two main dimensions of constitutional design, majoritarian
versus proportional representation electoral systems, or between presidential and parlia-
mentary government. Related to our work, political elites can actively pursue different
institutional settings in their model.
A strand of this literature connects economic fundamentals with democratic transi-
tions. In an influential paper, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that democratiza-
tion processes, such as franchise extension, can be analysed as strategic setting by ruling
elites to prevent social unrest or revolution. Inequality plays a pivotal role in increasing
the chances of revolution, inducing elites to democratise to attenuate it. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) extend this model to switches between democracy and autocracy observed
around the world, especially in Latin America and Africa. The origin of transitions results
from the fact that in democracies, poor might target elites through taxation, and rich will
try to mount a coup to regain power. Consolidation of democracy in such scenarios is
more difficult. In their model, inequality again seems to play a crucial role; concentrated
economic power in small groups will increase political instability. Acemoglu et al. (2007)
associate income inequality with political inequality. A small portion of society may have
disproportionate institutional power. Using historical data in Cundinamarca municipali-
ties in Colombia, and the mayors’ political affiliation, the authors find that land inequality
(land Gini), is negatively correlated to political inequality. Surprisingly, the authors also
find a positive association between land inequality and economic development. Lagunoff
(2009) develops a theoretical model with endogenous institutional reforms to study the
drivers of change. Political institutions are modelled as social choices, as such they can
either be stable or admit reform. Crucially, one of the nice features of this model is the
conception of the dynamic political game, where wealth accumulation can play a pivotal
role altering the stability of the system. Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) build a theoretical
model to link income inequality with constitutional selection. While a majoritarian model
of constitution seems to be preferred by unequal countries, consensual democracies emerge
from more uniform societies. In a majoritarian democracy, fiscal policy simply in the form
of taxation is set by an elected leader directly. The main takeaway in this literature is
that constitutions, and institutions more generally, are intrinsically affected by economic
fundamentals.
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3.2.3 Decentralisation and Elite Capture
Even though decentralisation has been expected to improve public services by tailoring
them to local preferences (see Oates (2008)), a growing literature has raised some aware-
ness on its negative effects (comprehensive surveys on this include Mookherjee (2015);
Mansuri and Rao (2012)). One of the most studied problems concerns elite capture, the
idea that certain vested interest-groups can redirect and appropriate local institutions to
benefit them in corrupt manners. However, an interesting point raised by Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2000) compares elite capture at the local level versus the centralised alterna-
tive. The authors develop a theoretical model that incorporates electoral competition and
lobbying by local elites. A number of factors can affect the likelihood of capture, ranging
from interest-group cohesiveness, voters’ awareness, electoral competition and heterogene-
ity in local districts. Given these multiplicity of factors, final outcomes are far from clear.
Interestingly, voter ignorance, cohesiveness of interest groups and high income inequality
may increase the risk of local capture.
A great deal of empirical work has examined the effects of decentralisation. Some
interesting applications to subnational governments are centred in India. Bardhan et al.
(2009) study the effect of political decentralisation on political awareness, participation
and distribution of benefits in West Bengal, India. They find that the participatory levels
are higher in educated aﬄuent groups, but clientelist networks also help to understand
the remarkable stability of the government in that province. Uneducated, land-poor and
socially backwards groups are prone to clientelism. Evidence in this regard is not conclu-
sive. For instance, in another application to West Bengal, India, Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2006b) find that targeting of decentralised welfare programs (credit programs and agri-
cultural minikits - seeds, fertilizers and pesticides-) was not influenced by higher poverty,
land inequality or low caste composition. Nandwani (2019) analyses the impact of a decen-
tralised program aimed to address grievances in India, the PESA (Panchayats Extension
to the Scheduled Areas), on the likelihood of insurgence of a minority economically segre-
gated ethnic group, the Scheduled Tribes (STs). Using a diff-in-diff empirical design, the
author finds that the program (PESA) ended up captured by groups within the tribes and
increased insurgency. Another example of how decentralisation of some programs, if not
adequately implemented considering local institutions, can backfire. A very relevant point
is raised by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a). Elite capture of decentralised programs,
and its effects on local accountability, cannot be fully internalised without properly ex-
ploring the financing connection of such services. The authors develop a theoretical model
in which they explore not only provision of these services, but also the way they are fi-
nanced (user fees, taxes or federal grants). It is shown that user-fee-financing can limit
the amount of resource misallocation.
While the preponderant role of institutional quality in the likelihood of elite capture
is clear, the constitutional setting reflects the balance of power within a society. Vested
interest-groups may appropriate institutional processes, specially at the subnational level.
For instance, Dal Bo´ and Di Tella (2003) consider an extreme form of “nasty” groups, and
how such organisations can exert pressure on policy makers. Such groups may use threat,
legal harassment or even direct violence. They key point in their model is that these special
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groups can redirect policies into their benefit. By making policy outcomes endogenous,
the authors are able to capture why some reforms or initiatives may be delayed or never
adopted. Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) explores the extent to which powerful elites can
influence politics at the local level. The authors use a quasi-random experimental design
in districts in Indonesia, where local mayors (Soeharto’s regime mayors) were allowed to
stay in power before being replaced during a democratic transition. Those districts that
experienced longer exposure to old-regime mayors exhibited worse outcomes, in terms
of public good provision and property right enforcement, even after a decade of being
replaced. Furthermore, these districts showed weaker political accountability.
Sanctioning municipal charters is ultimately an act of civic engagement. However,
self-selection of participants can reduce their representativeness. In their book, Mansuri
and Rao (2012) mention that “(P)articipants in such civic activities tend to be wealthier,
more educated, of higher social status (by caste and ethnicity), male, and more politically
connected than non-participants. In addition, by surveying nearly 500 articles, the authors
find certain regularities in terms of the relationship between elite capture and inequality.
“ ’“Capture”’ (also) tends to be greater in communities that are remote from centres of
power; have low literacy; are poor; or have significant caste, race, or gender disparities”.
3.2.4 Alternative Explanations. Theory of Constitutional Contracts
Finally, there is scattered literature that analyses the causes of adoption of local charters in
the US, at the municipal level Maser (1985, 1998); Feiock and Yang (2005) or at the county
level McDonald and Gabrini (2014). Maser (1985) explores theoretically and empirically
the fundamentals behind having charters. His theory of “Constitutional Contracts” where
municipal charters are seen as social agreement between citizens is compelling. Changes in
economic conditions will affect local demands and therefore the cost-balance of adopting
a charter. Maser (1998) further develops this theory. When aggregating social preferences
cooperation problems may arise in the form of coordination, division and defection. In
this framework, income inequality is a factor that explains specific constitutional rules;
local heterogeneity will increase the chance of the municipal charter having safeguards.
However, the empirical evidence provided in his work does not find a significant role
for inequality. Closely related, Feiock and Yang (2005) study the probability that recall
provisions, designed to remove public officials, are included in local charters in US cities.
The authors find that adopting this important constitutional safeguard is correlated with
the distribution of wealth. McDonald and Gabrini (2014) correlates the likelihood of
reforms with socio-economic and political variables. Their methodology resembles our
work in the use of “event history approach” (EHA), but the driving channels are different.
The authors do not give wealth concentration a role in their analysis, while our work takes
account of it. In general, studies undertaken so far provide conflicting evidence concerning
the impact of inequality in this constitutional event.
In summary, it has been shown from this review that there are a few strands of lit-
erature that connect local segregation to institutional/constitutional change. The four
channels explored are immense in range and scope, so I have tried to summarise what I
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believe to be closely related to the purpose of this chapter. The rich, wealthier, concen-
trated elites, along with socio-economic factors, are drivers of change. The repercussions
in the institutional setting can therefore be multiple and diverse. In the next section, I




In the previous section we explored the theoretical fundamentals that connect income
segregation or inequality to constitutional change. In this section we focus on an appli-
cation to the institutional setting of Argentinian municipalities, where local governments
can dictate their own Municipal Charters (MC). Two initial findings stand out. The first
one is that many municipalities sanctioned their MC when were allowed to; albeit at a
slow pace (average time to reform is 11 years), and the process being highly influenced
by provincial constraints. The second result is that those municipalities that reformed
first were more segregated and unequal. In this section, I proceed in three steps. First, I
describe the institutional organization of the country. Then I get into detail about how
to measure income segregation by using Census data. Once inequality measures are ob-
tained, I proceed to use survival analysis method to study the effect of local disparities in
constitutional change.
3.3.1 Provincial Constitutional Reforms and Municipal Autonomy
In order to dictate their own municipal charters, local autonomy must be granted in
provincial Constitutions. For historic circumstances, most provinces did not acknowledge
municipal autonomy, and therefore adopting MC was banned. In the second column in
Table 3.1, I include the year in which provinces reformed their constitution and permitted
municipal charters for the first time. As we can observe, even though the country expe-
rienced political and institutional turmoil for more than 50 years, over 1930-1983, some
democratic milestones were achieved. Seven provinces recognised municipal autonomy be-
fore 1983 (Herna´ndez, 2003). However, only one municipality managed to obtain its own
MC in 1961, Santiago del Estero. All other municipalities dictated MC after 19833.
Once the right institutional setup is granted, municipalities have to meet additional
requirements to dictate MC. In general, they involve population thresholds, but they can
also include specific requirements such as; complying with provincial plans4, meeting legal
definitions for “cities” or “municipalities”5, or having a minimum number of registered
voters6. In some provinces, these requirements have been relaxed in time. The province of
Catamarca first reformed in 1993, and established a population threshold of 4,000, then in
2007, this threshold was reduced to 1,000 habitants. Lastly, five provinces do not permit
municipal autonomy. Municipalities in these jurisdictions have to follow provincial laws
when it comes to institutional, political and constitutional affairs.
3It is worth mentioning that the municipalities of Rosario and Santa Fe in the province of Santa
Fe dictated their municipal charters in 1933, by-product of the provincial constitutional reform in 1921.
However, in 1935, this Constitution was abolished and so did the municipal charters. Santa Fe is currently
one of the 5 provinces that do not permit MC.
4Formosa and its Plan Regularizador.
5Cordoba and Rio Negro are examples of this. In Cordoba, Coronel Moldes was classified as “city”” by
Provincial Decree without meeting the population threshold. Similar cases can be mentioned for Comallo
or Ministro Ramos Mexia in the province of Rio Negro.
6Province of Chubut. To be considered elector, it is a requirement to be taxpayer and resident. In the
empirical section this is proxied by adult population (defined as 18 plus).
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Buenos Aires (1994) Not permitted - - -
City of Buenos Aires (1996) Not permitted - - -
Catamarca 1966 Population of 10,000 8 8 33.6 (15.6)
Chaco 1994 Population of 20,000* 12 2 12
Chubut 1957 1,000 of registered electors1 20 5 7
Co´rdoba 1987 Population of 10,000** 48 24 11.25
Corrientes 1993-2007
Population of 4,000 in 19932 -
Population of 1,000 after 2007
30 (1993) - 64
(2007)
12 before 2007 -
37 after 2007
14.22
Entre Rios 2008 Population of 10,000 21 0 -
Formosa 1957 Population of 1,0003 36 0 -
Jujuy 1986 Population of 20,000 6 5 2
La Pampa (1994) Not permitted - - -
La Rioja 1986 No threshold4 18 0 -
Mendoza (1916) Not permitted - - -
Misiones 1958 Population of 10,000* 26 11 43.4 (17.4)
Neuque´n 1957 Population of 5,000* 14 12 39.3 (12.3)
Rio Negro 1957 Population of 2,000** 38 30 36.9 (9.9)
Salta 1986 Population of 10,000* 25 16 8.5
San Juan 1986 Population of 30,000* 7 7 10.7
San Luis 1987 Population of 25,000 2 2 3
Santa Cruz 1994 Population of 1,000 15 0 -
Santa Fe (1962) Not permitted - - -
Santiago del Estero 1960 Population of 20,000* 5 5 32.8 (16.7)
Tierra del Fuego 1991 Population of 10,000 2 2 13
Tucuma´n 2006 Population of 5,000** 42 0 -
Total 409 178 19.1 (11)
Source: Ministry of Treasury, Sub-secretary for Relations with Provinces, Direction of Tax Coordination with Provinces.
Notes: This Table contains institutional requirements for Municipal governments to dictate their own Municipal Charters “Carta Orga´nica”.
* Also defined as first-category municipalities by provincial Constitution.
** Provincial Constitution establishes that “cities” or “municipalities” can dictate Municipal Charter. Provincial Laws usually establish a
population threshold for such categories. In Cordoba, some urbanizations were labelled as cities by Provincial Decree without meeting the
population threshold (Coronel Moldes, Decree Nr. 1127 (1979), with 9,010 habitants in 2010 Census). In Rio Negro, Comallo and Ministro
Ramos Mexia are recognised as municipalities.
1 Proxied using adult population (defined as 18 plus).
2 The Constitution establishes that localities with 15,000 must sanction Municipal Charter (Art. 158), and it is optional for 4,000 habitants
(Art. 159).
3 Municipalities with ”Plan Regularizador”. To access Plan Regularizador, there is a population threshold of 1,000.
4 No further requirements for Municipalities to dictate ”Carta Orga´nica”.
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The last column of Table 3.1 shows that the average time to reform has been 19.1
years. This time is almost halved to 11 years if we start counting from 1984. This is a
relevant point. It has been already discussed that the country only gained democratic
stability after 1984. This set forth an ongoing process of provincial reforms that among
other things facilitated municipal autonomy. For that reason, using 1984 as starting point
in the survival analysis section is sound. Results are unaltered if I consider the entire
period, but from an institutional perspective results are more comparable if I restrict the
analysis after 1984.
To date, a total of 178 municipalities have a Municipal Charter7. While in some
provinces all compliers have reformed, in provinces such as Entre Rios, Formosa, La Ri-
oja, Santa Cruz and Tucuman, MC are yet to be dictated. This points out to two distinct
features. First, it is clear that there are important provincial factors that influence mu-
nicipal behaviour when it comes to sanctioning MC (132 non-reformers, 32% of eligible
municipalities, are located in these provinces with 0 MCs). They range from strictly legal
limitations, to soft institutional constraints8. Second, given that in those provinces where
municipalities indeed proceeded to dictate MC the percentage of compliance is high, time
to reform becomes actually relevant. This gives substantial support to a “survival” type
of analysis of MC reforms.
3.3.2 Data Description
3.3.2.1 Use of Census Tracts
We use Census tract counts from 2001 and 2010 censuses. Unfortunately, income related
questions are not part of Census questionnaires, although a wide range of household char-
acteristics are provided. In particular, we will try to approach income concentration by
using the counts in the Census tracts of three main variables; Heads of household that
finished secondary studies (5 years after primary education level), Unsatisfied Basic Needs
(UBN), an indicator of poverty stratification in the area9, and Overcrowded Dwellings,
defined as households with more than 3 people per room. These predictors have been
widely used in the literature as proxies for income (for an application in Argentina, see
Rodr´ıguez (2013, 2019); Gasparini et al. (2019), for Chile, Rodr´ıguez Vignoli (2001)).
7See Appendix C.1 for a detailed explanation on sources and year of reforms.
8In Tucuman for instance, even though the Constitution permit MC, the legal procedure has not been
regulated yet and therefore municipalities have not proceed to reform.
9In Argentina, INDEC considers a household as having UBN if it meets one of the following charac-
teristics:
• Households with more than three persons per room (overcrowding);
• Households that live in housing of unsuitable type;
• Households with no kind of toilet.
• Households with children of school age not attending school (lack of access to basic education);
• Households with four or more persons per employed member and whose household’s head is low
level education (less than second grade of primary education).
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The literature clearly points out to two main flaws when using Census tracts to
study spatial segregation; the Checkerboard Problem and Modifiable Area Unit Prob-
lem (MAUP) (Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004; Rodr´ıguez, 2013, 2019). The checkerboard
problem arises when ignoring the spatial allocation of people’ characteristics. MAUP orig-
inates from the fact that population is grouped in Census tracts, and statistical measures
can be affected by its size, as smaller tracts will imply more homogeneous distribution and
vice-versa. This last flaw has been specially highlighted by Rodr´ıguez (2013, 2019) for Ar-
gentina, and some solutions have been put forward, such as re-grouping smaller areas or
redistributing population. We are not particularly concerned with these biases for two
reasons. First, census tracts are not built considering household’s characteristics, rather
they are a tool for logistic organisation of Census (INDEC 201510). Additionally, given
that there are institutional limits to dictate MC, essentially population thresholds, our
sample of municipalities imply medium to large urban agglomerations, partially averaging
out the MAUP bias. The mean number of census tracts for analysed municipalities is 33.5
units, with a maximum reaching 1361 tracts for the city of Cordoba.
Socio-economic residential segregation (SRS) has been studied for Argentinian munic-
ipalities, either as case studies or as comprehensive measures of local spatial inequalities.
Applications of SRS to case studies can be found in Rodr´ıguez (2016, 2017), for Greater
Buenos Aires Agglomeration and the City of Buenos Aires, Perren et al. (2015) for the city
of Neuque´n, or Molinatti (2013) for the city of Co´rdoba. Closest to our work in measur-
ing segregation we can mention two papers by Rodr´ıguez (2013, 2019). Rodr´ıguez (2019)
compiles the evolution of SRS in 789 cities using three Census (1991, 2001 and 2010). His
research is centred around sorting the methodological concern of MAUP in segregation
indexes. Furthermore, the author studies the evolution of SRS and explores its correlation
with income inequality for a subset of 34 cities where data is available. Similarly, exploit-
ing information in Census tracts, Mart´ınez (2009, 2018) develop dynamic socio-territorial
indicators to study patterns of intra-urban inequality in the city of Rosario, one of the
biggest agglomerates in the country. Lastly, Groisman (2009) uses the Permanent House-
hold Survey, a different source of data, to study segregation across age cohorts to study
persistence and perpetuation of SRS between 2002-2007.
3.3.2.2 Measuring Local Segregation
Income segregation captures the separation of individuals on income within an specific
area. Being a complex multidimensional phenomenon, income segregation is strongly
linked to income inequality (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011). At the subnational level, it is
likely that segregation will be a visible and influential force behind local policies.
There are a number of segregation indexes available to the researcher (for a compre-
hensive discussion see Tivadar (2019)). In this section, we will only analyse the evenness
dimension, simply defined as the distribution of population (on specific characteristics) in
the area. Following Reardon and Firebaugh (2002); Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004)) I will
use two broadly accepted indexes; the Gini Segregation Index (G) and the Information
10https://geoservicios.indec.gov.ar/codgeo/index.php?pagina=definiciones
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Theory Segregation Index (H) based on Theil and Finizza (1971); Theil (1972). This se-
lection of measurements is based on two criteria. First, I use the Gini for being broadly
accepted, easy to interpret and of generalised use in the literature. Secondly, the Infor-
mation Theory Index (H) presents a number of desirable properties in term of satisfying
axiomatic index characteristics (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002)11.
In addition to our segregation measures, Table 3.2 includes descriptive statistics for 4
additional variables that intend to capture economic local conditions. These are municipal
population, and a grouping of “human capital variables” that include the percentage of
people with UBN, the percentage of overcrowded households, and a measure of literacy in
the area, the percentage of people with reading and writing comprehension.
3.3.2.3 A Tale of Two Municipalities
To better appreciate the empirical method, in this subsection I have selected two munic-
ipalities in the province of Cordoba as an example; Villa Carlos Paz and San Francisco.
Both local governments have similar population, but only Villa Carlos Paz has dictated
its Municipal Charter. This institutional landmark was achieved in 2007, 20 years after
the provincial reform in 1987 that permitted MCs.
The most relevant variables are in table 3.3. This table is subdivided in two panels, A
and B, containing variables for Census 2001 and 2010 respectively. Census 2001 is partic-
ularly representative in this case, because it portraits the situation of both municipalities
before the reform in Villa Carlos Paz. While there are not significant differences in most
of the variables, segregation indexes are higher in the reformer municipality. This uneven-
ness in the distribution in household head’s education level or in Unsatisfied Basic Needs
(UBN) is captured both by the Gini Segregation Index and by the Information Theory
11Based on (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002), I use the “SEG” Stata package developed by Reardon and























• ti: number of cases (counts) in unit i (census tract i)
• pim: proportion in group m (proportion of households with UBN)
• piim: proportion in group m, of those in unit i (proportion of households with UBN in census tract
i)
• I: Simpson’s Interaction Index (I =∑Mm=1 pim(1− pim));
• E: Theil’s Entropy Index (E =∑Mm=1 pim ln( 1pim ))
• T : Total number of cases
83
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics Municipalities
2001 Census 2010 Census
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
A- Household Head’s Education
- Gini Segregation Index (G) 404 0.364 0.140 409 0.335 0.132
- Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 404 0.083 0.052 409 0.074 0.048
B- Unsatisfied Basic Needs
- Gini Segregation Index (G) 404 0.329 0.129 409 0.354 0.143
- Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 404 0.069 0.044 409 0.074 0.048
C- Overcrowded Households
- Gini Segregation Index (G) 404 0.374 0.157 409 0.375 0.156
- Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 404 0.073 0.049 409 0.071 0.046
Percentage with -at least one- UBN 404 0.083 0.052 409 0.149 0.088
Percentage of overcrowded households 404 0.231 0.109 409 0.064 0.043
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension 404 0.808 0.052 409 0.908 0.029
Population 405 29,230 80,821 409 32,331 85,825
Note: This Table presents a summary of segregation indexes, Gini (G) and Information Theory (H)
for three variables, Household Head’s Education in Panel A, Unsatisfied Basic Needs in Panel B and
Overcrowded Households in Panel C. Additionally, four relevant covariates are included. All these statistics
are portrayed for Census 2001 and 2010.
Segregation Index. In Panel B, for Census 2010, these patterns are repeated, although
they are not as clear-cut as in 2001.
Using data from Census 2001, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 offer a visual appreciation of the
previous results. Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of households in which the head of
the family achieved education level higher than secondary school, allocated by Census
tracts12. The difference in shades in both cities stands out. In Carlos Paz, the contrast
between some areas is sharper than in San Francisco. While we observe darker blues in
north-eastern or centre areas and whiter colours in the south or western areas in Figure
3.1a, these contrasts are not observed or less abrupt in Figure 3.1b. Figure 3.2 shows
the distribution of households not meeting any of the conditions for UBN distributed by
Census tracts in these two municipalities. We can reach similar conclusions regarding the
segregation in both cities. The contrast is less pronounced and less abrupt in Figure 3.2b
than in Figure 3.2a. Even more, the spatial location of these two variables seems fairly
similar to Figure 3.1.
12In 2001, Villa Carlos Paz was conformed by 72 Census tracts or blocks groups, while San Francisco
was divided in 76. The polygons contain an average of 230 households and vary in shape.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Indicators for Villa Carlos Paz and San Francisco, Co´rdoba
Villa Carlos Paz San Francisco
Year dictated Municipal Charter 2007 -
“Survival” (years from provincial reform in 1987) 20 -
Panel A: Variables Census 2001
Population 56,407 58,983
Number of Census tracts 72 76
Percentage with -at least one- UBN 0.072 0.095
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings 0.031 0.032
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension 0.893 0.883
Gini Segregation Index (G)
-Segregation on Household Head’s Education 0.368 0.321
-Segregation on Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.468 0.402
Information Theory Segregation Index (H)
-Segregation on Household Head’s Education 0.085 0.058
-Segregation on Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.092 0.071
Panel B: Variables Census 2010
Population 62,750 62,211
Number of Census tracts 87 84
Percentage with -at least one- UBN 0.043 0.026
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings 0.025 0.012
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension 0.952 0.946
Gini Segregation Index (G)
-Segregation on Household Head’s Education 0.42 0.34
-Segregation on Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.58 0.65
Information Theory Segregation Index (H)
-Segregation on Household Head’s Education 0.105 0.069
-Segregation on Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.136 0.168
Notes: This Table portraits an example for two cities in the province of Cordoba that have followed
opposite paths in terms of Municipal Charter reforms. While Villa Carlos Paz reformed in 2007,
San Francisco remains without MC. The table compares a number of variables using 2001 and
2010 Census, and the calculated measures of segregation using the Gini Segregation Index (G) and
Information Theory Segregation Index (H).
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Figure 3.1: Concentration of Household Head’s Education Levels
(a) Villa Carlos Paz, Co´rdoba
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(b) San Francisco, Co´rdoba
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Note: This Figure shows the spatial location by Census tracts of percentages of house-
hold head’s with education levels greater than secondary school. Two municipalities in the
provinces of Co´rdoba are displayed, both with similar population but with different segregation
indexes.
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Figure 3.2: Concentration of Households with no Unsatisfied Basic Needs
(a) Villa Carlos Paz, Co´rdoba
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(b) San Francisco, Co´rdoba
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Note: This Figure replicates the previous two municipalities in Co´rdoba, but in this case,
the segregation indexes are calculated on the percentage of people with no Unsatisfied Basic
Needs.
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3.3.3 Cox Semi-parametric Model
To determine whether institutional change, in the form of the sanction of municipal char-
ters, is influenced by segregation, I analyse 409 municipalities that were in legal and in
institutional conditions to adopt MC. This process can be approached as a survival model,
where failure is MC reform, and the units (municipalities) start treatment when provinces
permit MC for the first time. The identification strategy relies in the plausibly exogenous
provincial decision to reform the Constitution. We base this in three observations. First,
the span that covers provincial reforms is ample (Chubut in 1957 and Entre Rios in 2008
(see Table 3.1)). If municipalities were a driving force behind provincial reforms, we would
not expect such divergence in timing. Second, even in the case of constitutional reforms
at the provincial level, municipal autonomy was not always a central point and it was not
always granted thereafter (for instance, Buenos Aires in 1994). Third, the institutional
limits, normally population thresholds, leave out a considerable number of municipalities
and prevent them from adopting charters. By exploiting this, we use the Cox proportional
hazards model. Our main empirical specification presents the following structure:
h(t) = h0(t) exp(β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βkxk) (3.1)
The Cox regression models the likelihood of sanctioning Municipal Charter as a func-
tion of time (from provincial reform) and municipal specific covariates. These xk variables
include provincial dummies, local population, and a set of “human capital” municipal
variables; including the percentage of people with UBN, of overcrowded households and
of literacy levels.
We try to exploit the cross-sectional nature of the dataset using each Census in the
following way. First, we run the first set or regression using only data on Census 2001.
This is far from ideal, as we would like to have information pre-dating MC sanctioning.
Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, data for Census 1991 was not accessible. For those
municipalities that reformed between 1991 and 2001, the segregation measures will be
ex-post reform. Second, in order control for this, I restrict the analysis only to those
municipalities that reformed after 2001. This allows us to further argue in favour of
the channel that goes from segregation measures to institutional reforms, rather than
otherwise. Finally, in an attempt to get the clearest possible picture in terms of segregation
and population just before reforms13, for those municipalities that either reformed after
2010 or haven’t reformed yet, Census 2010 data is used.
The first set of results obtained from the semi-parametric Cox model are displayed in
Table 3.4. This table is divided in three panels A, B, and C. In Panel A, the two indexes of
segregation, Gini and Information Theory Index, are calculated on the counts within the
Census tract of heads of households with more than secondary education. Panel B shows
the results using the counts of households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs, and Panel C
uses the number of Overcrowded Households in the area. For each index, two alternative
models were calculated, one including only a set of provincial dummies and the other
adding municipal covariates.
13Population thresholds might be binding in one Census and not in the following.
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The results seem to support the hypothesis that inequality is a driving force of MC
sanctioning. Higher segregation is positively correlated with the likelihood of enacting
Municipal Charter, and this relationship is significant at 1%. Moreover, these findings
are robust to different segregation indexes and model specifications. Given that indexes
are scaled from 0 to 100, the quantitative results in column (1) imply that an increase
in one point in Gini increases the hazard of sanctioning municipal charters by 4.9%.
Alternatively, in column (11), for an unit change in the Information Theory Segregation
Index, the probability of MC jumps to 14.4%14.
These findings are best summarised in Figure 3.3. For the Gini Segregation Index, in
Panel 3.3a, the hazard is constructed by selecting both the 10% and 90% values in the
decile distribution of Gini, and generating the instantaneous hazards for each measure.
That gives us the “High” and “Low” segregation hazard rates in every period of time.
For this theoretic municipality with high segregation, i.e., the top 90% of the distribution,
there is roughly 4.4% chance of sanctioning Municipal Charter in its 15th year without
reform. This hazard is 1.6% at the same period for a low-segregation municipality. Panel
3.3b plots the same estimations but for the Information Theory Index (H).
The overall fit of the model is good. Both the inclusion of provincial dummies and
municipal covariates is validated by the Wald test of joint significance. This is corroborated
by the selection of the preferred model using the Akaike information criterion (AIC ),
which hits smaller values in specifications that include the full set of covariates. Lastly,
the proportional hazards test does not hold for most of the specifications in Table 3.4. This
points out certain problems with using the Cox proportional hazard. However, somewhat
reassuringly, when interacting offending variables with time the results are not altered (see
Appendix C.2 for further analysis on this important issue).
3.3.3.1 Reformers After 2001
As previously mentioned, the next step was to restrict the analysis to those municipalities
that sanctioned MC after 2001. What we are trying to avoid is the confounding factor of
reverse causality driven by inequality being measured after reforms. In this subsample,
segregation measures were taken before MC reforms, in Census 2001, and thus reinforcing
one direction of the correlation.
In Table 3.5, Cox model (3.1) is re-estimated using all covariates but only for the
sub-period after 2001. The number of municipalities in the sample is reduced to 301, 75
of which would reform MC at some point between 2001 and 201715. Overall, results are
fairly consistent with baseline specifications in their significance levels. When comparing





For instance, in column (1) Table 3.4, the coefficient associated with the Gini Segregation Index of 0.0483
implies that one standard deviation from the mean, from 36.4 to 50.4 (+14), increases the likelihood of
MC reform in 96.6%.
15There is one municipality that drops from the regressions due to not having segregation measures.
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Table 3.4: Survival Analysis, Dictated Municipal Charter “Carta Orga´nica”
Dep. Var.: Survival time to Municipal Charter sanction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Segregation on Household Head’s Education
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0483+++ 0.0432+++
(0.00680) (0.00745)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.101+++ 0.0815+++
(0.0165) (0.0186)
Municipal population -in ten thousands-(2001) 0.0148+++ 0.0156+++
(0.00494) (0.00509)
Percentage with -at least one- UBN (2001) -0.00611 -0.00717
(0.0283) (0.0274)
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings* (2001) -0.0250 -0.0153
(0.0330) (0.0327)
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension (2001) 0.136++ 0.134++
(0.0563) (0.0534)
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.157 0.127 0.150
AIC 1727.7 1688.6 1739.4 1703.9
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Segregation on Unsatisfied Basic Needs
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0648+++ 0.0489+++
(0.00680) (0.00764)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.161+++ 0.116+++
(0.0167) (0.0198)
Municipal population -in ten thousands-(2001) 0.0117++ 0.0114++
(0.00476) (0.00476)
Percentage with -at least one- UBN (2001) -0.00749 -0.0141
(0.0272) (0.0261)
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings* (2001) -0.0172 -0.00721
(0.0335) (0.0324)
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension (2001) 0.0821 0.0884+
(0.0538) (0.0506)
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.157 0.142 0.153
AIC 1689.9 1679.5 1710.7 1697.3
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel C: Segregation on Overcrowded Households
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0537+++ 0.0430+++
(0.00667) (0.00674)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.135+++ 0.102+++
(0.0163) (0.0178)
Municipal population -in ten thousands-(2001) 0.0153+++ 0.0143+++
(0.00453) (0.00455)
Percentage with -at least one- UBN (2001) 0.00766 -0.000695
(0.0263) (0.0255)
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings* (2001) 0.0165 0.0116
(0.0312) (0.0311)
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension (2001) 0.124++ 0.123++
(0.0512) (0.0489)
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.149 0.159 0.141 0.153
AIC 1697.1 1686.5 1712.1 1689.2
Nr. of Subjects 401 401 401 401
Nr. of Failures 174 174 174 174
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) National Census
of Population, Households, and Housing 2001.
Notes: This table shows the Cox estimates for three different dimensions of income segregation; Household
Head’s Education Level, Unsatisfied Basic Needs, and Overcrowded Households. Two segregation indexes
are used, the Gini (G) and the Information Theory Index (H), and two alternative specifications are
estimated, one only including provincial dummies and the other accounting for a full set of municipal
covariates. Results point out to a significant positive effect of segregation on the likelihood of reforming
municipal charters.
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Figure 3.3: Hazard Rate at Top 90% and Bottom 10%. Household Head’s Education
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Note: This Figure portraits the differential hazard rate valued at the top 90% and the bottom
10% of the distribution of both indexes; the Gini Segregation Index (G) and the Information
Theory Segregation Index (H).
the quantitative results no clear patter arises. In some cases the impact on the hazard
increases (Gini Index for household education level changes from 4.3% to 4.8%), while in
others it decreases (Gini Index for overcrowding households move from 4.3% to 3.2%).
3.3.3.2 Using Census 2001 and 2010
Finally, we try to exploit both censuses 2001 and 2010. For those municipalities that
reformed after 2001, we get all our measures as close as we can to the year of reform.
An important point is worth mentioning here. The inclusion of covariates in this last
specification adds a lot of noise. During Census 2001, the country was navigating through
one of its most pronounced economic crisis. Therefore, it is expected to find an overall
improvement in our “human capital” variables in the measurement in 2010. Reassuringly,
the most relevant findings are consistently observed, albeit with a slight modification in
the quantitative impact.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0485+++ 0.0442+++ 0.0322+++
(0.0102) (0.0147) (0.0118)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.0824+++ 0.120+++ 0.0821++
(0.0247) (0.0439) (0.0390)
Full Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Subjects 301 301 301 301 301 301
Number of Failures 74 74 74 74 74 74
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.223 0.224 0.221 0.221 0.218
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) National Census of Pop-
ulation, Households, and Housing 2001.
Notes: This Table replicates model specifications in Table 3.4 but restricting the sample to those municipalities
that reformed after 2001. The six specifications include full set of covariates and provincial dummies (not shown).








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0273++ 0.0277++ 0.0417+++
(0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0130)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.0470 0.0818++ 0.123+++
(0.0326) (0.0367) (0.0405)
Full Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Subjects 305 305 305 305 305 305
Number of Failures 74 74 74 74 74 74
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.264 0.267 0.266 0.277 0.274
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) National Census of
Population, Households, and Housing 2001.
Notes: This Table replicates model specifications in Table 3.4 but restricting the sample to those munici-




This study set out to assess the connections between local segregation and institutional
change, in the form of adopting municipal charters, in Argentinian municipalities. We pro-
vided evidence that segregation in education levels, poverty and household overcrowding
was consistently correlated to the likelihood of sanctioning MC. In particular, we observed
that when municipalities were exposed to the possibility of sanctioning, granted by provin-
cial reforms, it was a matter of time until they tailored local preferences by adopting the
written institutional document.
In the conceptual framework, we have examined four potential channels that relate
local segregation to institutional change. First, we showed related research on how lo-
cal conditions determine a number of outcomes. Second, we discussed the endogenous
institutional change literature and the role of inequality in explaining democratic tran-
sitions. Third, we explored the idea that elite capture and several other maladies can
have their origins in the decentralised structure of a country. And lastly, we acknowledged
the “Constitutional Contract Theory” where charters are seen as aggregations of citizen
preferences.
This chapter breaths life into these mechanisms in two ways. The first one, and our
main conclusion, is that there is a strong and consistent correlation between segregation
and the likelihood of sanctioning MC. Exploiting the timing of exogenous provincial reform
of Constitutions, we observe that higher socio-economic segregation significantly increases
the chances of reforming. The second one is that provincial factors are relevant to the
adoption of municipal charters. When countries are organised in more than one tier of
government, it is not unusual to find discrepancies across the institutional organisation of
provinces (or states). In this chapter, we show that provinces play a significant role in
explaining MC reforms.
A number of future directions for research are signalled. The current study is limited
to 2001 and 2010 Census, but the addition of the 1991 round seems natural. This will
increase the strength of results by adding more municipalities with a picture of pre-reform
segregation levels. Furthermore, in this work we have been silent regarding the particular
provisions included in the 178 new charters. Municipal charters can potentially influence
a number of important policy outcomes, such as type of nomination to run for elected
officials, council size, partisanship in elections, or executive powers (Maser, 1985). Addi-
tionally, modern MCs regulate gender parity, minority representation, or environmental
regulations. Future lines of research can explore the connections between these two ar-
eas. Another methodological extension of the present study could involve instrumenting
socio-economic segregation in order to disentangle causal mechanisms.
Improving the quality and quantity of local services has long been a concern for devel-
oping countries. A number of factors influence and define the scope of local institutions.
In this chapter we explored a constitutional method by which citizens adapt provisions
to local preferences. If not considered carefully, this process may end up being captured
by local powerful groups and the gains from decentralisation may diminish. As a policy
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implication, it is relevant to be aware of the intricate workings of local urban inequalities.
A sound analysis made by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a) points out that decentralisa-





A.1 Provincial Fiscal Data
Fiscal data for provinces comes from three different sources:
1. School of Economics - Buenos Aires University (FCE-UBA) - Public Administration
Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones en Administracio´n Pu´blica (CIAP)):
• Period 1983-1990: Ejecucio´n por clasificacio´n econo´mica metodolog´ıa ampliada
1983, Executed Budget based on National Bureau of Fiscal Coordination with
Provinces - Ministry of Economics of Argentina ( DNCFP- MECON).
• Period 1991-2002: Ejecucio´n por clasificacio´n econo´mica. Metodolog´ıa nueva
1991-Cuadro 1.1.1.6, Executed Budget based on National Bureau of Fiscal
Coordination with Provinces - Ministry of Economics of Argentina (DNCFP-
MECON).
• Period 2003-2004(2011): Ejecucio´n por clasific. econo´mica 2003-2010 Cuadro
1.1.1.7a Executed Budget based on National Bureau of Fiscal Coordination
with Provinces - Ministry of Economics of Argentina (DNCFP-MECON).
• Period 1990-2011(2012): 1.3.1.- Recursos tributarios provinciales a partir de
1990, Executed Budget based on National Bureau of Fiscal Coordination with
Provinces - Ministry of Economics of Argentina (DNCFP-MECON). Informa-
tion disaggregated on tax revenues per province.
2. National Bureau of Fiscal Coordination with Provinces - Ministry of Economics of
Argentina (DNCFP-MECON):
• Period 2005-2014: Series on Provincial Accounts: The information in MECON
from 2005-2014 includes both Social Security Contributions (Contribuciones
a la Seguridad Social) and Social Security Expenditure (Prestaciones de la
Seguridad Social). In order to make it comparable with previous sources, data
on social contributions was omitted.
• Period 2012-2013: yearly tax revenues disaggregation.
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3. Revenue data year 2014: A combination of provincial sources, including the General
Accountant Office, Revenues Office (Rentas), the Argentinian’ Association of Budget
and Public Financial Administration (ASAP), and in some cases, estimations based
on third quarter data on 2014 from National Bureau of Fiscal Coordination with
Provinces - Ministry of Economics of Argentina (DNCFP-MECON).
A.2 Macroeconomic Variables
A.2.1 Gross Geographic Product (GGP)
The data on provincial GGP was especially challenging. Each province has its own statis-
tics institute, and therefore methodology varies (e.g., year used as base for the constant
series). Updated information availability was also an issue. For instance, 2005 is the last
year of GGP data for the province of Santa Cruz. In the next subsection, we discuss how
we dealt with constant and current values for GGPs. Source and specific clarifications are
summarised in Tables A.2.1.1 and A.3.
A.2.1.1 Constant Gross Geographic Product
The predominant base year for most of provincial series was 1993. However, given that the
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) updated
the base year for the National GDP series to 2004, some provinces have updated their base
since (City of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios and Neuquen). In such cases, I maintained 1993
but applied yearly growth rates from new bases. Most of the information from 1993 to
2012 was compiled by the Ministry of Industry of Argentina, based on provincial sources1.
The data from 1982 to 1993 was obtained from both Russo (1997) (from 1970 to 1995)
and Porto (2004) (from 1971 to 2001). This data was collapsed using yearly growth rates.
The issue of non-updates was difficult to deal. Most provincial centres did not have
information for 2014, and some provinces stopped publishing as far as 2006. Fortunately,
along with GGP calculations, local provincial institutes elaborate local economic activity
indicators, based on real and monetary variables (for a survey on compound indexes for
Argentina refer to Jorrat (2005) or Mun˜oz and Trombetta (2015)). When this informa-
tion was available, the GGP was adjusted using the yearly growth rate in this indicator.
Otherwise, we used the Provincial Index for Economic Provincial Activity (IPAE for the
Spanish acronym), elaborated by Direction of Statistics, Census and Documentation of
the Province of Formosa2.
A final hurdle was to adapt the different types of GGPs. When possible, market price
GGP was used. The main difference between producer’s prices GGP and market prices
1The following link contains a detail of sources: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/
17lNxSmsYsQ40DdIy2Tjb9hMhlBjadAQA0pzIRzytIL0/edit?usp=sharing. Last accessed October 2019.
2Last accessed October 2019 using capture August 2016 in Wayback Machine: http://web.archive.
org/web/20160808162907/https://www.formosa.gob.ar/estadisticas/indicadoresactividad
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GGP are Federal taxes (VAT and Income Tax) 3.
GGP market prices = GGP producer’s prices + Taxes
GGP basic prices = GGP producer’s prices− Taxes
All the relevant information is summarised in Table A.1.
3From collected sources, both taxes represent an average of 9% of market GGP.
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Table A.1: Constant GGP Series Details
Province Type of PBG Source
Buenos Aires GGP market prices 1982-1991 Russo (1997); 1992 Porto (2004); 1993-2013 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2014 estimated based on ITAE Provincial Activity Indicator
Catamarca GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997);1993-2006 Ministry of Industry; 2007-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Chaco GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997);; 1991-2004 Ministry of Industry; 2005-2014 esti-
mated using IMACH Provincial Activity Indicator
Chubut GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997);1993-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute
Ciudad de Bs. As. GGP market prices 1982 -1993 Russo (1997);1993-2004 City of Buenos Aires Statistic Institute;
2005-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute series base year 2004
Cordoba GGP producer prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute
Corrientes Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 2014 estimated as average quarterly in the Provin-
cial Statistic Institute web page
Entre R´ıos GGP producer prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2004 Provincial Statistic Institute - 2005-2014
Provincial Statistic Institute series base year 2004
Formosa Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2007 Ministry of Industry -2008-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Jujuy GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2008 Ministry of Industry; 2007-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
La Pampa GGP producer prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2008 Ministry of Industry; 2009-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
La Rioja Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2012 Provincial Statistic Institute; 2013-2014
estimated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Mendoza Unknown 1982-1985 Russo (1997); 1986-1990 Provincial Statistic Institute series base
year 1986; 1991-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute series base 1993
Misiones GGP market prices 1982-1990 Russo (1997); 1991-2007 Ministry of Industry; 2008-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Province Type of PBG Source
Neuquen GGP Basic prices 1982-1992 Provincial Statistic Institute series base year 1986; 1993-2004
Provincial Statistic Institute series base year 1993; 2005-2013 Provincial
Statistic Institute series base year 2004; 2014 estimated by yearly growth
rate of IPAE
R´ıo Negro Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2008 Ministry of Industry; 2009-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Salta Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2009 Ministry of Industry; 2010-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
San Juan Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2010 Ministry of Industry; 2011-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
San Luis Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2007 Ministry of Industry;2008-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Santa Cruz GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2005 Ministry of Industry; 2006-2014 esti-
mated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Santa Fe Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2013 Provincial Statistic Institute series base
year 1993- 2014 estimated using ISAE
Santiago del Estero GGP producer prices Russo (1997); 1993 Provincial Statistic Institute - 1994-2007 Ministry of
Industry; 2008-2014 estimated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Tierra del Fuego Unknown 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2007 Provincial Statistic Institute series base
year 1993; 2008-2014 estimated by yearly growth rate of IPAE
Tucuman GGP market prices 1982 -1992 Russo (1997); 1993-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute series base
year 1993
Notes: In this Table we find a detailed account of the sources for Constant Gross Geographic Product. We use a
combination of Russo (1997), provincial statistic institutes and IPAE (Provincial Activity Index), elaborated by the
Institute of Statistics in Formosa.
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A.2.1.2 Current Gross Geographic Product
Compilation of current GGP series faced similar issues; swaps in the base year, economic
instability (including hyperinflation and three changes in the national currency from 1982
to 1992), and lack of updates. Based on the constant series, we obtained the current
values using the GDP Deflator (Implicit Price Deflator (GDP-IPD)). We also employed
the current series in Ministry of Industry of Argentina public file4, and provincial statistic
institutes. In following Table A.3, there is a detailed explanation of different sources for
each province.
A.2.2 Population
Based on the INDEC, and Census performed every 10 years, 1980, 1991, 2001 and 2010,
the province population for each year was adjusted at a constant rate coincident with the
decade variation.
A.2.3 Inflation Rate
Over the 30 years covered by the dataset, there were periods of great instability in the
economy, including hyperinflation and change in currency. In the following Table A.2 we
can observe the relation between currencies. After 2010, 2001-2010 variation is used.
Table A.2: Currencies in Argentina
Used from Currency name Relation to Divided by
01/01/1992 Pesos
18/06/1985 Australes Pesos 10,000
01/06/1983 Pesos Argentinos Pesos 10,000,000
01/04/1970 Pesos Ley 18188 Pesos 100,000,000,000
We halted the use of official price indexes from INDEC after 2007, because the insti-
tute was intervened by the government, and the CPI was blatantly modified (reduced)
thereafter. For that reason, we used the price index from the Billion Price Project at MIT
(see (Cavallo, 2013) for more details). The index base is 31/10/2007 and we have used
this year as base for constant values.
4The next link contains a detail of sources: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/
17lNxSmsYsQ40DdIy2Tjb9hMhlBjadAQA0pzIRzytIL0/edit?usp=sharing. Last accessed October 2019.
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Table A.3: Current GGP Series Details
Province Type of PBG Source
Buenos Aires PBG market prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2013 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted
by GDP-IPD
Catamarca PBG market prices 1982-1989 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-
UBA); 1993-2006 Ministry of Industry; 2007-2014 (nominal growth rate ad-
justment using constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD
Chaco PBG market prices 1982-1989 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD; 1990-1991nominal growth rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-
UBA); 1991-2008 Ministry of Industry; 2009-2014 nominal growth rate ad-
justment using constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD
Chubut PBG market prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2011 Ministry of Industry;
2012-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
City of Bs. As. PBG market prices 1982-1989constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2003 Provincial Statistic
Institute, 2004-2014 nominal growth adjustment using current series different
base year
Cordoba PBG producer prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2014 Provincial Statistic
Institute
Corrientes Unknown 1982-1989constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2013 Provincial Statistic
Institute
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Province Type of PBG Source
Entre Rios PBG producer prices 1982-1989constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2003 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2004-2014 nominal growth adjustment using current series different
base year
Formosa Unknown 1982-1989constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2007 Ministry of Industry;
2008-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
Jujuy PBG market prices 1982-1989constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2006 Ministry of Indus-
try; 2007-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted
by GDP-IPD
La Pampa PBG producer prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2008 Ministry of Industry;
2009-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
La Rioja Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2011 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2012-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series
adjusted by GDP-IPD
Mendoza Unknown 1983-1985 Provincial Statistic Institute change in currency; 1986-1990 nominal
growth adjustment using current series different base year; 1991-2014 nominal
growth adjustment using current series different base year
Misiones PBG market prices 1990-1994 nominal growth rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-
2007 Ministry of Industry; 2007-2014 Provincial Statistic Institute; 2008-2014
nominal growth adjustment using current series different base year
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Province Type of PBG Source
Neuquen PBG Basic prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2013 nominal growth ad-
justment using current series different base year; 2014 nominal growth rate
adjustment using constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD
Rio Negro Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2008 Ministry of Industry;
2009-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
Salta Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2010 Ministry of Industry;
2011-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
San Juan Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2010 Ministry of Industry;
2011-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
San Luis Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2007 Ministry of Industry;
2008-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by
GDP-IPD
Santa Cruz PBG market prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2005 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2006-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series
adjusted by GDP-IPD
Santa Fe Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD;1990-1992nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2013 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted
by GDP-IPD
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Province Type of PBG Source
Santiago del Estero PBG producer prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1993 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1994-2013 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted
by GDP-IPD
Tierra del Fuego Unknown 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1993 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1994-2001 nominal growth rate
adjustment using CEPAL ; 2002-2007 Ministry of Industry; 2008-2014 nominal
growth rate adjustment using constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD
Tucuman PBG market prices 1982-1989 constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD; 1990-1992 nominal growth
rate adjustment based on CIAP (FCE-UBA); 1993-2012 Provincial Statistic
Institute; 2013-2014 nominal growth rate adjustment using constant series
adjusted by GDP-IPD
Notes: This Table shows the sources used to compile the Current Gross Geographic Product per province. In general we
rely on constant series adjusted by GDP-IPD (GDP Deflator), but also we use data from provincial institutes and Ministry
of Industry of Argentina.
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A.2.4 Provincial Differences
In Table A.4 we can observe the variability in terms of population, development, fiscal
structure and political organisation in Argentinian’ provinces. For instance, while the
province of Buenos Aires concentrates the 38% of the population of the country, Tierra
del Fuego only represents 0.36%. In terms of development, the City of Buenos Aires
(Ciudad de Buenos Aires) and Santa Cruz enjoy a GGP per capita similar to developed
nations. However, La Rioja and Formosa show a GGP per capita 7 times smaller than
that of Santa Cruz. Formosa and La Rioja reach the lowest levels of Human Development
Index (HDI). Furthermore, the preponderance of provincial public sector in GGP for these
two jurisdictions is above 63% (72% in the case of Formosa). Clearly, there are substantial
differences in terms of development and in fiscal structures.
A.2.5 Political Variables
What we describe as “political variables” includes the composition of both provincial
and federal legislatures, and their politic affiliation. Most of the data comes from two
sources, Calvo and Escolar (2005) and Tow (2016). However, some discrepancies were
found. In such situations, provincial legislatures websites were accessed, even in some
cases using “The Wayback Machine”- http://http://web.archive.org/-, an archive of
old websites. Thus, a full data set was recovered for period 1983-2014.
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Table A.4: Summary on Provincial Data


























Buenos Aires 9,903 38% 15,855,846 7% 13% 717 1,327 0.751 3.8
Catamarca 9,213 1% 438,944 6% 36% 531 3,277 0.918 3.3
Chaco 5,254 3% 1,108,584 6% 59% 337 3,118 0.660 3.0
Chubut 15,098 1% 492,415 15% 25% 2,225 3,795 0.644 3.1
Ciudad de Bs. As. 33,569 7% 3,086,692 7% 8% 2,252 2,557 0.771 5.0
Cordoba 8,730 8% 3,515,242 9% 21% 776 1,842 0.778 3.8
Corrientes 4,722 3% 1,081,742 7% 39% 315 1,860 0.626 4.2
Entre R´ıos 9,740 3% 1,333,393 6% 24% 624 2,346 0.734 4.0
Formosa 4,792 1% 587,831 5% 67% 224 3,226 0.598 2.9
Jujuy 5,246 2% 738,024 5% 45% 249 2,386 0.745 2.4
La Pampa 5,478 1% 358,487 21% 63% 1,137 3,446 0.841 3.3
La Rioja 4,220 1% 386,230 5% 73% 198 3,080 0.716 2.4
Mendoza 9,390 4% 1,841,650 9% 21% 889 1,998 0.777 4.5
Misiones 7,430 3% 1,181,712 7% 28% 491 2,099 0.690 2.5
Neuque´n 15,935 1% 604,060 17% 28% 2,712 4,401 0.768 3.0
R´ıo Negro 6,153 1% 617,769 17% 47% 1,036 2,886 0.806 3.6
Salta 4,762 3% 1,358,422 7% 35% 351 1,673 0.681 2.1
San Juan 5,541 2% 757,567 8% 47% 469 2,606 0.660 3.8
San Luis 7,243 1% 499,894 7% 33% 528 2,407 0.714 2.0
Santa Cruz 34,136 1% 252,102 11% 20% 3,709 6,825 0.807 1.9
Santa Fe 11,410 8% 3,373,159 5% 15% 590 1,749 0.762 4.2
Santiago del Estero 4,597 2% 918,920 5% 52% 222 2,387 0.600 1.9
Tierra del Fuego 16,463 0.359% 151,276 17% 40% 2,866 6,631 0.810 3.2
Tucuma´n 5,265 4% 1,587,523 10% 38% 512 1,999 0.758 3.2




Own estimations UNDP** Gervasoni (2009)
*Official exchange rate in 2014. ** United Nations Development Program (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2013)
Notes : This Table displays a summary on compiled provincial data. Population is adjusted using Census variation between 2001 and 2010.
106
A.3 Testing Cox Model Assumptions
In this section, we perform a wide range of tests on the assumptions on which the Cox
model is based. Following procedures recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and colleagues
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001), we determine the
most appropriate specification and then explore the important issue of the proportional
hazards assumption. To make this section more readable, we identify specification by the
numbers in Table A.5.
A.3.1 Model Selection
In what follows, we use a combination of tools to select the most appropriate model.
They include the Wald test for joint significance of certain parameters, the link test for
misspecification, and two subsections on analysis of Cox residuals and multicollinearity.
From the initial model (1) in Table A.5, we gradually incorporate new variables and
test for joint significance of their parameters. As we can observe, the inclusion of political,
economic and fiscal covariates in Model 2 and growth variables in Model 4 is validated by
the Wald test. On the contrary, interactions among FTSA per capita, GGP per capita
and Executive Constraints fail to reject the Null Hypothesis that their parameters are
zero (Model 3). With this guidance, we use the link test to get an overall picture of
general issues with the model. As Cleves et al. (2004) point out, the link test is a powerful
tool for detection of misspecification in this context. Thus, by fitting the squared linear
predictor and testing whether or not its coefficient is significant, the test finds no issues
with Models 1, 2 and 4. Similarly, based on the log-likelihood function with a correction
for the number of variables implemented, we see in Table A.5 that the lowest values for
the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and for the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
are related to the first specification, although model 2 and 4 are close in terms of AIC
values. Consequently, we proceed only with these three models.
A.3.1.1 Residuals and Diagnostic Measures
The functional form of covariates is an important issue. Two widely used tools are
implemented here, the analysis of both Martingale and Cox-Snell residuals (see Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)). In Figure A.1, we explore four relevant variables of the
model: FTSA per capita, GGP per capita, Executive Constraints and Adjusted Malap-
portionment. As we can observe, it is difficult to detect non-linearity for the variables
by visual inspection. Similarly, the Cox-Snell residual allow us to study the goodness of
fit of the model. If Cox regression model fits the data, then the true cumulative hazard
conditional on the covariate vector has an exponential distribution with a hazard rate of
1 (Cleves et al., 2004). In Figure A.2 we can observe these residuals for the three selected
specifications in Table A.5. Overall, Models 1 and 4 show better fit (some variability about
the 45 degrees line is to be expected, especially in the right hand tail, as a consequence of
censored observations).
Using the previous three models (1, 2 and 4) we test for the presence of influential val-
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Table A.5: Model Specification Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FTSA per capita (Logs) 1.173+ 2.898++ 2.983++ 3.050+
(0.610) (1.406) (1.398) (1.649)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.150 3.280+ 3.115++ 3.561++
(0.428) (1.705) (1.363) (1.623)
Executive Constraints -5.267 -9.739++ -9.677++ -11.12+++
(3.203) (3.967) (4.916) (4.304)
Adjusted Malapportionment -1.741+ -1.389 -1.917+
(0.919) (1.056) (1.087)
Party Coincidence with President 0.315 0.397 0.229
(0.429) (0.465) (0.429)
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 0.125 0.119+ 0.142+
(0.0781) (0.0694) (0.0803)
Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs) 0.933 0.996 0.653
(0.618) (0.679) (0.683)
Total revenues per capita -2.636+ -2.776+ -2.446+
(1.472) (1.439) (1.345)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) -1.676
(2.051)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 2.265
(10.59)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 8.214
(9.454)
Growth FTSA pc (t− 1) -7.675
(4.756)
Growth difference GGP vs GDP (t− 1) 9.219++
(4.566)
Growth GGP pc (t− 1) -9.555
(7.307)
Growth discretionary transfers pc (t− 1) 0.498
(0.464)
Growth total revenues pc (t− 1) -0.659
(3.685)
Observations 237 236 236 235
No. of subjects 22 22 22 22
No. of failures 20 20 20 20
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.167 0.186 0.202
Wald test for joint significance (Prob > χ2)* 0.003 0.637 0.048
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) 94.9 96.0 100.2 102.5
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 105.3 123.7 138.3 147.5
Standard errors adjusted by provincial clusters in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table shows a detailed disaggregation of specifications in Table 1.5. We estimate the effect of FTSA
per capita (in logs) on the likelihood of relaxing term limits using the Cox Model. For simplicity, we use provinces
as subjects of failure, but analysis can easily be extended to governors. The new additions to this table are some
tests for model selection such as the Wald test, AIC and BIC. *The Wald test runs on added variables with respect
to the previous specification. In Model 2, the Null Hypothesis (NH) is (βAM = βPCP = βHDI = βDT = βTR = 0),
where AM stands for Adjusted Malapportionment variable, PCP is for Party Coincidence with President, HDI for
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking, DT is for Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs) variable and TR is for Total
revenues per capita. Similarly, in Model 3, the NH is (βFTSAGGP = βFTSAEC = βGGPEC = 0) for the parameters of
interacting variables FTSA FTSA per capita (Logs), GGP GGP per capita (Logs) and EC Executive Constraints.
Finally, Model 4 tests the joint significance of (βg FTSA = βg GGPvsGDP = βg GGP = βg DT = βg TR = 0) for
parameters of variables g FTSA growth FTSA pc (t− 1), g GGPvsGDP growth difference GGP vs GDP (t− 1),
and g GGP growth GGP pc (t− 1), g DT for growth of Discretionary Transfers (t− 1), and g TR for growth of
Total Revenues (t− 1).
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Notes: These Figures plot the Martingale residuals on four relevant variables; FTSA per capita, GGP per
capita, Executive Constraints and Adjusted Malapportionment. We would expect to observe no special distri-
bution of residuals.
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Notes: These Figures display the Cox-Snell residuals. The residuals should follow the 45 degrees line (an
exponential distribution with hazard rate of 1), although some variability is expected at the tails. Models 1
and 4 closely follow this pattern compared to Model 3.
ues and outliers. For that exercise, and following Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), we
start by inspecting disproportionate influence on parameters of covariates (dfbeta Stata
command), and the typical measures of influence; the likelihood displacement values (ld-
isplace Stata command) and LMAX values (Lmax Stata command). By using dfbeta we
find there is no province consistently influencing parameters. Nonetheless, Buenos Aires,
Santa Cruz and Jujuy seems to be poorly predicted jurisdictions. For instance, if I remove
Jujuy from the dataset, the likelihood of Model 4 improves 12% (-33.6 vs -38.2). However,
given the reduced number of provinces, and given that the effects of the covariates and its
significance (FTSA per capita significance drops to 12.6%) is not substantially affected, we
have decided to keep this province in the analysis. It is worth mentioning that in light of
Park and Hendry (2015) recommendations, special attention is given to the proportional
hazard assumption and the effect of the inclusion of Jujuy, Buenos Aires and Santa Cruz.
A.3.1.2 Multicollinearity
One way of approaching the issue of multicollinearity is by studying the correlation matrix
of coefficients in the Cox Model. Using Model 4, the most comprehensive specification,
we find no evidence of high correlation among potentially problematic variables. For fiscal
variables for instance, FTSA per capita (Logs) shows -0.32 correlation with Total revenues
per capita and -0.29 with Discretionary Transfers, while the correlation between the latter
two is -0.51. Political variables are also of concern as normally there is coincidence in the
day of provincial and national elections. However, Executive Constraints and Adjusted
Malapportionment exhibit 0.70 correlation. Lastly, as I mentioned before, HDI Ranking
uses among its score determinants an estimation of GGP per capita, so it is natural to
expect some correlation. However, since the ranking is constant for some years (until
there is a new calculation; every four or six years), and it comes from different sources,
we can rule out some potential problem of multicollinearity. Nonetheless, the correlation
coefficient for GGP per capita and HDI Ranking is about 0.73, one of the higher correlated
values. Multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue in this sample.
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Notes: These Figures present both the log-likelihood displacement and the Lmax-statistics applied to Models
1 and 4 to detect outliers. The provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Cruz and Jujuy seem to be poorly predicted
in models. This analysis is relevant when studying the proportional-hazards assumption.
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A.3.2 Testing the Proportional-hazards Assumption
Finally, one of the most important assumptions when using Cox model is the proportion-
ality of the hazard. Although there is not an unique way of verifying this assumption,
before testing for non-proportionality, good econometric practice recommends checking
for specification errors (and correct them) (Keele, 2010), and for influential observations
(Park and Hendry, 2015). Since we have already done that in the previous subsections, the
next step is to use Schoenfeld residuals test for proportional hazards. A violation of this
assumption will imply coefficient bias and powerless significance tests (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). For Models 1 and 4, the global test
for proportionality finds no evidence of violation of the assumption5. However, for Model
2, some problems are detected. It fails the general test for proportionality and the individ-
ual Harrel’s rho reveals some issues with FTSA per capita, GGP per capita and Adjusted
Malapportionment.
There is not a clear recommendation on how to proceed in this circumstance. One
option is to re-estimate Model 2 including the interaction of the three offending vari-
ables, FTSA per capita (Logs), GGP per capita (Logs), and Adjusted Malapportionment,
with time (log(t)). When running this specification, we find jointly significance of these
variables interacted with time. The point estimates are altered but not their sign or its
significance (results not shown). Another option is to calculate Model 2 but without the
outliers; La Rioja, Buenos Aires and Santa Cruz. For that matter, we run three new
models (see Table A.6), each time omitting one different jurisdiction. Buenos Aires seems
to be the province affecting the most the non-proportionality assumption, since when it is
excluded the problem is partially solved6. Buenos Aires is undoubtedly an special jurisdic-
tion within the sample: It is the most densely populated province (it conglomerates 38%
of total country population), and it concentrates a great proportion of country’s GDP. But
most importantly, the province receives a lower share of Federal Transfers than it would
have been determined based on population or any other indicator.
In terms of our preferred model, it is known that the proportional Schoenfeld residuals
test for proportional hazard is sensible to misspecification or outliers (Keele, 2010; Park
and Hendry, 2015). It seems to be the case here, and we have detected some problems with
Model 2. These problems are partially amended either by excluding Buenos Aires or by
interacting offending variables with time. Importantly though, the qualitative effects and
significance of our variables of interest (FTSA per capita, GGP per capita and Executive
Constraints) are not affected by this corrections. Even more, Model 1 and 4 satisfy
proportional hazard assumption. For that reason, we have decided to work with Models
1 and 4, but keeping in mind potential issues with Model 2.
5Here, following Park and Hendry (2015), I have used rank of analysis time as the time-scaling function.
It is worth mentioning that results are not affected by the time-scale specification chosen.
6General proportional test is passed but fails individually for FTSA per capita and Adjusted Malap-
portionment.
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Table A.6: Controlling for Outliers
(1) (2) (3)
FTSA per capita (Logs) 2.537 3.193++ 3.768+++
(1.708) (1.354) (1.099)
GGP per capita (Logs) 2.791 3.909+++ 3.771++
(1.715) (1.390) (1.870)
Executive Constraints -11.11+++ -10.53++ -9.950++
(4.090) (4.393) (4.482)
Adjusted Malapportionment -2.102++ -0.982 -2.042++
(0.967) (1.454) (0.978)
Party Coincidence with President 0.200 0.510 0.224
(0.477) (0.453) (0.507)
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 0.0848 0.134+ 0.147
(0.0654) (0.0683) (0.0960)
Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs) 1.387++ 0.920 1.090
(0.596) (0.673) (0.680)
Total revenues per capita -2.741+ -2.827+ -2.985+
(1.458) (1.509) (1.671)
Observations 234 226 227
No. of subjects 21 21 21
No. of failures 19 19 19
Omitted outlier Jujuy Santa Cruz Buenos Aires
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.195 0.209
Standard errors adjusted for provincial clusters in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table includes re-estimations of previous specifications but excluding potential out-
liers. We first omit Jujuy, then Santa Cruz and finally Buenos Aires. The effect of FTSA per
capita in the likelihood of reform remains positive and significant (except when we exclude Ju-
juy). It is worth mentioning that some of this loss of significance is expected due to reduced
cross-sectional variation.
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A.4 Time-series Cross-section Data with Binary Dependent
Variable
In this section, we explore different alternatives for studying time-series cross-section data
with binary dependent variable (BTSCS) Discrete time survival analysis can easily be
adapted to fit this purpose7. We can define the probability of an event occurrence as
Pr(yit = 1) = λi, and the probability of non-occurrence as Pr(yit = 0) = 1 − λi, then we
can describe it as a function of covariates as follows:
λit = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + ...+ βkxki (A.2)
We can adapt equation (A.2) to commonly used functions. One of them is the logit
specification, which defines λi in terms of the log-odds ratio of the probability of an event
occurrence to the probability of a non-occurrence.
log(
λi
1− λi ) = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + ...+ βkxki
We are assuming that time baseline hazard is constant (λˆi = h0(t) = exp(β0)). If we
would like to account for duration dependence, we can easily modify the model either by
including time dummies or by transforming the values of the duration time (log trans-
formation or polynomials)8. Following Allison and Christakis (2006), a general logistic
7In fact, it is identical to grouped duration data (Beck et al., 1998). Following Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones (2004), the first thing to notice is that the probability of an event occurring at time ti is,
f(t) = Pr(T = ti)
The survivor function for a discrete random variable T is given by,









= Pr(T = ti|T ≥ ti) (A.1)
Working out the likelihood of the previous function, we get the same standard likelihood as for a binary
dependent variable (in which the data is organised as individual-period data). We can include time-varying
covariates to the hazard rate (A.1) for discrete time by treating the probability of failure as conditional
on survival as well as covariates (Pr(T = ti|T ≥ ti, xit)).
8Actually, following Beck et al. (1998), if we depart from a continuous time Cox proportional hazard
model as
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(βxit)
Given that the baseline hazard for the Cox model is unspecified, we can treat the integral of the baseline
as an unknown constant (αtk =
∫
tk−1
h0(τ)dτ) and (κtk = log(αtk )). Modifying the index time we get
Pr(yit = 1) = 1− exp(−eβxitk+κtk )
That is exactly a binary dependent variable with a Complementary log-log (Cloglog) link (A link function
is a mathematical formulation of the probability of an event for binary response models). From there we
can similarly get the logit link. The main message here is that the distinction between continuous time
process and a purely discrete time analysis is not so clear-cut in practice.
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model can be specified as:
log(
λit
1− λit ) = αi + γt + βxit (A.3)
Where αi captures time-invariant effect, and more often than not non-measurable
characteristics of individuals (provinces in our analysis), γt represents an unspecified de-
pendence on time, and xit are time-varying covariates. Estimating the previous model by
maximum likelihood we can eliminate parameter α′is from the estimating equations. The
likelihood function takes the following form:
L = Πi(
exp(γt + βxit)
Σi exp(γt + βxit)
) (A.4)
A few things are worth mentioning with respect to the previous specification, also
known as “conditional logistic regression”9. First, it only runs on those individuals
(provinces) that experienced variation in the dependent variable. It means that we are
only left with those jurisdictions that reformed the Constitution. In our working sample
we are left with 20 out 22 provinces that reformed. We are inevitably losing precision in
our estimates. Secondly, the term γt could be problematic and the conditional likelihood
will not converge if the model includes any covariate that is function of time10. This is a
major limitation to the fixed effect logit.
If we are willing to make assumptions related to the effect of time, specifically if we
assume no dependence on time at all, γt = 0, then we can consistently obtain estimators
of β without making any assumption on the relation of αi and xit. This is a suitable
property, and we are going to trade that assumption either with some parametrization of
time or with some specification on the distribution of αi (random effect analysis).
9If we had repeated spells per individual, equation (A.4) can be calculated using the stratified partial
likelihood for a Cox proportional hazards model, using software packages that allow for stratification. This
estimator would have suitable properties (see Allison (1996) for instance). However, it is common to came
across data-sets with once-for-all-failure type.
10Given the structure of the data, the events (or failures) always occur at the end. Therefore, any
monotonic function of time will perfectly predict the event (Allison and Christakis, 2006). This problem
is also known as Complete Separation.
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A.5 Conditional Logit (Fixed Effects Logit) and Robustness
Checks
In this section we explore the Conditional Logit as an alternative to the LPM and the Cox
Model. By using the conditional logit specification we can obtain consistent, asymptoti-
cally normal estimators of β without any assumption on the distribution D(αi|xi). It is
important to notice that the FE logit estimator βˆ, also known as Conditional Maximum
likelihood estimator (CMLE), gives us the effect of each element of xt on the log-odds
ratio. We cannot estimate the partial effect on the response probabilities unless we plug
in a value for αi. In Table A.7 we replicate the same specifications as in Table 1.5, this
time only for provinces to simplify presentation. FTSA per capita remains positive and
highly significant across the 6 different specifications.
One interesting comparison can be done contrasting these results with the Cox model.
First of all, the point estimate for FTSA per capita is larger in the FE logit model. This is
a result of the combined effect of dropping two provinces from the sample, and the fact that
we are measuring different odds ratios, in this case provincial specific. Another important
observation is that main variables are not significant in most of the specifications. Within
variation seems to vanish all marginal effect of the covariates selected.
Finally, in Table A.8 we repeat the alternatives discussed in the Cox model section.
We include royalties, shorter periods of time and different failure events. We observe
some slight modifications on results compared to Table 1.6, not in sign but in significance
levels (including royalties does indeed reduce power of FTSA per capita, and there is
no correlation to passing a Law calling for reform). However, the other two alternatives
preserve significance. Even more, this overall reduction in explanation power can be due
to working with a reduced number of units (only those who reformed).
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Table A.7: Conditional Logit Applied to Provinces, Reformed Term Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTSA per capita (Logs) 1.653+++ 2.771+++ 5.070+++ 2.703++ 4.203+++ 5.919++
(0.590) (0.870) (1.740) (1.180) (1.429) (2.362)
GGP per capita (Logs) -0.0946 0.816 -0.899 -0.319 -0.344 -1.847
(2.360) (2.809) (3.786) (2.561) (3.083) (4.407)
Executive Constraints -11.51 -9.671 -10.61 -8.422 -5.146 -7.335
(7.449) (7.546) (7.291) (8.261) (7.367) (7.449)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × GGP per capita (Logs)(*) 2.247 2.665 0.326
(2.557) (2.576) (3.191)
FTSA per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) -18.81 -20.74 -13.32
(12.85) (12.65) (13.22)
GGP per capita (Logs)(*) × Executive Constraints(*) 5.275 7.979 9.507
(15.85) (16.36) (18.20)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Growth Covariates Yes Yes
Nr. of Subjects 20 20 20 20 20 20
Nr. of Failures 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 197 196 192 197 196 192
(*) Mean centred variables.
Standard errors adjusted for 22 clusters in provinces. + p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table displays an alternative binary dependent variable estimation. We use the Conditional Logit, also known as the fixed effects
logit, to assess the impact of FTSA per capita (in logs) on the probability of relaxing term limits. We gradually include Control Covariates
(Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs), Total revenues per capita (Logs), Adjusted Malapportionment, Party coincidence with President, Human
Development Index (HDI) Ranking), and Growth Covariates (Growth FTSA pc (t−1), Growth difference GGP vs GDP (t−1), Growth GGP
pc (t− 1), Growth discretionary transfers pc (t− 1), Growth total revenues pc (t− 1).). The positive impact of FTSA per capita is significant
across the six models.
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Table A.8: Exploring Alternatives, Conditional Logit
Including Royalties Before 1994 Different failure event
(1) (2) (3) (4(*)) (5(**))
FTSA per capita (Logs) 24.89 2.069+ 2.494++ 0.947
(17.16) (1.202) (1.111) (1.245)
FTSA + royalties per capita (Logs) -23.39 0.704
(16.94) (0.865)
GGP per capita (Logs) 2.449 0.271 -0.482 0.0681 0.621
(2.109) (3.011) (4.046) (3.475) (3.727)
Executive Constraints -8.625 -10.73 -1.193 -2.640 -29.57+++
(11.43) (7.269) (13.39) (13.19) (10.74)
Adjusted Malapportionment 0.148 0.0700 -2.216 -2.412 -2.989
(1.235) (1.440) (1.677) (1.648) (2.283)
Party Coincidence with President 1.911 1.285 0.655 0.879 0.732
(1.215) (0.964) (1.137) (0.927) (0.871)
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking -0.176 -0.121 -0.0753 -0.156 -0.0227
(0.158) (0.109) (0.739) (0.197) (0.180)
Discretionary Transfers pc (Logs) -0.0341 -0.0286 0.535 0.560 -0.897++
(0.491) (0.367) (0.539) (0.447) (0.379)
Total revenues per capita 2.617 0.0145 -6.282 -4.600 2.388
(3.864) (2.789) (4.055) (3.312) (3.114)
Nr. of Subjects 20 20 15 20 20
Nr. of Failures 20 20 15 20 20
Observations 196 196 105 146 165
Pseudo R2 0.305 0.111 0.162 0.143 0.311
Standard errors clustered by provinces.
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents replications of the alternatives used in the Cox Model section, but using the Conditional
Logit. They include accounting for Royalties, reducing the period of analysis before 1994, and using two competing
events; constitutional reforms and provincial call for reform. We gradually include Control Covariates (Discretionary
Transfers pc (Logs), Total revenues per capita (Logs), Adjusted Malapportionment, Party coincidence with President,
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking), and Growth Covariates (Growth FTSA pc (t − 1), Growth difference
GGP vs GDP (t − 1), Growth GGP pc (t − 1), Growth discretionary transfers pc (t − 1), Growth total revenues pc
(t − 1).). Although some significance is lost in these specifications, the positive effect is observed across the five




B.1 Collected Data Set
The multiple sources of municipal data are described in this Appendix. As a summary,
we relied primary on municipal authorities when possible, but secondary sources, such as
provincial organisms, were also immensely useful. The data collection process involved a
wide variety of different sources. A detailed account of them can be found in Table B.1.
In some provinces, municipal fiscal data was compiled either by provincial organisms or by
the provincial audit office (Tribunal de Cuentas Provincial). Examples of the latter were
Entre Rios and Mendoza, providing access to comprehensive municipal fiscal datasets. In
Neuquen, local government statistics were collected and published by the Provincial Direc-
tion of Statistics. Similarly, for municipalities in Chubut, the Provincial Council for Fiscal
Responsibility annually publishes municipal budgets. In Buenos Aires, the provincial gov-
ernment produces annual reports on its municipalities. By using supra-municipal sources,
fiscal information on 294 local governments, in 5 provinces, was collected. Unfortunately,
the remaining provinces did not offer open access to data sets.
The other portion of data was individually collected from municipal-specific sources.
A thorough search was performed for the entire set of municipalities bigger than 10.000.
This process was organised in two stages. As a first step, web scraping involved navigating
through official web pages either from municipalities, from local legislative councils, or
from the municipal audit office (if there was any). In general, the degree of transparency
was extremely poor. When possible, executed budget information was recovered. In
the absence of this, more accessible budget data was used12. As a second step, in a
1In some cases, even though we have labelled data as budget info, it consisted of a corrected esti-
mation of the final executed budget, presented at some point of the fiscal year. This is rather normal
as municipalities are required to present quarterly executed budgets, and projections of final budget are
normally included in these reports. This constitutes a closer projection of the data. There is another
important aspect related to the accuracy of this data, and it connected to budget modifications. For legal
purposes, in order to modify municipal budgets, revenues estimations should be achieved within the fiscal
period. Thus, if revenues were projected to increase then it implies that municipal authorities expected to
accomplish this objective in that period.
2In some exceptional cases, only data for budget 2009 was recovered. We decided to dismiss such
data on the grounds of it being biased. This was the first period under which the influx of funds hit
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more direct approach, emails and phone calls were made. In some exceptional cases,
such as local governments in Formosa or Chaco, the effort was more notorious. For
these municipalities, letters were posted. Less cost effective, budgets on particularly non-
transparent municipalities were collected in this way. This effort was done in order to
alleviate concerns on municipal selection. It is important to mention a key web resource,
the “The Wayback Machine”3, a digital library with billions of stored web pages, which
allowed us to recover data from deleted or unused old websites.
Because of the numerous sources used, it comes as no surprise some overlap in the
data. Given the panel structure, in order to avoid unnecessary jumps in the series simply
resulting from changes in sources, we prioritised time continuity within the local govern-
ment. In Mendoza for instance, data on provincial/federal transfers (and royalties) and
OSRs come from two different sources in order to favour time continuity of the data.
Nonetheless, when possible, consistency of the data was achieved by drawing all variables
from the same single data source.
In some cases, preserving time continuity of some variables become at odds with using
single data sources. Behind these overlaps lurks the inconsistent registration of resources
across municipalities, especially notorious when dealing with FFS funds and Royalties.
For instance, FFS funds were registered either as capital revenue or as current revenue
with equal chance. In one jurisdiction Royalties were registered as OSRs. In such cases,
correction was made by dropping values on aggregated variables. Two simple collapsing
restrictions were implemented; first, that the sum of OSRs and Provincial/Federal Trans-
fers should not exceed Total Current Revenues. Secondly, Total Current Revenues should
not be greater than Total Revenues.
Finally, Provincial Gross Geographic Product (GGP) information was borrowed from
Chapter 1 dataset.
municipalities. Given that budgets are prepared in advance, between October and December of the previous
year, the information for 2009 will be specially misleading for that year. By doing this, we dismissed data
for 29 municipalities in 2009. This effect was especially important for Villa Mercedes, San Luis, where pre








Main Source Secondary Sources
Buenos Aires 135
RAFAM - Sistema de Informacio´n Municipal Consolidada (SIMCo -
https://www.simco.rafam.ec.gba.gov.ar/); Subsecretar´ıa de Pol´ıtica y Coordinacio´n




Catamarca 1 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls and emails
Municipal Websites, phone calls, emails
and letters to the provincial audit office
(Tribunal de Cuentas Provincial)
Chaco 2 Phone calls, letters and emails Municipal Websites
Chubut 27
Concejo Provincial Responsabilidad Fiscal- Gobierno de Chubut
(http://www.chubut.gov.ar/portal/wp-organismos/cprf/)
Municipal Websites
Cordoba 19 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Corrientes 3 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Entre Rios 78 Provincial Audit Office (Tribunal de Cuentas Provincial)- Accessed through phone calls Municipal sources, phone calls and emails
Formosa 2 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Jujuy 3 Municipal Websites
Phone calls, emails and formal
applications
La Pampa 3 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls and emails Municipal Websites
La Rioja 1 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Mendoza 18
Ley de Responsabilidad Fiscal - Tribunal de Cuentas Mendoza
(http://app.tribunaldecuentas.mendoza.gov.ar/leyrespfiscal/Home.php);
Presupuesto Provincial - Ministerio de Hacienda Provincia de Mendoza
(http://www.hacienda.mendoza.gov.ar/presupuesto-2/)
Municipal Websites
Misiones 3 Municipal Websites
Phone calls, emails and formal
applications
Neuquen 36
Direccio´n Provincial de Estad´ıstica y Censos, Provincia de Neuquen
(http://www.estadisticaneuquen.gob.ar/index.php?sec=panel_publicaciones_IMB);
Coordinacio´n Provincial de Relaciones Fiscales con Municipios - Subsecretar´ıa de Ingresos
Pu´blicos - Ministerio de Economı´a e Infraestructura de la Provincia del Neuque´n
(https://www.economianqn.gob.ar/municipios/contenido/transferencias)
Municipal Websites
Rio Negro 5 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls, emails and letters Municipal Websites
Salta 15 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
San Juan 3 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
San Luis 49
Municipal sources accessed through phone calls, emails and letters; budget data for smaller
municipalities in Provincial Legislature
Municipal Websites
Santa Cruz 3 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Santa Fe 16 Municipal Websites Phone calls and emails
Santiago del Estero 2 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls, emails and letters Municipal Websites
Tierra del Fuego 2 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls, emails and letters Municipal Websites
Tucuman 1 Municipal sources accessed through phone calls, emails Municipal Websites
Notes: This Table shows a detailed account of the municipal sources used in this dataset. In most cases, more than two sources were used, but it has been grouped in
“Secondary Sources”. Websites last accessed (October 2019).
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Sample Control: Municipal Socio-economic Structure: In this Appendix, we use
data from 2010 National Census of Population, Households, and Housing, to compare
the distribution of three groups of variables between our sample and the entire set of
municipalities. These variables are; Human Capital (considering Unsatisfied Basic Needs4,
and Education), Municipal Services (access to sewerage and water from piped network),
Property Characteristics (overcrowded dwellings and irregular properties). These three
dimensions can potentially affect municipal revenues.
Table B.2 displays selected variables means for both the sample and the entire popu-
lation of municipalities. In Panel A, the working database containing 426 municipalities5
is contrasted with the 2,227 governments for which there is Census data. I run a t-test for
mean differences with unequal group variance. Overall, local governments in our sample
have better human capital, show superior access to basic services and have better property
characteristics. In Panel B, only municipalities greater than 10,000 habitants are consid-
ered. The most notorious effect is that all these mean differences are reduced. Nonetheless,
it is worth mentioning that the panel structure of the database should account for all these
structural differences.
4In Argentina, INDEC considers a household as having UBN if it meets one of the following charac-
teristics:
• Households with more than three persons per room (overcrowding);
• Households that live in housing of unsuitable type;
• Households with no kind of toilet.
• Households with children of school age not attending school (lack of access to basic education);
• Households with four or more persons per employed member and whose household’s head is low
level education (less than second grade of primary education).
5Two municipalities were “created” after 2010: Lezama in Buenos Aires and Plottier in Neuquen.
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Table B.2: Mean Differences for Local Governments in Sample
Total In Sample




Panel A: Total Sample and Population
Dimension a: Human Capital in Local Governments
Percentage with -at least one- UBN 0.128 2,227 0.093 426 0.034+++ 0.003
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension 0.912 2,227 0.925 426 -0.012+++ 0.001
Percentage on higher degree education* 0.093 2,227 0.131 426 -0.038+++ 0.003
Dimension b: Municipal Services
Percentage connected to sewerage system 0.170 2,227 0.473 426 -0.303+++ 0.016
Percentage connected to regulated water piped network 0.692 2,227 0.851 426 -0.158+++ 0.010
Dimension c: Property Characteristics
Percentage living in regular properties** 0.930 2,227 0.958 426 -0.027+++ 0.003
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings*** 0.051 2,227 0.042 426 0.009+++ 0.001
Panel B: Municipalities greater than 10,000 hab.
Dimension a: Human Capital in Local Governments
Percentage with -at least one- UBN 0.108 459 0.080 257 0.028+++ 0.004
Percentage with reading and writing comprehension 0.921 459 0.932 257 0.010+++ 0.001
Percentage on higher degree education* 0.138 459 0.154 257 -0.015+++ 0.004
Dimension b: Municipal Services
Percentage connected to sewerage system 0.437 459 0.551 257 -0.113+++ 0.021
Percentage connected to regulated water piped network 0.834 459 0.840 257 -0.006 0.015
Dimension c: Property Characteristics
Percentage living in regular properties** 0.949 459 0.964 257 -0.014+++ 0.003
Percentage of overcrowded dwellings*** 0.048 459 0.037 257 0.010+++ 0.002
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) National Census of
Population, Households, and Housing 2010, and Collected Data Set.
Notes: This table compares total local governments in Argentina with in sample municipalities in the
collected database. A two-sample t-test with equal variances is run to compare means for both groups
across four dimensions of the data; Human Capital, Municipal Services, Property Characteristics, and Fiscal
Structure.
* Whether the individual is taking or has taken superior education.
** Flats and houses.
*** More than 3 individuals per room.
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B.2 Using a Different Measure of Windfall Intensity
In this Appendix, it is shown that even though different classifications of winners and
losers can be chosen, there is in general coincidence on the provinces that benefit the
most (and not) from current FTSA. For that purpose, in Table B.3 we add two proposals,
one by Porto (2004) and the other by Vega et al. (2016). These alternatives shares try
to comply with the constitutional mandate, and at the same time be feasible given the
political constraints. Departing from actual coefficients, Porto (2004) gradually adjusts
only by population, in a lapse of ten years. The City of Buenos Aires keeps 1.4% but
it is detracted from secondary distribution. In practice this implies a reduction for this
jurisdiction, since in the current regime the City obtains 1.4% of the common pool of
resources6. In the work by Vega et al. (2016), two alternative proposals are studied. On
the one hand, coefficients are estimated accounting for the comprehensive impact of the
federal government, meaning that federal transfers and expenditures are included. On the
other hand, the second proposal includes variables such as Population (65%), Development
Gap (15%), Unsatisfied Basic Needs (10%), and a measure of Fiscal Responsibility (10%).
This last indicator is novel in the sense of encouraging fiscal effort7. This is the proposal
we include in the Table.
Table B.4 groups repeated winners and losers across the three alternatives. They are
highlighted in bold letters. There are many provinces that obtained an advantageous
position thanks to the FFS being distributed using the FTSA. In contrast, Buenos Aires
and Chubut are the only two provinces on where there is coincidence of being the losers of
the actual scheme. Furthermore, in the tails of the distribution, deviated more than 5%
from each alternative, Buenos Aires is the only repeated jurisdiction. Regarding winners,
the clear winners are Formosa, Catamarca, San Juan and Chaco (obtained more than 5%
according to the three specifications). We give an important weight to the political and
institutional voice in selecting the adequate alternative, for that reason, in the main body
of analysis we only use deviations from Law 20,221.
6In December 2015, this 1.4% was increased by the Federal Government to 3.6%. Provinces obtain a
percentage of the 57.7% of that common pool.
7It measures the ratio of current revenues to current expenditures, the proportion of personal expen-
ditures in total expenditure, and provincial fiscal surplus.
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Table B.3: Deviations from the Optimal, Alternative Proposals
Coefficients Deviation
Province Distribution FFS Law 20,221* Porto (2004) Vega et al. (2016) Law 20,221 Porto (2004) Vega et al. (2016)
Buenos Aires 0.212 0.269 0.280 0.268 -21% -24% -21%
Catamarca 0.027 0.019 0.020 0.019 43% 33% 40%
Chaco 0.048 0.040 0.039 0.034 21% 23% 42%
Chubut 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.020 -15% -5% -24%
Co´rdoba 0.086 0.085 0.088 0.064 1% -3% 34%
Corrientes 0.036 0.036 0.031 0.032 -1% 16% 12%
Entre R´ıos 0.047 0.044 0.040 0.033 7% 18% 43%
Formosa 0.035 0.022 0.026 0.025 60% 35% 41%
Jujuy 0.027 0.021 0.025 0.025 30% 10% 10%
La Pampa 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 5% 1% 7%
La Rioja 0.020 0.017 0.021 0.019 20% -5% 5%
Mendoza 0.040 0.045 0.039 0.041 -11% 3% -2%
Misiones 0.032 0.028 0.033 0.033 12% -3% -3%
Neuque´n 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.023 1% 5% -27%
Rio Negro 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.023 10% 16% 6%
Salta 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.036 3% 9% 3%
San Juan 0.033 0.025 0.026 0.024 33% 25% 36%
San Luis 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.021 30% 16% 5%
Santa Cruz 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.018 10% -5% -15%
Santa Fe 0.086 0.087 0.090 0.064 -1% -4% 35%
Santiago del Estero 0.040 0.039 0.035 0.030 3% 14% 33%
Tierra del Fuego 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.016 200% 19% -26%
Tucuma´n 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.037 5% 9% 24%
City of Buenos Aires (CAB.A.) 0.024 0.036 0.014 0.078 -33% 70% -70%
Total Provinces + CAB.A. 1 1 1 1
Note: This Table proposes two additional coefficient distributions. Porto (2004) gradually corrects, in a lapse of ten years, by population. Vega et al. (2016) consider
Population (65%), Development Human Index (15%), Unsatisfied Basic Needs (10%), and a measure of Fiscal Responsibility (10%). Coefficients in Law 20,221 from
1973 were formed in 25% by development gap (Development Human Index), 10% by demographic dispersion, and 65% by population.
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Table B.4: Coincidences
Neutral +/- 0% Neutral +/- 5% Neutral +/- 10% Neutral +/- 15%
Winners Losers Winners Losers Neutral Winners Losers Neutral Winners Losers Neutral
Law 20,221 in 1973 Tierra del Fuego Santa Fe Tierra del Fuego Mendoza La Pampa Tierra del Fuego Mendoza Entre R´ıos Tierra del Fuego Buenos Aires Misiones
Formosa Corrientes Formosa Chubut Santiago del Estero Formosa Chubut Tucuma´n Formosa CAB.A. Santa Cruz
Catamarca Mendoza Catamarca Buenos Aires Salta Catamarca Buenos Aires La Pampa Catamarca Rio Negro
San Juan Chubut San Juan CAB.A. Neuque´n San Juan CAB.A. Santiago del Estero San Juan Entre R´ıos
San Luis Buenos Aires San Luis Co´rdoba San Luis Salta San Luis Tucuma´n
Jujuy CAB.A. Jujuy Santa Fe Jujuy Neuque´n Jujuy La Pampa
Chaco Chaco Corrientes Chaco Co´rdoba Chaco Santiago del Estero
La Rioja La Rioja La Rioja Santa Fe La Rioja Salta
Misiones Misiones Misiones Corrientes Neuque´n
Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Co´rdoba
Rio Negro Rio Negro Rio Negro Santa Fe







Porto (2004) CAB.A. Co´rdoba CAB.A. Buenos Aires Neuque´n CAB.A. Buenos Aires Jujuy CAB.A. Buenos Aires Santiago del Estero
Formosa Misiones Formosa Mendoza Formosa Tucuma´n Formosa Jujuy
Catamarca Santa Fe Catamarca La Pampa Catamarca Salta Catamarca Tucuma´n
San Juan Santa Cruz San Juan Co´rdoba San Juan Neuque´n San Juan Salta
Chaco La Rioja Chaco Misiones Chaco Mendoza Chaco Neuque´n
Tierra del Fuego Chubut Tierra del Fuego Santa Fe Tierra del Fuego La Pampa Tierra del Fuego Mendoza
Entre Rı´os Buenos Aires Entre Rı´os Santa Cruz Entre R´ıos Co´rdoba Entre R´ıos La Pampa
San Luis San Luis La Rioja San Luis Misiones San Luis Co´rdoba
Corrientes Corrientes Chubut Corrientes Santa Fe Corrientes Misiones
Rio Negro Rio Negro Rio Negro Santa Cruz Rio Negro Santa Fe
Santiago del Estero Santiago del Estero Santiago del Estero La Rioja Santa Cruz






Vega et al. (2016) Entre Rı´os Mendoza Entre Rı´os Santa Cruz Salta Entre R´ıos Santa Cruz Jujuy Entre R´ıos Santa Cruz Corrientes
Chaco Misiones Chaco Buenos Aires Mendoza Chaco Buenos Aires La Pampa Chaco Buenos Aires Jujuy
Formosa Santa Cruz Formosa Chubut Misiones Formosa Chubut Rio Negro Formosa Chubut La Pampa
Catamarca Buenos Aires Catamarca Tierra del Fuego Catamarca Tierra del Fuego La Rioja Catamarca Tierra del Fuego Rio Negro
San Juan Chubut San Juan Neuque´n San Juan Neuque´n San Luis San Juan Neuque´n La Rioja
Santa Fe Tierra del Fuego Santa Fe CAB.A. Santa Fe CAB.A. Salta Santa Fe CAB.A. San Luis
Co´rdoba Neuque´n Co´rdoba Co´rdoba Mendoza Co´rdoba Salta
Santiago del Estero CAB.A. Santiago del Estero Santiago del Estero Misiones Santiago del Estero Mendoza
Tucuma´n Tucuma´n Tucuma´n Tucuma´n Misiones
Corrientes Corrientes Corrientes
Jujuy Jujuy
La Pampa La Pampa
Rio Negro Rio Negro
La Rioja La Rioja
San Luis San Luis
Salta
Note: This Table highlights in bold letters provinces on which there is coincidence across the three alternative distributions of federal funds. Each column considers as neutral if the province is not deviated more than 0%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively.
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B.3 Pre-trends Analysis and No Anticipatory Behaviour
In this Appendix, we examine two crucial assumptions for the use of event case diff-in-
diff, the parallel trends assumptions and no anticipatory behaviour. As a consequence
of having a continuous policy variable, Windfall Intensity (Wk), to get clean figures for
parallel trends we have grouped Wk variable by quartiles. Quartile 1 (Q1) contains revenue
data on municipalities in 6 provinces8 that sit in the Top 25% of FFS distribution by Law
design. Similarly, Quartile 4 accounts for the Bottom 25% of FFS distribution9. As can be
seen from Figure B.1, pre-2009 behaviour of revenues followed a similar path for top and
bottom quartiles. After 2009, following the linear fit line, we can see that for Contributions
on Property and Total Revenues a divergence can be noticed. But while Total Revenues
recovered at a faster rate, revenue collection from property has moved at sluggish pace.
A more rigorous and widely used method is the dynamic two-way FE regression (Autor,
2003; Abraham and Sun, 2018). The main goal of this model is to assess the prevalence of
time effects before the introduction of FFS in 2009. The following regression is estimated,
Tikt = α0 +
T+3∑
t=T−3
αt(Wk ∗Dt) + µi + vt + εikt (B.1)
Pre-FFS windfall intensity (Wk) is interacted with the set of time dummies (Dt).
What we are looking here is a differential behaviour of revenues before 2009, captured
by the interaction term of year dummies and Wk. Figure B.2 displays the results for our
four main sources of municipal revenues. We use a seven year window from 2006 to 2012
(T −3 = 2006 and T +3 = 2012)10. Using confidence intervals, the figures show that these
effects are essentially no different from zero.
Overall, these results point to similar behaviour of tax revenues in municipalities before
the FFS application. If we combine this with no anticipatory assumption, we can build
an argument for the differential impact of FFS in municipalities winners of this system.
8These provinces received 29.4% more of what they would have obtained were Law 20,221 still in place.
These provinces are Catamarca, Formosa, Jujuy, San Juan, San Luis, and Tierra del Fuego (see Table 2.5)
9Provinces of Buenos Aires, Chubut, Cordoba, Corrientes, Mendoza and Santa Fe are included in Q4.
10Due to multicollinearity it is common practise to reduce the period under analysis (Abraham and
Sun, 2018)
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Linear Fit
Log Total Revenues per capita
Note: These Figures show pre and post windfall trends. Municipalities located in provinces defined as dis-
proportionate winners and losers are grouped (top and bottom 25% of the distribution), and revenues are
portrayed.
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As discussed above, FFS funding reduced Contributions on Property on municipalities
where the influx of funds was more notorious. In this Appendix, we turn to check how
robust these findings are to a number of alterations. Unless stated otherwise, we de-
part from our baseline estimation, municipalities with population greater than 10,000 and
(semi)balanced panel, and gradually check for different specifications. The most relevant
result of this section is that findings are quite consistent and robust across different models.
Unbalanced Panel for Municipalities with Incomplete Revenues: First, as a
consequence of having an unbalanced panel, data on Contributions on Property is scarcer
than that of OSRs or Total Revenues. We re-run Equation (2.19) but for all available data.
Table B.5 illustrates that the full dataset shows an increase in municipal OSRs revenues
after the windfall. The change is in the region of 2.27% and 2.61% for every extra 10%
increase in windfall intensity. Nonetheless, through a number of falsification tests in the
following subsections, we can disregard this finding as a phenomenon starting before 2009
(see placebo tests section). If the database is restricted only to those municipalities where
data Contributions on Property is available, there is no significant increase in OSRs after
2009, and this result does not depend on the addition of covariates.
Placebo or Falsification Tests 2007 and 2008: Following the same logic, we re-
estimate Equation (2.19) simulating the year that they received treatment to be either
2007 or 2008. We do not expect to find alteration in the coefficients. As observed in Panel
A and B in Table B.6, for Contributions on Property, there is no significant change after
2007, and only at 10% significance level after 2008. It is worth mentioning that latter
result is sensible to the population threshold, and significance is lost when using smaller
municipalities. Based on OSRs results, the significance levels on both panels suggest there
was a positive trend in place before 2009. For falsification tests for years after 2009 placebo
test would be invalid, as the windfall will be already in operation.
Smaller Municipalities: The database contains information for population in munici-
palities ranging from 50 (El Talita - San Luis) to 1,775,816 (La Matanza - Buenos Aires).
One wonders whether the urban size will have an impact on revenue collection. As the
urban sprawl grows, so it does the tax base. At the same time, the complexity of the tax
administration can become cumbersome and influence total revenues per capita. In Panels
C and D in Table B.6, we relax the population threshold including municipalities of more
than 5,000 habitants or the entire sample. While the significance levels drop in Panel D,
main findings are not altered. For the reasons discussed in Section 2.3.4, on theoretical
and empirical grounds, a lower bound of population threshold is preferred.
Control for Municipalities in Provinces that Altered the Provincial Regime
when Received FFS: As we mentioned in Section 2.3.3.1, three provinces altered
their provincial regime to transfer FFS to their municipalities. It can be problematic
as it challenges our exogenous source of variation in funding due to Federal Law 23,548.
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Table B.5: Unrestricted Sample: Impact of 2009 Windfall on Municipal Revenues, 2006 - 2015
Panel A: No Control Covariates











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.227+++ -0.338+++ -0.144 -0.142+++
(0.0821) (0.126) (0.241) (0.0542)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1796 1500 1314 1752
Number of municipal clusters 238 212 194 251
Panel B: Control Covariates











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.261+++ -0.501++ -0.137 -0.0419
(0.0829) (0.237) (0.255) (0.0448)
Log Provincial GGP pc -0.414++ 0.772 0.150 -0.315++
(0.188) (0.771) (0.592) (0.131)
Log Automatic Transfers pc -0.0461 -0.0340 0.140 0.447+++
(0.0703) (0.210) (0.307) (0.0626)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1683 1432 1265 1554
Number of municipal clusters 236 209 191 235
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Note: This Table presents Model (2.19) but using the entire unbalanced panel.
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In order to assess this, Table B.7 compares 4 different model specifications; first excluding
these provinces one at the time, and then in Panel H simultaneously excluding the three of
them. Findings signal that results do indeed improve in significance and retain coefficient
effect.
Including Provincial Fixed Effects: In Panel I in Table B.8 I include Provincial
Fixed Effects. Significance levels are not altered by this modification.
Executed Budget Data: In Section 2.3.2 we discussed that there were two main
sources and types of collected data. Executed budget was used when possible, but some-
times we had to do only with budget data estimations. Budgets are normally presented
in October and run from January to December. We do not have any evidence that these
budget estimations are differentially affecting my controls and treatments. However, given
the unexpected application of the Federal Solidarity Fund in 2009, budget estimations for
that year will be particularly imprecise. Therefore, we got rid of those observations (34).
In this robustness check we control by only using Executed data. As observed in Panel
J, main findings are not affected by this, although there is an important reduction in the
number of observations.
Similar Tax Bases; Property Tax and Turnover Tax: Some municipalities tax
properties and businesses in several ways (see Section 2.3.1). In this check, we estimate
whether results are modified by adding similar sources of revenues. This poses the com-
plexity that the great majority of municipalities do not collect Property Tax, therefore
logs biases the sample (by not including 0). In order to tackle that, I combine both
types of taxes and then apply logs. Similar considerations are done for Turnover Tax,
as municipalities in Chubut are the only local governments that can collect this revenue.
Figure B.3 compares the behaviour of these two alternative sources of municipal revenues.
The direction and significance of results is hardly altered (I am using 95% Confidence
Intervals).
Alternative Windfall Intensity Variable; Per Capita Disparities in 2009: In
this robustness check, we test if results are affected by the definition of Windfall Intensity.
We substitute this source of heterogeneous treatment for per capita influx of funds in 2009
at the provincial level. In Panel K in Table B.8 we can observe that results only change
in quantitative values but not in their significance level.
Treatment and Controls: Top 25% vs Bottom 25%: Finally, and similarly to the
analysis in Section B.3, in this robustness check, we restrict the database to compare
municipalities in provinces at the Top 25% of the distribution of FFS, compared to the
Bottom 25%. Panel L in Table B.8 shows that the effects of reduction in Contributions
on Property are stronger at the tails of the distribution.
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Table B.6: Robustness Checks A
Panel A: Falsification Test 2007











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 2007 0.586+ 0.00761 0.327 0.427+
(0.310) (0.520) (1.090) (0.256)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1447 1432 1265 1339
Number of municipal clusters 207 209 191 206
Panel B: Falsification Test 2008











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 2008 0.0699 -0.542+ 0.0911 -0.0605
(0.156) (0.310) (0.409) (0.0707)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1447 1432 1265 1339
Number of municipal clusters 207 209 191 206
Panel C: Population ≥ 5,000











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0212 -0.253+ -0.0924 -0.117++
(0.0844) (0.145) (0.236) (0.0567)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1691 1392 1578
Number of municipal clusters 236 235 205 235
Panel D: No Population Threshold











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.166+ -0.148 -0.0942 0.0121
(0.0917) (0.131) (0.237) (0.0643)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2264 2047 1424 1905
Number of municipal clusters 298 278 209 293
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Robustness Checks B
Panel E: Excluding Chubut Province











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.101 -0.350+++ -0.136 -0.161+++
(0.0845) (0.125) (0.240) (0.0583)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1481 1295 1334
Number of municipal clusters 203 209 191 202
Panel F: Excluding Neuquen Province











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0872 -0.342+++ -0.194 -0.154+++
(0.0853) (0.127) (0.247) (0.0576)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1503 1486 1300 1382
Number of municipal clusters 205 208 190 204
Panel G: Excluding Salta Province











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0670 -0.352+++ -0.144 -0.154++
(0.0839) (0.124) (0.241) (0.0598)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1494 1478 1303 1372
Number of municipal clusters 201 204 189 200
Panel H: Excluding Simultaneously











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0639 -0.369+++ -0.187 -0.191+++
(0.0829) (0.123) (0.246) (0.0567)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1421 1445 1270 1300
Number of municipal clusters 191 197 182 190
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
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Table B.8: Robustness Checks C
Panel I: Provincial Fixed Effects











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0947 -0.338+++ -0.144 -0.137++
(0.0852) (0.126) (0.241) (0.0600)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1516 1500 1314 1394
Number of municipal clusters 209 212 194 208
Panel J: Only Executed Budget Data











Windfall Intensity (logs) × POST 0.0620 -0.250+ -0.0505 -0.205+++
(0.111) (0.144) (0.370) (0.0719)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1401 1387 1204 1279
Number of municipal clusters 190 192 173 190
Panel K: Alternative Windfall Measure











Per Capita Windfall (logs) × POST 0.0476 -0.143++ -0.0993 -0.0770+++
(0.0325) (0.0585) (0.0922) (0.0269)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1516 1500 1314 1394
Number of municipal clusters 209 212 194 208
Panel L: Treatment Q1 vs Control Q4











Treated (Q1) × POST 0.0368 -0.216+++ 0.261 -0.0393
(0.116) (0.0721) (0.208) (0.0642)
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1222 1207 1202 1216
Number of municipal clusters 164 168 169 163
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
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Note: These Figures compare post-windfall behaviour of four municipal revenues as in Model (2.19). Coincident




C.1 Municipal Charters in Argentina
The dataset of Municipal Charters draws mainly on Atela and Caputo (2018). However,
some discrepancies were found and cleaned. This was the result of accessing the official
documents using three main websites, which have uploaded a great number of MC;
• Website 1: Lideres Municipales1
• Website 2: Gobiernos Locales2
• Website 3: Fiscal de Mesa3
Tables C.1 and C.2 present a detailed account on municipality, year of reform, and the





cartas-organicas-municipales/ (accessed using WebArchive capture from 9 December 2016.)
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Table C.1: Adoption of Municipal Charters
Nr. Province Municipality Year Reform Source Nr. Province Municipality Year Reform Source
1 Catamarca Andalgala 2005 Atela and Caputo (2018) 45 Corrientes Caa Cati 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018)
2 Catamarca Belen 2005 Atela and Caputo (2018) 46 Corrientes Chavarria 2016 Atela and Caputo (2018)
3 Catamarca Fray Mamerto Esquiu 2004 Atela and Caputo (2018) 47 Corrientes Colonia Liebig S 2013 Atela and Caputo (2018)
4 Catamarca Recreo 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 48 Corrientes Colonia Santa Rosa 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
5 Catamarca San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca 1993 Atela and Caputo (2018) 49 Corrientes Concepcion 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
6 Catamarca Santa Maria 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 50 Corrientes Corrientes 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
7 Catamarca Tinogasta 2005 Atela and Caputo (2018) 51 Corrientes Cruz de los Milagros 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
8 Catamarca Valle Viejo 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 52 Corrientes Curuzu Cuatia 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
9 Chaco General San Martin 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018) 53 Corrientes Empedrado 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018)
10 Chaco Resistencia 2000 Atela and Caputo (2018) 54 Corrientes Esquina 1994 Document accesed using website 1
11 Chubut Comodoro Rivadavia 1999 Atela and Caputo (2018) 55 Corrientes Felipe Yofre 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
12 Chubut Esquel 2005 Document accesed using website 1 56 Corrientes Garruchos 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
13 Chubut Puerto Madryn 1994 Document accesed using website 1 57 Corrientes Gobernador Virasoro 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
14 Chubut Rawson 2005 Atela and Caputo (2018) 58 Corrientes Goya 2009 Atela and Caputo (2018)
15 Chubut Trelew 2002 Atela and Caputo (2018) 59 Corrientes Ita Ibate 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
16 Cordoba Almafuerte 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 60 Corrientes Itati 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018)
17 Cordoba Alta Gracia 1999 Atela and Caputo (2018) 61 Corrientes Ituzaingo 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
18 Cordoba Arroyito 1998 Atela and Caputo (2018) 62 Corrientes La Cruz 2007 Atela and Caputo (2018)
19 Cordoba Bell Ville 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018) 63 Corrientes Lavalle 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
20 Cordoba Colonia Caroya 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018) 64 Corrientes Lomas de Vallejos 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
21 Cordoba Cordoba 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 65 Corrientes Mburucuya 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
22 Cordoba Coronel Moldes 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 66 Corrientes Mercedes 1993 Document accesed using website 1 and 2
23 Cordoba Corral de Bustos 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 67 Corrientes Mocoreta 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
24 Cordoba Cruz del Eje 2017 Atela and Caputo (2018) 68 Corrientes Monte Caseros 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
25 Cordoba General Cabrera 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 69 Corrientes Palmar Grande 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
26 Cordoba Hernando 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 70 Corrientes Paso de la Patria 2009 Atela and Caputo (2018)
27 Cordoba La Falda 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 71 Corrientes Paso de los Libres 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
28 Cordoba Laboulaye 1995 Document accesed using website 3 72 Corrientes Pedro R. Fernandez 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
29 Cordoba Las Varillas 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 73 Corrientes Perugorria 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
30 Cordoba Marcos Juarez 2004 Atela and Caputo (2018) 74 Corrientes Ramada Paso 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
31 Cordoba Morteros 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 75 Corrientes Saladas 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
32 Cordoba Rio Ceballos 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 76 Corrientes San Carlos 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
33 Cordoba Rio Cuarto 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 77 Corrientes San Cosme 2009 Atela and Caputo (2018)
34 Cordoba Rio Tercero 2007 Atela and Caputo (2018) 78 Corrientes San Luis del Palmar 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
35 Cordoba Villa Allende 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 79 Corrientes San Roque 2015 Atela and Caputo (2018)
36 Cordoba Villa Carlos Paz 2007 Atela and Caputo (2018) 80 Corrientes San Antonio 2008 Document accesed using website 3
37 Cordoba Villa Dolores 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 81 Corrientes Santa Ana 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
38 Cordoba Villa Maria 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 82 Corrientes Santa Lucia 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
39 Cordoba Villa Nueva 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 83 Corrientes Santo Tome 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
40 Corrientes 9 de Julio 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018) 84 Corrientes Sauce 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
41 Corrientes Alvear 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 85 Corrientes Tabay 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018)
42 Corrientes Bella Vista 1994 Document accesed using website 1 86 Corrientes Villa Olivari 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
43 Corrientes Beron de Astrada 2011 Atela and Caputo (2018) 87 Corrientes Yapeyu 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
44 Corrientes Bonpland 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018) 88 Corrientes Yatayti Calle 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
Note: This Table contains the year the municipality dictated its Municipal Charter, sorted by province. Although the main source of the information is Atela and Caputo (2018),
multiple sources were accessed to cross-check dissimilarities. Website 1 refers to http://lideresmunicipales.cippec.org/category/cartas-organicas/, Website 2 is http://www.
gobiernoslocales.com.ar/cartas-orgnicas-municipales-de-argentina_s-2108.htm, and Website 3 is http://web.archive.org/web/20161209191535/http://www.fiscaldemesa.com.ar/
cartas-organicas-municipales/ (accessed using WebArchive capture from 9 December 2016.)
138
Table C.2: Continuation... Adoption of Municipal Charters
Nr. Province Municipality Year Reform Source Nr. Province Municipality Year Reform Source
89 Jujuy Libertador General San Martin 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 134 Rio Negro Lamarque 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
90 Jujuy Palpala 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 135 Rio Negro Luis Beltran 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018)
91 Jujuy Perico 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 136 Rio Negro Mainque 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018)
92 Jujuy San Pedro de Jujuy 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 137 Rio Negro Maquinchao 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018)
93 Jujuy San Salvador de Jujuy 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 138 Rio Negro Rio Colorado 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018)
94 Misiones Apostoles 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018) 139 Rio Negro San Antonio Oeste 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
95 Misiones Aristobulo del Valle 2013 Atela and Caputo (2018) 140 Rio Negro San Carlos de Bariloche 1986 Atela and Caputo (2018)
96 Misiones El Soberbio 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018) 141 Rio Negro Sierra Grande 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
97 Misiones Eldorado 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018) 142 Rio Negro Valcheta 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018)
98 Misiones Leandro N. Alem 2001 Atela and Caputo (2018) 143 Rio Negro Viedma 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
99 Misiones Montecarlo 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018) 144 Rio Negro Villa Regina 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018)
100 Misiones Obera 2013 Atela and Caputo (2018) 145 Rio Negro Comallo 2002 Atela and Caputo (2018)
101 Misiones Posadas 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 146 Rio Negro Ministro Ramos Mexia 2012 Atela and Caputo (2018)
102 Misiones Puerto Iguazu 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018) 147 Salta Aguaray 2016 Atela and Caputo (2018)
103 Misiones Puerto Rico 2010 Atela and Caputo (2018) 148 Salta Cafayate 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
104 Misiones San Vicente 2013 Atela and Caputo (2018) 149 Salta Cerrillos 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
105 Neuquen Centenario 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 150 Salta Colonia Santa Rosa 2008 Atela and Caputo (2018)
106 Neuquen Chos Malal 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 151 Salta Embarcacion 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
107 Neuquen Cutral Co 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 152 Salta General Guemes 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
108 Neuquen Junin de los Andes 1998 Atela and Caputo (2018) 153 Salta General Mosconi 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
109 Neuquen Neuquen 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 154 Salta Hipolito Yrigoyen 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
110 Neuquen Plaza Huincul 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 155 Salta Joaquin V Gonzalez 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
111 Neuquen Plottier 1995 Atela and Caputo (2018) 156 Salta Metan 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018)
112 Neuquen Rincon de los Sauces 1998 Atela and Caputo (2018) 157 Salta Pichanal 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018)
113 Neuquen San Martin de los Andes 1989 Document accesed using website 1 158 Salta Rosario de la Frontera 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
114 Neuquen San Patricio del Chan˜ar 2004 Atela and Caputo (2018) 159 Salta Rosario de Lerma 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
115 Neuquen Villa la Angostura 2009 Atela and Caputo (2018) 160 Salta Salta 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
116 Neuquen Zapala 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018) 161 Salta San Ramon de la Nueva Oran 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
117 Rio Negro Allen 1989 Atela and Caputo (2018) 162 Salta Tartagal 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018)
118 Rio Negro Campo Grande 1998 Atela and Caputo (2018) 163 San Juan Caucete 2007 Atela and Caputo (2018)
119 Rio Negro Catriel 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018) 164 San Juan Chimbas 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
120 Rio Negro Cervantes 2004 Atela and Caputo (2018) 165 San Juan Pocito 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018)
121 Rio Negro Chichinales 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018) 166 San Juan Rawson 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
122 Rio Negro Chimpay 1994 Atela and Caputo (2018) 167 San Juan Rivadavia 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
123 Rio Negro Choele Choel 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018) 168 San Juan San Juan 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
124 Rio Negro Cinco Saltos 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018) 169 San Juan Santa Lucia 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
125 Rio Negro Cipolletti 1987 Document accesed using website 1 170 San Luis San Luis 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018)
126 Rio Negro Contralmirante Cordero 1996 Atela and Caputo (2018) 171 San Luis Villa Mercedes 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018)
127 Rio Negro Dina Huapi 2013 Atela and Caputo (2018) 172 Santiago del Estero An˜atuya 2007 Atela and Caputo (2018)
128 Rio Negro El Bolson 1991 Document accesed using website 1 173 Santiago del Estero Frias 1998 Atela and Caputo (2018)
129 Rio Negro General Conesa 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018) 174 Santiago del Estero La Banda 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
130 Rio Negro General Fernandez Oro 1997 Atela and Caputo (2018) 175 Santiago del Estero Santiago del Estero 1961 Atela and Caputo (2018)
131 Rio Negro General Roca 1988 Atela and Caputo (2018) 176 Santiago del Estero Termas de Rio Hondo 1992 Atela and Caputo (2018)
132 Rio Negro Ingeniero Huergo 1990 Atela and Caputo (2018) 177 Tierra del Fuego Rio Grande 2006 Atela and Caputo (2018)
133 Rio Negro Ingeniero Jacobacci 1991 Atela and Caputo (2018) 178 Tierra del Fuego Ushuaia 2002 Atela and Caputo (2018)
Note: This table is a continuation of the previous table. It contains the year the municipality dictated its Municipal Charter, sorted by province. Although the main source of the informa-
tion is Atela and Caputo (2018), multiple sources were accessed to cross-check dissimilarities. Website 1 refers to http://lideresmunicipales.cippec.org/category/cartas-organicas/,
Website 2 is http://www.gobiernoslocales.com.ar/cartas-orgnicas-municipales-de-argentina_s-2108.htm, and Website 3 is http://web.archive.org/web/20161209191535/http:
//www.fiscaldemesa.com.ar/cartas-organicas-municipales/ (accessed using WebArchive capture from 9 December 2016.)
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C.2 Proportional Hazard Assumption
The Proportional Hazard Assumption is an important issue when fitting a Cox model.
It refers to the covariates proportionally shifting the hazard and this process being in-
dependent of time. When non-proportional hazards are detected, a recommendation is
to interact these offending variables with some function of time Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones (2004). From the Grambsch and Therneau global proportional test, we obtain that
Segregation Indexes and Municipal Population fail the proportional-hazard assumption.
For that reason, in the following Table C.3, we show that interacting such variables with
time does not affect main conclusions. When these two variables are interacted with time
(Panel B), we find that they are not significant. Furthermore, even though coefficients in
the main specifications are altered in their quantitative impact, significance is preserved.
For that reason, we do not find support in this case for violation of proportional haz-
ard assumption. Thus, in the main body of the chapter we continue to use the baseline
specifications.
Table C.3: Proportional Hazard Assumption, Variables Interacted with Time
Dep. Var.: Survival time to Municipal Charter sanction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Main Estimation
main
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.0417+++ 0.0289++
(0.0105) (0.0118)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.0928+++ 0.0573+
(0.0255) (0.0295)
Full Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Variables interacted with time
Gini Segregation Index (G) 0.000530 0.00109
(0.000688) (0.000785)
Information Theory Segregation Index (H) 0.000691 0.00185
(0.00168) (0.00195)
Full Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of Subjects 401 401 401 401
Nr. of Failures 174 174 174 174
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.159 0.127 0.151
AIC 1729.3 1690.2 1741.3 1695.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, in its Spanish acronym) National Census
of Population, Households, and Housing 2001.
Note: This Table replicates Table 3.4 but including the interaction of offending variables with time.
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